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Abstract 
 
The contemporary approach to education policy borrowing uses the features of 
‘world-class’ education systems (top performers in international surveys of pupil 
achievement) as evidence to inform, legitimate and promote domestic changes. East 
Asia has been frequently cited as ‘inspiration’ for education reforms in many 
countries, including England. However, the extent to which East Asia education 
systems portrayed and interpreted by the UK Government are congruent with the 
policies and practices adopted within East Asia has not been subjected to critical 
scrutiny. Moreover, there has been a tendency to describe East Asia as a 
homogeneous and undifferentiated entity. 
 
Using school autonomy as an illustrative example, this thesis investigates how 
are the education systems in East Asia represented by policy-makers in England 
since 2010 and does it accord with the ‘reality’ as perceived within domestic 
contexts. The English representation is explored by analysing policy papers, official 
statements and their key sources of evidence. The examination of ‘reality’ 
specifically focuses on secondary schools in Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai; 
and draws on a triangulated analysis of policy documents, literature and interview 
data with school leaders, policy-makers, academics and education journalists. 
Moreover, this ‘looking-East’ trend is examined in the discourse of ‘global 
competition’. 
 
The analysis demonstrates that the nature and degree of school autonomy in 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai are both markedly distinctive and reflect the 
‘socio-logic’ prevailing in each of those societies. The representation promoted in 
England is significantly different from the ‘reality’ as perceived within East Asia. 
The highly-selective evidence used by the UK Government represents distorted 
images of East Asian education systems to provide external legitimation for its 
preferred policy agendas. Furthermore, East Asian education systems have been 
social-imaginarily represented by a western-centred policy network; and 
‘East-to-West’ education policy borrowing is discursive and imagined. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
When I first came to England from China in 2010, I was surprised by the then 
Education Secretary Michael Gove’s (2010, December 28) statement: “I’d like us to 
implement a cultural revolution just like the one they’ve had in China”. My surprise 
was twofold: his admiration for the Chinese ‘Cultural Revolution’ and his 
enthusiasm for learning from East Asian education systems. Historically, the flow 
has been in the opposite direction: East Asia has a long record of seeking to imitate 
‘advanced’ models from affluent and industrialised western countries since the 
mid-19
th
 century. For example, as part of the Meiji Restoration, a Japanese 
government delegation toured the US and Europe to study their modern education 
systems (Buruma, 2003). This ‘catching-up’ trend continues to date. For example, 
as Forestier and Crossley (2014) note, the UK has become “a significant source of 
expertise” for the post-1997 Hong Kong reforms. 
The reverse of this trend has emerged not just in England but also in other 
Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the US and Australia. In addition to Finland, East 
Asia has become the new ‘poster boy’ (Sellar & Lingard, 2013a) or ‘reference 
society’ (Schriewer & Martinez, 2004) in the global discourse of education policy 
borrowing (EPB). Catching this ‘looking-East’ fever, an increasing number of 
politicians and experts have made ‘fact-finding’ trips to East Asia, claiming that 
they have discovered the ‘secrets’ of its education success. Although those ‘secrets’ 
are broad, diverse and even sometimes contradictory (Steiner-Khamsi, 2014), East 
Asia has been commonly described by policy-makers in those Anglo-Saxon 
countries as an education ‘utopia’. Conversely, for German policy-makers, it has 
served as a ‘dystopia’ of education. As Waldow, Takayama and Sung (2014) 
observe, ‘Asian education’ has been often associated with “metaphors of damnation 
and torture (‘examination hell’, ‘running the gauntlet’)” in German media and 
provided an example of what German Government does not want (p.7). 
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My initial research curiosity was sparked by this reverse form of EPB and 
different western descriptions of East Asian education systems. I was interested in 
three specific questions: why does East Asia receive such admiration particularly in 
England
1
; how is East Asian education portrayed and interpreted by the UK 
Government; and what are the features of East Asian education systems identified 
as worthy of emulation in England. 
In addition to ‘policy borrowing’, there are a number of other terms describing 
the process by which policies in one place/time are used in, or have impact on, the 
development of policies in another place/time, such as ‘policy transfer’ (Dolowitz 
& Marsh, 2000), ‘social learning’ (Hall, 1993), ‘lesson-drawing’ (Rose, 1991), and 
‘diffusion’ (Stone, 2001) in politics, sociology and social anthropology literature. In 
comparative education, the most widely and habitually used term is ‘policy 
borrowing’ (Perry & Tor, 2008), although it is also one of the most 
controversial (Phillips, 2000). In this thesis, ‘policy referencing’ seems to be more 
appropriate. The reasons for this terminological choice and the critique of ‘policy 
borrowing’ are elaborated in the literature review chapter. It is noteworthy here that 
‘policy borrowing’ is retained for the present to reflect the literature and to 
represent the UK Government’s statements about what they have been doing, while 
‘policy referencing’ is mainly employed for analysing policies and elucidating the 
arguments of this study. 
Historically, the concept ‘policy borrowing’ can be traced back as far as Plato 
(Phillips, 1993). However, only in the early 19
th
 century did it start to be developed, 
and used as a nascent and weak form of evidence-based policy-making (Green, 
2003). Since the inception of comparative education as a discipline, EPB has 
remained a persistent and contentious concern (Beech, 2006), which has helped 
comparative education to substantiate and legitimate its ‘discipline’ status 
(Steiner-Khamsi, 2014). Since then, EPB has been concerned with a series of topics, 
including ‘whether borrowing is possible’, ‘why and under what circumstances 
                                                             
1 The focus of this thesis is specifically on England (rather than the UK), because, within the UK, Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales have gained a certain degree of autonomy in education matters through the process 
of devolution. In other words, there are significant divergences of education policies and practice between 
England and the other three countries. 
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borrowing is made’, ‘what can we borrow from other education systems’, ‘why 
certain features of foreign systems are attractive’, ‘how contextual factors affect the 
process of borrowing’, ‘what are the impacts of policy borrowed from elsewhere’ 
and ‘whether national education systems become similar as a result of borrowing’ 
(Phillips, 2000; Steiner-Khamsi, 2000; Cowen, 2007). 
From Marc-Antoine Jullien to Matthew Arnold, to the later 20
th 
Century 
leaders, many comparativists have attempted to identify and transfer lessons 
underlying the improvement of education in foreign countries across nations (Ochs 
& Phillips, 2002). There seemingly exists a taken-for-granted ‘comparative logic’ 
that, if a policy action, seen as the reason for desired outcomes in country A, is 
absent in country B, then the introduction of this policy is assumed to be 
necessary to improve the education system in country B (Morris, 1998). Cowen 
(2006) argues that ‘what works elsewhere’ has become an indispensable condition 
of thinking well of an education system, driven by ‘the ideology of usefulness’. 
Silova (2012) similarly emphasises that it is the “potential policy utility” of EPB 
that attracts national policy-makers (p. 229). Therefore, as Morris (2012) points out, 
an effective approach to the production of legitimacy for policy-making is 
portraying proposed reform initiatives as salient features of successful education 
systems elsewhere. 
However, the transferability of education reforms, or the feasibility of EPB, 
has been constantly questioned by another group of comparativists (Phillips, 2006). 
As Steiner-Khamsi (2004) recognises, “a large rift yawns between those 
implementing and those studying” EPB (p.1). Sadler’s famous Guildford lecture in 
1900 drew specific attention to “the things outside the schools” and warned that: 
 
“We cannot wander at pleasure among the educational systems of the world, 
like a child strolling through a garden, and pick off a flower from one bush and 
some leaves from another, and then expect that if we stick what we have 
gathered into the soil at home, we shall have a living plant.” (Sadler, quoted in 
Higginson, 1979, p. 49) 
 
Similar criticisms of uncritical and de-contextualised EPB are also made by 
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Holmes (1971) and Cowen (2000). Nevertheless, transplanting policies and 
practices from one context to another, either de jure or de facto, has taken place all 
over the world, so that Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) remind researchers that “when 
we are analysing policy change we always need to ask the question: Is policy 
transfer involved?” (p. 14). 
EPB characterised by the normative (Steiner-Khamsi, 2010), or ‘applied’ 
(Cowen, 2006), tradition of comparative education has been revitalised and 
redefined since the mid-1980s. There has emerged a growing application of 
quantitative measurements, big datasets and performance indicators, mandated by a 
‘global policy network’ composed of entrepreneurial academics, consultancies, 
think tanks and international organisations
2
 (Auld & Morris, 2014), which has 
constituted a ‘global education policy field’ (Sellar & Lingard, 2013a), or, as 
Carney (2012) terms it, ‘educational policyscape’. More specifically, the network of 
‘knowledge brokers’ (Morris, 2015) creates data through organising large-scale 
international surveys of pupil achievement
3
 and provides expert-based 
explanations
4
 (Carvalho, 2012), in which ‘world-class’ models and their ‘best 
practices’ are interpreted and circulated as a standard package of universal policy 
‘prescriptions’, or ‘global panacea’ (Waldow et al., 2014), to cure national 
education ‘disease’. This kind of international comparative evidence is seen as a 
scientific and reliable basis for national policy-making (Martens, 2007). EPB is in 
this sense portrayed as objective, rational and non-ideological (Ozga & Jones, 
2006). 
Rappleye (2007) notes two parallel trends that have particularly shaped the 
context for the emerging form of EPB described above. First is the “growing global 
interconnectedness” (p. 9), which has facilitated the production and popularisation 
of ‘best practices’ and ‘international standards’ and fundamentally changed 
approaches to education governance in national settings (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). 
                                                             
2 For example, consultancies, such as McKinsey & Company and PriceWaterhouseCoopers; think tanks, such 
as Reform and Policy Exchange; and international organisations, such as World Bank and Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
3 For example, Programme for International Student Assessment and Trends in International Mathematics and 
Science Study. 
4 For example, How the world’s best performing school systems came out on top (Barber & Mourshed, 2007) 
and PISA 2009 results: What makes a school successful? – Resources, policies and practices (Volume IV) 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010a). 
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Although the reception and translation of ‘what works elsewhere’ in local contexts 
may be diverse, ‘world-class’ models have nonetheless become hegemonic 
(Alexander, 2010). Second is the “emergence of the ‘Asian century’” (p. 8). East 
Asia has won massive attention from all over the world, due to high rankings of 
many of its countries in international league tables and an assumption associated 
with ‘human capital theory’ that high performance in education has contributed to 
its dramatic and persistent economic growth (Morris, 2015). As Wolf (2003) opines, 
“Europe was the past, the US is the present and a China-dominated Asia the future 
of the global economy”. 
In the case of England, the rhetoric and practice of EPB are not new in 
education reforms. It experienced an ‘epidemic’ in the 19th century (Steiner-Khamsi, 
2002) and a ‘renaissance’ in the 1980s (Finegold, McFarland & Richardson, 1993). 
According to Phillips (2011), at various times, Germany, France and the US 
provided the source of inspiration for English policy-makers, as did Sweden in the 
1960s, Japan during the 1970s and 1980s, and Taiwan in the 1990s. A range of foci 
were involved, such as pedagogy, curriculum, teacher training, and institutional 
methods (Morris, 2012). The 2010 Schools White Paper, The Importance of 
Teaching (Department for Education, DfE, 2010), signalled an apotheosis of the use 
of outward-looking and evidence-based policy-making in England. To be specific, 
acknowledging a continuing ‘fall’ in the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) over the last decade in contrast to constant East Asian and 
Finnish success, the UK Government and its policy consultants have verified the 
necessity and urgency of EPB from high-performing systems, particularly East Asia, 
to solve domestic education problems. 
Driven by my initial research curiosity as mentioned above, four problems 
emerged from my reading. Firstly, the UK Government has provided limited details 
about the features of high-performing East Asian education systems from which 
they have intended to ‘borrow’ policies. Secondly, the assertions about the features 
of East Asian education systems, both in policy documents and their supporting 
sources of evidence, have not been subjected to critical scrutiny and, in fact, often 
16 
seem to conflict with personal experience in East Asia
5
. Thirdly, the extent of 
differentiation among East Asian education systems seems to have been overlooked, 
as, in English official and media discourse, East Asia has been frequently cited as a 
homogeneous ‘reference society’6. Lastly, East Asian education systems are not 
universally attractive; as demonstrated above, they have served as negative 
examples in Germany. The reason why England particular values the glory of East 
Asia is thus worth looking into. 
Given the widespread appeal of ‘world-class’ models as central to the process 
of policy-making in England, in the context of globalisation and ‘Asian century’, 
research is necessary to shed light on EPB from East Asia to England. 
 
1.2. Research questions 
 
In examining East Asia as a source of EPB in England, an overarching 
research question accordingly arises: how are the education systems in East Asia 
represented by policy-makers in England since 2010 and does it accord with the 
‘reality’ as perceived within East Asia. School autonomy is particularly chosen as 
an illustrative example, because it has featured prominently in England’s education 
reforms invoking evidence from East Asia. Thus, addressing this overarching 
research question involves answering three sub-questions: 
 
1. What is the representation of school autonomy in East Asia by policy-makers in 
England
7
 since 2010? 
This research question starts from 2010 when the Coalition Government took 
office. Since then, East Asia has been unprecedentedly highlighted as the key 
reference for proposed reforms and has subsequently led to de facto policy changes. 
Answers to this question can be derived from three sources: 
                                                             
5
 For example, in China, a career in teaching is far from a prioritised choice for the majority of talented school 
leavers, which is contrary to the UK Government’s portrayal that teachers in East Asia are from the best cohort 
of graduates. 
6 For example, in contrast to the case of China, in Korea, only primary schooling teaching is attractive to high 
performers (Morris, 2012). 
7 In addition to England, other national representations of East Asia discussed in this thesis, including Germany, 
the US and Australia, are the views primarily derived from their official policy papers and policy-makers’ 
statements. 
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(1) school autonomy in East Asia represented in English policy 
documents and policy-makers’ official statements; 
(2) school autonomy in East Asia portrayed in key supporting sources of 
evidence on which the English representation has been based; and 
(3) policy initiatives, aiming to increase school autonomy, consequently 
proposed and implemented in England by referencing East Asia. 
Particular attention is also given to what and whose evidence has been selected 
or ignored by English policy-makers; and how has the selected evidence been 
combined and reproduced to construct the UK Government’s preferred images of 
school autonomy in East Asia. 
To better understand these, two brief reviews are additionally provided. The 
first is concerned with EPB in England from 1985, when overseas exemplars were 
increasingly ‘borrowed’ in its education debates, to 2010, when the ‘New’ Labour 
era ended. This sets the historical backdrop for examining the current EPB in 
England. The second focuses on the development of school autonomy in England 
between 2000 and 2010, because, as a significant move, Academies were 
introduced in 2000. This provides the context of school autonomy reforms in 
England since 2010 and facilitates the analysis of the impact of East Asian 
references on existing policies. By doing so, the connotations and application of the 
concept ‘school autonomy’ in English setting are also illuminated. 
Subsequently, moving beyond school autonomy and England, the images of 
East Asian education in different western countries are explored, which is better 
understood through comparing with the western descriptions of Finland – another 
global education model popularised by PISA. This attempt locates the present study 
in a broader ‘East/West’ frame and renders a more in-depth analysis of EPB from 
‘East’ to ‘West’8. 
 
 
 
                                                             
8 The terms ‘East’ and ‘West’ are used with single quotation marks in this thesis to indicate that the categories 
of ‘East’ and ‘West’ are problematic. This study criticises this problem specifically through scrutinising the 
representation of ‘East’ as an identical referencing unit. 
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2. What is the ‘reality’ of school autonomy as perceived within three East Asian 
societies (i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai)? 
This research question mirrors the first research question in that it examines 
school autonomy in East Asia from the perspective of insiders. Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Shanghai are chosen as cases because they: (1) have consistently 
ranked highly in various international league tables, particularly, PISA; (2) have 
been amongst the most frequently cited models of ‘what works’ in England9 
(Morris, 2012); and (3) are the places where I have personal contact to approach 
potential interviewees and there are no language barriers to collect and analyse data. 
Moreover, this study concentrates on public-funded secondary schools, as: (1) PISA, 
the start point of this study and the most influential international survey, is taken by 
15-year-old pupils; and (2) public-funded schools cater for the vast majority of 
pupils at this age stage in these three societies. This research question is approached 
through four steps: 
(1) introducing the historical background of economy, socio-politics and 
culture in which the education system has been rooted; 
(2) reviewing the historical development of school autonomy; 
(3) examining the current situation of school autonomy; and 
(4) identifying and enunciating the features of school autonomy. 
In particular, the current situations of school autonomy in three East Asian 
societies are summarised and presented as three models. These models are 
developed by applying a new conceptual framework created on the basis of 
literature review and drawing on considerable data from three sources: policy 
documents and official statements, literature and interviews with school leaders, 
academics, policy-makers and education journalists. 
 
3. Is the ‘reality’ of school autonomy in East Asia congruent with its English 
representation and how can this be explained? 
In answering this research question, the English representation and the ‘reality’ 
                                                             
9 For example, there are 49 DfE announcements referencing Hong Kong, 83 referencing Singapore and 52 
referencing Shanghai since 2010, while the frequencies of reference to Finland and Sweden are respectively 46 
and 21 (https://www.gov.uk/government/announcements, accessed on 24th September 2015). 
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of school autonomy in East Asia investigated in the first two research questions are 
juxtaposed. Comparison is also made amongst the three East Asian models of 
school autonomy to explore the accuracy and appropriateness of referencing East 
Asia as a homogeneous and undifferentiated entity. By taking EPB from East Asia 
in England as an example, this study then allows an in-depth analysis of the 
rationale, nature, process and implication of reference to external or international 
sources of evidence in domestic reforms. Additionally, through examining the 
emerging flow of ‘East-to-West’ EPB from postcolonial perspectives, a better 
understanding is developed with regard to the socially-imaginary constitution of 
East Asia as a ‘reference society’ in the global education policy field and the 
production of hegemonic knowledge about East Asia as a model of ‘world-class’ 
education system by the global policy network. 
 
1.3. Boundaries and limitations 
 
The purposes and concerns of this study are elaborated above. They are further 
clarified in this section by setting the boundaries; that is, what is not done in this 
thesis. Although the present study starts from England’s enthusiasm about ‘learning 
from East’, there is no intent to make a judgement on which education system is 
better. Additionally, school autonomy is regarded as a key reason for East Asia’s 
high performance in the discourse of EPB in England, whether it is indeed 
attributable to East Asia’s success in international league tables or in general is not 
the focus here. More importantly, rather than comprehensively comparing school 
autonomy in England and East Asia, this study concentrates on the similarities and 
differences between England’s policy initiatives legitimated by the English 
representation of East Asia and the de facto policies and practices adopted within 
East Asia. It is on this basis that I argue which education system enjoys higher 
levels of school autonomy. 
There are four limitations of this study. First, this study testifies whether the 
UK Government’s representation accords with the ‘reality’ of East Asia. It is 
inevitably confronted by a methodological challenge – to what extent that the 
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‘reality’ constructed in this study is valid. In this study, the data is derived from 
three sources (perspectives) – policy documents and statements (government), 
literature (academics) and interviews (practitioners) – to triangulate the analysis. 
Although qualitative inquiry is not based on ‘hard’ evidence as that used in natural 
science research, its contextual nature can provide richer descriptions and entail 
deeper understandings (Sechrest & Sidani, 1995), which enables researchers to better 
represent a ‘shifting, changing and dynamic’ world (Filstead, 1979). This is 
explained in detail in the methodology chapter. 
The second limitation of this study is the number of interviewees, particularly, 
school leaders. In addition to 11 academics, policy-makers and senior education 
journalists, only 18 school leaders were interviewed due to research restrictions and 
political sensitivity. Details about interviewees, the selection criteria and 
accessibility issues I encountered during data collection are provided in the 
methodology chapter. The limited number has eroded the reliability of the ‘reality’ 
at the school level to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the lack of day-to-day school 
operation experience and information is partly compensated by including 
academics who have worked closely with school leaders and in school environment, 
and partly by referencing previous relevant studies. 
The paucity of the voice from policy-makers in England is the third limitation. 
This is primarily due to the issues of access, which weakens the examination of the 
English representation to some degree. Notwithstanding, the present study is based 
on policy and official announcement texts as well as interviews of politicians as 
reported in the mass media. Through these, English policy-makers make public 
their interest in East Asia and school autonomy and their link to consequent 
education reforms. By analysing this documentary data, their perceptions and 
intentions are taken into account. 
Lastly, this study involves four education systems, crossing East and West. 
The broad geographic scope is one of the fascinating aspects of this comparative 
study, but also generates difficulties to deal with. As a Chinese, I lived in Mainland 
China for 26 years before I came to England to do my second masters degree and 
subsequently PhD. So far I have been living in London for five years. The living 
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and studying experience have given me some, but maybe still insufficient, 
background knowledge of these two societies. In order to collect data, I have been 
to Hong Kong three times and stayed there for three months altogether; and to 
Singapore for nearly two months. Limited time has weakened the breadth and depth 
of the understanding of these two societies, although the time was not short for a 
doctoral level study. Hong Kong and Singapore are part of the Great China region, 
heavily influenced by Confucianism especially in terms of education development 
and school management. The language and cultural heritage shared between these 
societies and Mainland China largely helped me to overcome the shortage of field 
work time. 
 
1.4. Significance and contributions 
 
The significance and contributions of this study are fivefold. Firstly, in 
comparative education, research with regard to EPB has focused on the process of 
borrowing (e.g. Phillips & Ochs, 2003), the political and economic reasons for 
borrowing (e.g. Halpin & Troyna, 1995; Steiner-Khamsi, 2000), the agencies, 
international networks and regimes that instigate borrowing (e.g. Sellar & Lingard, 
2013b; Jakobi, 2012), and the local adaptation of borrowed systems, agendas and 
institutions (e.g. Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006; Akiba & Shimizu, 2012). In 
recent years, two themes have commonly appeared in this academic field. One is 
that, in the context of globalisation, benchmarking against ‘world-class’ models 
results in standardisation and convergence of national education systems. The other 
is that EPB functions as a tool to provide political legitimacy for contentious 
domestic reforms (Waldow, 2012). 
This study involves both themes. Through examining the congruence between 
education reforms in England and their external references, it considers whether 
EPB in England has led to a shared standard of education systems with East Asia, 
or further, whether education systems in these two regions converge towards 
international standards under the impact of globalisation. In addition, Phillips (2000) 
notes that EPB can result from scientific/academic investigation, the superiority of 
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popular conceptions, politically motivated endeavours and distortion of evidence to 
highlight perceived deficiencies at home. This study examines the nature, 
sophistication and reliability of referencing external sources of legitimacy, which 
demonstrates how these four types of forces have affected England’s education 
reforms through reconstituting the images of East Asia. It is in these respects that 
this thesis makes an empirical contribution to, and facilitates the disciplinary 
development of, comparative education. 
Secondly, evidence-based policy-making is adopted by English policy-makers 
under the mantra of ‘what matters is what works’ since the late 1990s. As 
mentioned above, although East Asia has discursively become a vital ‘reference 
society’ for England, little detailed evidence has been provided by the UK 
Government and the use of evidence from East Asia in policy-making has seldom 
been scrutinised. This study concentrates on how this evidence has been selected 
and has functioned in the national setting of England. By doing so, it has the 
potential to challenge a widely employed but rarely elaborated assumption in EPB – 
evidence is faithfully and consistently considered (Morris, 2015). In this sense, the 
present study contributes to profoundly understand the nature and politics of the 
evidence-based approach to public policy generally and education policy 
specifically. 
The third contribution of this study is to explore the English (western) 
representation of the education systems in Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai 
(East) through the lenses of postcolonialism. As Willis and Rappleye (2011) 
recognise, “political manipulation of images overlaid an earlier Orientalising, an 
‘Othering’ which, we hardly need remind ourselves, is still taking place, producing 
a body of scholarship that has had an important impact yet equally significant 
distortions” (p. 18). This study specifically examines whether education policy is 
genuinely ‘borrowed’ from ‘East’ to ‘West’; whether this reverse form of EPB 
designates an accordingly changed power/knowledge relationship between ‘East’ 
and ‘West’; and whether the constitution of East Asia as a ‘world-class’ ‘reference 
society’ results in hegemonic distortions. No studies, to my knowledge, have 
scrutinised EPB from this theoretical perspective. This discussion would open the 
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possibilities for contemplating how postcolonial theoretical resources might be 
further developed to inform research on EPB in the context of globalisation and 
‘Asian century’. 
Fourthly, many previous studies have paid attention to the case of borrowing 
from a single nation (e.g. Phillips, 2011); focused on the inter-attraction between 
two nations (e.g. Whitty, 2012); and probed the impact from one starring nation to 
various others (Rappleye, 2007). This study moves away from bilateral frames of 
reference and beyond comparing between national contexts. Rather, it investigates 
how a country references to a specific area within which three societies share 
similarities but are also distinguished from one another in the economic, 
socio-political and cultural sense. Moreover, it compares the domestic and external 
perceptions and understandings of education systems in this specific area. This will 
make a methodological contribution to the study of EPB. 
Lastly, school autonomy fits with the broader zeitgeist of applying 
neo-liberalism and the ‘New Public Management’ to the education sector since the 
1980s around the globe. As Glatter (2012) points out: 
 
“…‘autonomy’ has a significantly different connotation in a system in which 
schools have traditionally had little discretion than in one where they have been 
used to considerable freedoms. There is a need for comparative research on 
understandings of autonomy and accountability in different national contexts 
and their determinants.” (p. 570) 
 
This study examines the historical and recent development of school autonomy 
in four different socio-political contexts. Furthermore, drawing on the literature 
review, it creates a conceptual framework for analysing the nature and degree of 
school autonomy. By employing this framework, models and features of school 
autonomy in different East Asian societies are developed, identified and compared. 
Therefore, this study not only empirically and conceptually contributes to the 
academic understanding of school autonomy, but also has the potential to provide 
rich descriptions of school autonomy for those in government and civil society 
studying foreign systems and involved in making and critiquing policy. 
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1.5. Organisation of chapters 
 
In order to achieve research aims and explore arguments, this thesis is divided 
into eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two reviews 
literature with regard to EPB and school autonomy and develops a new conceptual 
framework for analysing the nature and degree of school autonomy. This lays a 
theoretical and conceptual foundation and offers an analytical tool used throughout 
the rest of the thesis to examine empirical data. Chapter Three illustrates the 
rationale and process of research design and the methods for collecting and 
analysing data, and discuss the extent to which empirical data from various sources 
guarantees the reliability and validity of this study. 
The English representation of school autonomy in East Asia is interrogated 
and analysed in Chapter Four, which answers the first research question. From 
Chapter Five to Chapter Seven, the second research question is considered in these 
three mirrored chapters by investigating the historical and recent development, 
developing models and identifying features of school autonomy in Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Shanghai respectively. Chapter Eight compares the English 
representation and the ‘reality’ of school autonomy in East Asia, and the 
similarities and differences regarding school autonomy amongst East Asia, to settle 
the third research question. Drawing on the literature review and these comparisons, 
it also discusses the process, rationale, nature and implications of EPB influenced 
by globalisation. 
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Chapter 2. Literature review: education policy borrowing and 
school autonomy 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In the introductory chapter, I have identified three research questions: how is 
school autonomy in East Asia represented by English policy-makers; how is school 
autonomy actually practiced and perceived within East Asia; and does the 
representation accord with the ‘reality’ and how to understand this. By answering 
them, the rationale, process, nature and implication of EPB from East Asia in 
England is concretely examined. EPB and school autonomy are thus the two key 
themes concerned in this study. This chapter reviews the previous academic efforts 
to construct theoretical foundations, develop conceptual frameworks and propose 
explanatory perspectives pertaining to these two themes. It provides in-depth 
insights into defining core concepts, regarding the English representation as 
‘evidence’ constructed and used socio-politically, investigating school autonomy in 
East Asia and explaining the gap/congruence between the representation and 
‘reality’. 
More specifically, the review of EPB contains six sections. Following this 
introductory section, section 2.2 clarifies the crucial concepts ‘policy borrowing’ 
and ‘policy referencing’ by comparing them with other associated concepts. Section 
2.3 examines four conceptual frameworks and models which illustrate how to 
interrogate EPB as a process and what are the elements and factors should be taken 
into consideration. Section 2.4 is particularly concerned with the understanding of 
‘evidence’ and sees EPB as a specific form of evidence-based policy-making. In 
section 2.5, the political motives and selective nature of reference to external 
exemplars are discussed. Section 2.6 investigates whether or not EPB in the context 
of globalisation results in the convergence/standardisation of national education 
systems. Understanding EPB from postcolonial perspectives in section 2.7 
facilitates a further examination of the ‘East-to-West’ EPB specifically emerged in 
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this study. 
The review of the literature on school autonomy is laid out in three sections. In 
section 2.8, the meaning of ‘school autonomy’ is clarified and its relationship with 
other associated concepts is discussed. Section 2.9 examines the rationales and 
motives of school autonomy reforms from administrative, political and 
philosophical perspectives. A new framework for this study is developed in section 
2.10, drawing on four previous frameworks. A conclusion to this chapter is 
provided in the last section. 
 
2.2. Clarification of concepts: policy borrowing and policy referencing 
 
The ever-growing focus on the cross-national movement of policy has led to a 
proliferation of terms in inter- or multi- disciplinary fields (Stone, 1999; 
Steiner-Khamsi, 2012). For example, terms such as ‘copying’, ‘emulating’ and 
‘adopting’ would be accurate in describing policy from one context being 
implemented in another (Phillips, 2000). The use of ‘adaption’, ‘appropriation’, 
‘recontextualisation’ and ‘reproduction’ emphasises that local contextual factors 
determine the actual enactment of foreign policy (e.g. Finegold et al., 1993). The 
term ‘diffusion’, similar to ‘spreading’, ‘dispersal’ and ‘dissemination’, connotes 
that policy changes in different settings derive from “a common source or point of 
origin” (Stone, 2001). ‘Convergence’, as a result of ‘harmonisation’, 
‘standardisation’ or ‘de-territorialisation’, refers to a pattern where similar 
developments take place in various nations (Bennett, 1991). 
Thus, it has become customary for literature reviews to begin with a 
conceptual and terminological discussion. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, 
‘policy borrowing’ and ‘policy referencing’ are employed in this study respectively 
for the purposes of literature review and data analysis. The focus of this section is 
to clarify the meaning of ‘policy borrowing’ by comparing it with ‘policy transfer’ 
and ‘policy learning’, as these three terms are the most frequently used in the 
literature. An attempt is then made to distinguish between ‘policy referencing’ and 
‘policy borrowing’. By so doing, this section illustrates why ‘policy borrowing’ is 
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critiqued for being linguistically inappropriate, while ‘policy referencing’ is seen as 
more appropriate for this study. 
 
Policy transfer 
 
‘Policy transfer’ is the most generic and widespread term adopted in political 
science (Evans & Davies, 1999), serving as an ‘overarching label’, and 
subsequently accepted by comparative education (Perry & Tor, 2008). According to 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), it covers two forms: the ‘voluntary’ transfer “occurs as 
a result of the free choices of policy actors”, while the ‘coercive’ transfer involves 
one “pushing”, or even “forcing”, another to adopt a concrete policy (p. 344). 
Phillips and Ochs (2004) argue that “imposed policy is not borrowed policy” (p. 
775). ‘Policy borrowing’ conveys a sense of unidirectional transfer being voluntary 
and depending on local actors.  
Nevertheless, it is not easy to identify whether or not a policy choice is 
permeated by extrinsic factors. In many cases, the movement of policies is 
indirectly fuelled by ‘financial inducement’ (Ikenberry, 1990), recommendations 
from powerful consultants (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996), pressure from a perceived 
shortfall in standards (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004), or even just a desire to ‘jump on a 
band-wagon’ and avoid becoming the minority in a global trend (Bennett, 1991). In 
recent years, the emergent global policy network advocating similar policies across 
diverse nations has further blurred the boundary between voluntary and indirect 
coercive transfer. 
 
Policy learning 
 
Hall (1993) argues that ‘policy learning’, (or ‘social learning’), designates the 
process of the deliberate cognition, redefinition and adjustment of policy goals and 
techniques in respond to past experience and new information. In other words, 
‘policy learning’ brings about policy changes inspired by the ‘knowledge’ obtained 
across time and space. Similar to ‘learning’, ‘borrowing’ also leads to reforms. 
28 
However, as Raffe (2005) distinguishes, ‘learning’ indicates that system and 
context in one country is well studied and understood by another, rather than simply 
‘borrowed’ as a repertoire. From this perspective, Steiner-Khamsi (2012) notes that 
the use of ‘policy learning’ might create “an excessively positive association” with 
the purposes, processes and outcomes of the movement of policies, whereas 
‘borrowing’ can “avoid some of the interpretive pitfalls” entailed by ‘learning’ (p. 
8). 
 
Policy borrowing 
 
A definition of ‘policy borrowing’ is provided by Bennett (1997): 
“policy-makers are aware of policies elsewhere, that they utilise that information 
within domestic policy debates and conflicts, and that this utilisation can help 
explain policy adoption” (p. 213). In this sense, ‘borrowing’ is conscious, active 
and intentional (Garratt & Forrester, 2012). As Phillips (2000) notes, it has 
“become fixed in the literature of comparative education and is the term which is 
habitually employed” (p. 299). A recent example is that ‘policy borrowing’ was 
chosen as the title of the 2012 World Yearbook of Education – Policy Borrowing 
and Lending in Education. One of the editors, Steiner-Khamsi (2012) provides 
three reasons for this deliberate terminological choice, namely, its dominant use in 
comparative education research, neutral nature and foci on agencies and receivers. 
Notwithstanding broad employment, the term ‘policy borrowing’ has always 
been controversial. Phillips (2000) argues that ‘borrowing’ literally suggests 
temporariness – temporary solutions to education crises. Additionally, as Morris 
(2013) points out, it denotes “ownership and repayment/return” (p. 262). More 
criticisms are concerned with its political nature. Halpin and Troyna (1995) argue 
that ‘borrowing’ can be highly selective, and not dependent on something being 
‘good’ but rather serving political functions. Many academics also note that 
sometimes ‘borrowing’ occurs symbolically (e.g. Steiner-Khamsi, 2004; Takayama, 
2010) or silently (e.g. Waldow, 2009) with specific political considerations or in a 
particular political culture. 
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Policy referencing 
 
The term ‘referencing’ originates from Luhmann’s (1981, 1995) theories of 
‘self-referential systems’, which has been further developed as the main approach 
in comparative education to understanding referencing external sources of authority 
for contested domestic reforms (Schriewer, 1990; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004). I shall 
explain this in more detail later. ‘Policy referencing’ has not been used as 
commonly as ‘policy borrowing’ in academic circles. Notwithstanding, a growing 
number of academics (e.g. Sellar & Lingard, 2013a; Waldow et al., 2014) 
acknowledge the implication of ‘reference societies’ (Schriewer & Martinez, 2004). 
The reference to Luhmann’s theories and other associated frameworks in this thesis 
leads to the terminological choice of ‘policy referencing’. 
There are another two reasons why this term is considered to be more proper 
for this study. ‘Referencing’ literally means consulting sources of information in 
order to inform or make a decision. In contrast to ‘policy borrowing’, it is more a 
discursive act of providing evidence to produce legitimacy for policy-making; but 
intrinsically avoids inferring that subsequent policy actions are necessarily in 
conformity with external references. It is similar to ‘symbolic policy borrowing’ in 
this respect. Moreover, it draws attention to ‘reference societies’ and the 
approaches to referencing, which are highly relevant to the focus of this study – 
how East Asia, an emerging ‘reference society’, has been discursively represented 
in English education debates. 
 
In this section, I have dealt with terminological issues. I will now move to the 
examination of conceptual frameworks for analysing the process of EPB. 
 
2.3. Examining education policy borrowing as a process 
 
A number of studies have attempted to elucidate the process of EPB and 
examine the elements and factors involved. Over the past decades, heuristic 
frameworks and models have been developed by Dolowitz and Marsh, Phillips and 
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Ochs, and Rappleye. This section aims to represent these devices and describe the 
way that they inform this study. 
 
Dolowitz and Marsh’s framework 
 
The framework created by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), although rooted in 
political science, can be applied to education transfer. As shown in Figure 2.1, it 
concentrates on eight aspects regarding the process of transfer. A list of answers is 
provided drawing on their literature review. This ‘encyclopaedic introduction’ of 
policy transfer was significant as few studies at that time had examined this directly. 
It is of specific interest in this study because it presents the key aspects that should 
be taken into account in studying EPB, including the stimuli for and degrees of 
transfer, the foci of interest, the actors involved and the sources demonstrating 
transfer. Nonetheless, they admit that although this framework is able to display a 
“way of organising research”, it has limited “explanatory power” (p. 8). In other 
words, it cannot illuminate how the identified elements interact in ways which 
initiate transfer and eventually lead to policy changes. Besides, it seems to merely 
cast light on substantive policy transfer. 
 
Phillips and Ochs’ models 
 
Principally using the example of British attraction to German education over a 
long historical period, Phillips and Ochs have identified and enunciated four 
sequential stages of EPB and a number of ‘filters’ influencing EPB.  
In the Composite Processes of Policy Borrowing in Education model (Phillips 
& Ochs, 2003), as shown in Figure 2.2, after ‘cross-national attraction’, EPB then 
goes through ‘decision-making’ and ‘implementation’, and reaches ‘internalisation/ 
indigenisation’. The first stage can be broken down into: (1) impulses – stimulus or 
catalyst which spark interest; and (2) externalising potential – the elements of 
foreign systems that are theoretically ‘borrowable’. At the second stage, Phillips 
and Ochs propose four types of decisions: (1) theoretical: based on  
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Figure 2.1. A policy transfer framework (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000)
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theories; (2) realistic/ practical: drawing on proved success; (3) quick fix: meeting 
immediate political necessity; and (4) phoney: rhetorically seeking political effect. 
 
Figure 2.2. Policy borrowing in education: composite processes (Phillips & Ochs, 
2003) 
 
As shown in Figure 2.3, Ochs and Phillips (2004) postulate a set of ‘filters’ to 
demonstrate how a policy is transformed into another in the process of EPB, after 
being interpreted by actors and organisations from their perspectives, transmitted 
by agencies, media and publications according to their agendas, selectively 
accepted by individuals and institution and implemented by practitioners in specific 
contexts.  
 Figure 2.3. Filters in the borrowing process (Ochs & Phillips, 2004) 
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Similar to Dolowitz and Marsh’s framework, Phillips and Ochs’ models are 
mainly used to facilitate a broad understanding of substantive EPB between nations. 
For example, Ochs and Phillips (2002) identify eight cases of ‘borrowing’ from 
Germany to supply England’s ‘deficiencies’ from the 1800s to 1980s, such as the 
establishment of local education authority system in 1902 and the introduction of 
the National Curriculum in 1988. In each case, they describe the main issues of 
policy concern in England, the nature of the efforts of English policy-makers to 
make use of the German example and the outcomes in the form of official decisions 
and recommendations reflecting German influence.  
Nevertheless, Phillips and Ochs admit that English enthusiasm in foreign 
systems often did not result in any policy implementation bearing much 
resemblance with the original models. In fact, the particular interest I have in their 
models is the transformation of policy from elsewhere during the process of 
‘borrowing’ and the ‘political-speak’ of ‘borrowing’ based on this transformed 
policy. 
Rappleye (2007) is specifically critical of the fact that Phillips and Ochs do not 
“adequately represent the extreme complexity” of the ‘cross-national attraction’ 
stage (p. 70). This is mainly because impulses do not necessarily lead to attraction 
to foreign systems as indicated in their models. Moreover, Phillips and Ochs do not 
discuss the interaction between contextual factors, the “malleable nature” of context, 
the role played by actor agencies and the influence of infrastructure, which are the 
crucial components of shaping attraction (p. 71). It is on this basis that Rappleye 
develops a new model to further depict and decode the first stage of EPB. 
 
Rappleye’s conceptual map of the context of cross-national attraction 
 
Rappleye’s (2006) Conceptual Map of the Context of Cross-national 
Attraction, as shown in Figure 2.4, attempts to improve existing models. It 
incorporates two opposite transformation orientations – reform and resist. Both 
sides involve structural factors and human actors. Based on Ochs and Phillips’ 
(2002) list, Rappleye includes six structural impulses and originally proposes six 
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structural obstacles. Drawing on the works by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) and 
Ochs (2005), he incorporates a number of reform and resistance actors into his 
model, who either promote or prevent ‘cross-national attraction’. 
 
Figure 2.4. Conceptual map of context of cross-national attraction (Rappleye, 2006) 
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At the centre of the ‘map’ rests the ‘externalising potential’ and four 
‘sparks’ ,which are related with structural factors and human actors to explain 
“reasons underpinning attraction, the motives for introducing and using the foreign 
example” (p. 233). On the ‘impulses’ side, reform actors ‘scandalise’ the ‘home’ 
system and ‘legitimate’ externalisation; on the ‘obstacles’ side, resistance actors 
‘glorify’ the current system at home and ‘caution’ against externalisation (p. 233). 
In this way, Rappleye’s model not just lists factors and actors involved in 
‘cross-national attraction’, but also illustrates why and how they drive education 
reforms to different directions. 
Rappleye (2007) demonstrates the use of this framework by applying it to his 
own empirical work – the US and China’s attraction to the Japanese education 
system. Drawing on his model, this study can better understand the rationale and 
nature of English attraction to East Asian education systems and, in particular, 
school autonomy, which then further explore whether this attraction leads to policy 
being ‘borrowed’ and in what way. 
Rather than limiting this study to any one of the frameworks and models 
reviewed in this section, as explained above, their core features are all valuable in 
investigating the process of EPB. The focus next is on evidence and its utilisation, 
as East Asia is represented by English policy-makers as the key source of evidence 
about ‘what works’. 
 
2.4. Policy borrowing: a specific form of evidence-based policy-making 
 
EPB has emerged as using ‘what works elsewhere’ to inform and refine 
domestic policy-making (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004), which in this sense can be seen as 
a specific form of evidence-based policy-making. In recent years, evidence, derived 
from various international comparisons and interpreted by the global policy 
network, has increasingly shaped national education reforms. The aim of this 
section is to examine the ‘evidence’ as a basis of policy-making generally and the 
‘international comparative evidence’ used in EPB specifically. 
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What is meant by evidence? 
 
Evidence-based policy-making has been popularised in England since the late 
1990s, then gradually in the US, Continental Europe, Australia and New Zealand 
(Oancea & Pring, 2009). It originally evolved from ‘evidence-based medicine’ 
which is a systematic review of the evidence collected through the randomised 
controlled trial for clinical decision-making (Marston & Watts, 2003; Timmermans 
& Mauck, 2005). Put differently, evidence-based medicine seeks to identify the 
most effective intervention though scientifically designed and operated experiments. 
Therefore, ‘evidence’ can be essentially seen as a result of systematic and scientific 
investigation (Davies, Nutley & Smith, 2000). As Tröhler (2015) notes, it is in this 
“medical ‘paradigm’” that evidence-based policy-making has been subsequently 
spread to social research (p. 749).  
Brown (2011) defines ‘evidence’ in policy-making as “data that has been 
gathered via a process of research, which has been interpreted and which 
subsequently has or could be used to address a particular policy issue” (p. 269). 
With regard to its interpretive nature, he (2014) further explains that evidence “is 
not simply the raw data produced by the research process, but also the significance 
ascribed to the data by the researcher” depending on the questions that researchers 
deal with and their intentions (p. 12). Thus, the interactive relation between national 
governments and a variety of evidence providers has attracted extensive attention 
(Solesbury, 2001; Perry & Tor, 2008). Additionally, there is a conspicuous lack of 
clarity between the concepts of ‘evidence’ and ‘knowledge’; in some studies, they 
are used interchangeably (Mulgan, 2005). Sanderson (2003) argues that ‘evidence’ 
seems to be self-explanatory and inherently empowered when it is linked with or 
labelled as ‘causal/scientific knowledge’. 
Although ‘basing-upon-evidence’ has increasingly dominated the approach to 
policy-making around the world, as Bridges and Watts (2009) argue, it remains 
debatable what sort of research/knowledge can and should be taken into account as 
evidence. Similarly, Cartwright, Goldfinch and Howick (2007) stress that there is a 
paucity of “practicable theory of evidence, one which is philosophically-grounded 
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and yet applicable for evidence-based policy” (p. 6). 
 
Why evidence matters? 
 
The link between evidence and policy is portrayed as a “logical – perhaps 
rational – pathway” (Bridge & Watts, 2009, p. 45). As Montuschi (2009) argues, 
the use of “appropriate evidence” is thus believed to be able to “eliminate bias and 
decisions taken on arbitrary grounds” and eventually lead to “optimal, legitimate 
and publicly acceptable” policy (pp. 425-427). According to Sanderson (2003), the 
rise of evidence-based policy-making is a surface-level manifestation of the 
predominant ‘modernism’ in human society. Rose asserts that “to govern is to be 
condemned to seek an authority for one’s authority” (quoted in Mulgan, 2005, p. 
216). For modernists, the first ‘authority’ is often associated with ‘scientific 
knowledge’ which is regarded to be capable of guiding human affairs and changing 
the world (Silova, 2012). The second ‘authority’ suggests that legitimacy for a 
modern government stems from the use of ‘scientific knowledge’ in policy-making 
(Wiseman, 2010). 
As the pioneer, England made a clear, passionate and formal commitment to 
evidence-based policy-making in its 1999 White Paper, Modernising Government. 
As reported in the Times Higher Education (Reisz, 2012), Charles Clarke, the 
former UK Secretary of State for Education and Skills from 2002 to 2004, called on 
education researchers to provide useful answers to questions which preoccupy 
policy-makers, such as “does class size make any difference at all” and “what is the 
best way of teaching training”. However, Morris responded that “extensive research” 
does not offer “the simple answers”, and researchers should not define themselves 
as “providers of policy briefs” and “focus on the search for ‘what works’”, because 
this could lead them to “take for granted the prevailing structures of schooling and 
fail to address the underlying values and political questions about what is 
desirable”. 
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What makes (good) evidence? 
 
Sorell (1994) argues that the term ‘scientism’ refers to the belief that empirical 
science research is the only or the most authoritative source of genuine factual 
knowledge about man and society. In the field of social research, ‘scientism’ is 
concretely manifested as the prioritisation and popularisation of quantitative 
methods and analysis (Whitty, 2007; Wiseman, 2010). Vulliamy (2004) considers 
this phenomenon as an “increasing hegemony of a positivist global discourse of 
educational research and policy-making” (p. 277). Grek and Ozga (2010) similarly 
argue that there has emerged a “‘scientisation’ of education governance, where it is 
only knowledge, closely intertwined with action (expressed as ‘measures’) that can 
reveal problems and shape solutions” (p. 272). However, ‘scientism’ has confronted 
considerable questioning. For example, Heisenberg (1962) argues that limited 
reality can be revealed through scientific approaches; and Lather (2004) points out 
that scientific methodology potentially oversimplifies complex contexts. 
Furthermore, whether certain scientific knowledge can be used as evidence 
and how to interpret it largely depends on the practicalities and politics of 
evidence-based policy-making (Marston & Watts, 2003). As Nutley, Powell and 
Davies (2013) argue: 
 
“There is no simple answer to the question of what counts as good evidence. It 
depends on what we want to know, for what purposes, and in what contexts we 
envisage that evidence being used. Research data only really become 
information when they have the power to change views, and they only really 
become evidence when they attract advocates for the messages they contain. 
Thus endorsements of data as ‘evidence’ reflect judgements that are socially 
and politically situated.” (p. 24) 
 
Similarly, Cable (2004), in an analogy to the oil industry, argues that evidence 
is extracted from “upstream” by researchers, and then gets passed “downstream” 
where politicians conduct trade on it in terms of “speed, superficiality, spin, secrecy 
and scientific ignorance” (p. 11). It is thus problematic to draw a simple or linear 
relationship between evidence and policy. The politics of using ‘scientifically’ 
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produced evidence to support policy-making is examined in this study. 
 
International comparative evidence 
 
As discussed above, evidence serving the purposes of EPB can be defined as 
‘knowledge’ of ‘what works’ in ‘reference societies’. Recent years have witnessed 
two significant shifts regarding ‘reference society’, which has accordingly resulted 
in changes to the source of evidence. Firstly, the form of ‘reference society’ has 
shifted from individual nations to ‘world-class’ systems (Morris, 2012). Although 
there is no agreement what the latter actually mean, as Steiner-Khamsi (2014) 
argues, the term is linked with global market competition and thus generates reform 
pressure. Secondly, the constitution of ‘reference society’ has no loner been based 
on their traditional reputation, but rather on their comparative performance in 
large-scale international surveys (Sellar & Lingard, 2013a). Crossley (2014) notes 
that this shift is underpinned by the ever-growing “legitimating influence” of big 
databases which “speak the language of power” (p. 19). 
Evidence in this scenario has increasingly derived from various international 
comparisons. The global policy network, serving as ‘expert’, has obtained the 
authority of interpreting comparative evidence, advocating ‘best practices’ and 
formulating policy recommendations for national education reforms (Auld & 
Morris, 2014; Tröhler, 2015). There has thus emerged a discernible ‘governance 
turn’ characterised by comparisons and performativity (Ozga, 2009). “Numbers”, as 
Grek (2009) notes, have become “an indirect, but nonetheless influential tool of the 
new political technology of governing” (p. 23). In particular, as the most influential 
international comparison, PISA has become “a very powerful policy instrument that 
is able to penetrate different kinds of policymaking regimes and very diverse 
political circumstances” (Ozga, 2012, p. 19). As Gorur (2015) puts it, “even those 
who are opposed to PISA are unable to think outside of PISA”. 
However, the enhanced importance of international comparative evidence has 
encountered wide criticisms. For example, as Crossley (2014) points out, many 
stakeholders involved in international studies are actually economists, statisticians 
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and data analysts with limited first-hand experience in education. Auld and Morris 
(2014) argue that the comparative method used to manipulate international 
comparative evidence by the global policy network is “reductionist; downplays 
context and non-educational factors; tends to confirmation bias; uses correlations to 
infer causality” (p. 21). As Nόvoa and Yariv-Marshal (2003) highlight, politicians 
seek appropriate ‘international education indicators’ in order to formulate policy 
agendas that are “legitimated by a kind of ‘comparative global enterprise’” (p. 425). 
Gorur and Wu (2015) specifically note that PISA often functions as a ‘policy object’ 
to “make up the neoliberal imaginary” (p. 650).  
This section has investigated EPB as a specific form of evidence-based 
policy-making and particularly focused on the concept ‘evidence’, which provides 
insights into the (political) nature of evidence from East Asia – an emerging 
‘reference society’, its production by the global policy network and the 
manipulation of it in the context of England. 
 
2.5. Externalisation, legitimacy production and symbolic policy borrowing 
 
Steiner-Khamsi (2014) divides the study of EPB into two groups: one uses 
comparison to identify what should be borrowed; the other is concerned with “why 
and when such external references are made” and “the impact of such imports on 
existing policies and power constellations” (p. 154). This section reviews the 
second approach, concentrating on the politics of EPB. It begins with drawing on 
systems theory and its core concept ‘externalisation’ to understand ‘policy 
referencing’. Then, it seeks to explore how EPB has been used and abused to 
produce legitimacy through constructing ‘social imaginaries’. It ends with a 
discussion on ‘symbolic policy borrowing’, which can be seen as a specific form of 
EPB serving political purposes. 
 
Systems theory and externalisation 
 
One prominent conceptual and theoretical approach to studying policy-making 
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based on evidence from elsewhere derives from Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory 
and its core concept ‘externalisation’. This has been elaborated, adopted and 
developed in many comparative studies, especially in the work of Schriewer (1990, 
2000) and Steiner-Khamsi (2004, 2014). Luhmann’s modern society consists of 
various social systems (e.g. education, religion and politics) that follow their own 
distinctive meanings and orders, and are surrounded by infinite environments 
(Rappleye, 2012). These social systems are made up of ‘internally linked 
communications’ (Waldow, 2012, p. 418) and communications from one system 
cannot directly connect to another. Rather, the external can ‘irritate’ the internal and 
the ‘irritation’ is then processed within the system (Waldow, 2012). This is what 
Luhmann conceptualises as ‘externalisation’. 
Luhmann and Schorr (1988) identify three possible ‘external points of 
reference’ that an education system can utilise, namely, values, organisations, and 
the principles and results of science. Schriewer (1990) adds ‘tradition’ and the 
‘world situation’ to the list. The former is embedded in the history of education 
practices and ideas and the latter refers to the knowledge conventionally titled 
‘education abroad’ or ‘international (development) education’. Waldow (2012) 
notes that the current trend of education reforms, referencing ‘world-class’ models / 
international standards and drawing on ‘big databases’, has created a form of 
externalisation which combines the ‘principles and results of science’ and the 
‘world situation’. All these external references, as Steiner-Khamsi (2004) argues, 
have a ‘certification’ effect on national policy-making10. Nevertheless, Schriewer 
(2000) maintains that only when domestic reforms become contentious, and the 
self-referential system is contested or fails, is evidence about foreign education 
systems introduced as a reference. 
However, externalisation does not necessarily lead to policy changes; external 
sources of evidence may only be ‘referenced’ rather than ‘borrowed’. According to 
Luhmann (1995), social systems allow “no other forms of processing in their 
self-determination” (p. 4). Schriewer and Martinez (2004) use the term ‘socio-logic’ 
                                                             
10 The term ‘certification’ was coined and defined by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) as “the validation of 
actors, their performances, and their claims by external authorities” (p. 12). 
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to stress “the idiosyncrasy of meaning” in specific societies (p.33). They argue that 
every society inherently and freely filters and selects a limited amount of 
information from the international environment, and “rearranges” it depending on 
the domestic system’s “internal needs for ‘supplementary meaning’” (p. 32). 
Luhmann (1981) thus argues that “system- internal interpretative acts… do not 
provide reliable information on… what is actually going on in the world” (p. 40). A 
good example is that policy-makers in Germany, Australia and Korea provide 
considerable different interpretations for Finnish success in PISA to serve their 
domestic reform debates (Takayama, Waldow & Sung, 2013). 
 
The production of legitimacy and the ‘social imaginary’ 
 
Max Weber identified three sources of political legitimacy, namely, 
charismatic, traditional and rational-legal authority (Schmitt, 2004). Drawing on 
Beck’s (1992) discussion of the ‘risk society’, Giddens (1999) argues that “we 
increasingly live on a high technological frontier which absolutely no one 
completely understands and which generates a diversity of possible futures” (p. 3) 
and the past can provide very little experience on dealing with this risk. Therefore, 
the self-referential system, specifically referencing to tradition, beliefs and 
organisation (Schriewer, 1990), can no longer be taken for granted as a reliable 
source of legitimacy for education reforms in ‘risk society’. This inevitably drives 
policy-makers to seek other rational sources of legitimacy. 
Drawing on Suchman’s (1995) definition of ‘organisational legitimacy’, 
Waldow (2012) defines the ‘production of legitimacy’ in a process of social 
construction as legitimating policy agendas and social structures to be “desirable, 
proper, or appropriate” (p. 417). In contrast to innovatively developing new 
“desirable, proper, or appropriate” solutions, borrowing other countries’ 
ready-made and tested policies seems to provide a ‘quick fix’ with cheap and 
minimal effort, especially when facing a controversial problem (Bennett, 1991; 
Robertson & Waltman, 1993; Phillips, 2000). Additionally, Rose (1991) points out 
that, if the lesson is negative, policy-makers may learn “what not to do from 
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watching the mistakes of others” (p. 4). EPB thus becomes a rational source of 
legitimacy. 
By referencing to the experience of former British senior civil servants, Halpin 
and Troyna (1995) argue that, however, EPB has been at times used to pursue 
personal motives and short-term political interests. For example, Ponting told the 
inside story of how Whitehall and ministers work in policy-making: 
 
“The instinctive reaction of most Ministers when confronted by an issue is not 
to think in terms of analysing a complex problem to seek out the optimum 
solution but instead to see it in political terms. The questions they ask are: 
‘How can this issue be exploited politically to maximum advantage?’, ‘How 
can the party gain and how can we maximise problems for the opposition?’, 
and finally: ‘Does this issue increase my political exposure and will it benefit 
my career?’” (Ponting, 1986, quoted in Halpin & Troyna, 1995, p. 308) 
 
In addition, politicians tend to show their understanding of ‘what works’ 
elsewhere when they face highly controversial problems, election/party competition, 
or politically contested reforms (Rose, 1991; Phillips, 2000; Steiner-Khamsi, 2002). 
As Robertson (1991) notes, the ‘borrowed’ policies are presented as “politically 
neutral truths” and used as “political weapons” to obtain strategic advantage in 
political conflicts (p. 55). Similarly, Steiner-Khamsi (2000) argues that EPB can 
“prevent arduous bargaining” among stakeholders, build policy coalitions, and offer 
“leverage” to prioritise certain policies (p. 170). 
Rappleye (2012) proposes the metaphor of theatre to elaborate how EPB has 
been subsumed under the political strategies of catalysing and framing education 
reforms. In the political theatre, attraction and ‘borrowing’ are taken as “political 
stagecraft”, political players write their own “script” on the basis of “pre-existing 
ideological convictions”, then perform the “drama” of ‘borrowing’, attempting to 
“produce salutary effects among the audience – other policy makers, media, general 
public and so on” (p. 125). In other words, a “powerful coalition of actors”, who 
adhere to their long-standing ideological agendas, drive domestic reform by 
discursively using external references, and then “erase” its “political origins” to 
normalise and legitimate the policy outcomes (p. 141). Hence, he insists that 
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academics should avoid imagining authentic ‘borrowing’, and move beyond 
studying policy documents and official statements, to critically observe education 
knowledge, discourse and power flows. 
Policy actors gain public support by convincing them that external exemplars 
can achieve their own goals or domestic problems fit existing international solution 
packages. This is related to the concept of ‘social imaginary’ which is defined by 
Taylor (2004) as views of social reality (how things usually go) and norms (how 
things ought to go) shared by ordinary people and embedded in everyday notions, 
images, theories and policies. He argues that it is these common understandings that 
generate sense and legitimacy for social practices. Drawing on this conceptual 
understanding, Rizvi (2006) argues that social imaginaries “play a major role in 
making policies authoritative, in securing consent and becoming legitimate” and it 
is important for governments to develop and exercise “a social imaginary within 
which policy practices are located” (p. 198). 
Appadurai (1996) argues that, in this highly mediated global world, more 
people than ever before can routinely imagine various possibilities of living 
elsewhere; the imaginaries spanning across national boundaries and cultural 
identities enable people to redefine themselves and reconstruct their relations to 
others. Drawing on this, Takayama (2010) argues that images of other successful 
education systems, created and reinforced by PISA rankings, mass media, experts 
and politicians, have become a “cultural repository” onto which the public can 
project their desires, fantasies and dreams of “alternative approaches to education 
reform” in the domestic system (p. 58). Policy actors thus seem to be more 
interested in using the images of ‘reference societies’ to mobilise the public’s 
feelings of anxiety, fear, despair and hope in their favoured direction for education 
reforms, rather than pursuing their ‘reality’. 
An example of examining social imaginaries of education systems is provided 
by Waldow et al. (2014), who focus on the media discourse of ‘Asian Tigers’’ PISA 
success in Australia, Germany and South Korea. According to them: (1) while 
Asian education is described as ‘utopia’ in Australian education reform debates, it 
“provides the dystopian mirror image” in Germany (p. 7); (2) within Germany, in 
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contrast to Asia, “Finland serves as the image of an educational utopia” (p. 7); and, 
(3) as one of the Asian societies, Korea’s self-perceptions of its educational 
characteristics are divided into “strengths” and “oppressive features” (p. 15). These 
social imaginaries of educational ‘utopia’ and ‘dystopia’ and accordingly the 
selection and construction of ‘reference society’ in different nations, as they further 
argue, are determined by local factors, including: “(1) national auto- and 
heterostereotypes and their interplay; (2) economic relations between countries; and 
(3) the decline or increase of the results of a country in large-scale assessments 
relative to potential reference countries” (p. 14). 
 
Symbolic policy borrowing 
 
The rhetoric construction of ‘reference society’ does not necessarily lead to de 
facto borrowing. Halpin and Troyna (1995) argue that the significance of EPB has 
sometimes “more to do with form than content” (p. 308). Put differently, the 
‘borrowed’ policy is more valued for its political symbolism than its details (Whitty 
& Edwards, 1992; Green, 1993). As Schriewer (2000) points out, ‘symbolic policy 
borrowing’ is likely to result in a gap between policy talk/rhetoric/discourse and 
policy action/practice/initiative. A similar concept, ‘phony policy borrowing’, as 
termed by Phillips (2000), indicates that ‘borrowing’ takes place, either without the 
intention of ever implementing the policy, or with the intent of eradicating the 
‘borrowed’ policy once the domestic reform is put into practice. Lynch (1998) 
describes EPB as a ‘flag of convenience’ to secure public support and international 
funding. This also explains why policy-makers claim the introduction of policy is 
based on lessons learned from overseas, even though similar practices are already 
implemented in their own backyards (Steiner-Khamsi & Quist, 2000). 
 
For the analysis of the present study, this section has provided theoretical and 
conceptual foundations for understanding the high selection of external references 
to authenticate policy concerns and naturalise given solutions. The following 
section explores the perceived implications of EPB. 
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2.6. Convergence, standardisation and globalisation 
 
As Waldow (2012) and Steiner-Khamsi (2012) note, it is contested whether 
EPB has made national education systems converge towards international standards 
and practices in the context of globalisation. Crucial questions that arise are: 
whether education convergence/standardisation is authentic and substantive, and 
how EPB associated with globalisation comes into play. This section examines 
education convergence/standardisation from various perspectives. Among them, 
world culture theory is highlighted as it has been one of the most powerful 
approaches to analysing this theme. It lastly focuses on the concept of the ‘spatial 
turn’ which signals that EPB has increasingly occurred within a global space. 
 
Education convergence/standardisation in the context of globalisation 
 
Steiner-Khamsi (2000) summarises three approaches to global education 
convergence. The consensus model is rooted in the assumption that all education 
systems are likely to confront similar challenges in the context of globalisation, or 
be affected by globalisation in similar ways. This results in the adoption of similar 
solutions across nations. The conflict model draws on neo-colonialism and cultural 
imperialism. It argues that international standards do not derive from “a consensual 
act of borrowing”, but are “propagated” by advanced wealthy countries which have 
more access to information, expertise, technology, networking and representation in 
international organisations (p. 161). In this regard, ‘western’ or ‘American’ 
standards seem to be more accurate than ‘international’ and ‘global’. 
In contrast, the culturalist model emphasises how local factors respond to 
global challenges in diverse ways. Drawing on Appadurai’s (1996) work, 
Steiner-Khamsi notes that transnational flows – such as people, technology, media 
images and information, and ideologies – do not necessarily cause conjuncture, but 
also disjuncture. Besides, there is “a plurality of cultures” (p. 161) within a country; 
people construct the meaning of education issues and privilege certain education 
interests and concerns depending on class, race, gender and ethnicity. EPB might 
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not result from a global consensus on what constitutes the ‘best’ education system 
and bring about convergence, but result in local forces and lead to diversity in its 
implementation. 
The global policy network has significantly shaped the ‘planetspeak’ (Nóvoa, 
2002) of education governance and schooling through promoting standardised tests 
and recommendations and ‘world-class’ models. Gorur (2015) criticises PISA as 
“an exercise in making education systems legible and manageable” through 
reducing and standardising education into “a single rank” and a set of ‘best 
practices’. Meanwhile, Alexander (2010) argues that the quest for ‘world class’ by 
national governments has been more like a concept, slogan, aspiration or claim, 
meaningless in practice. Similarly, Steiner-Khamsi (2014) points out that, terms, 
such as ‘international standards’ and ‘21st century skills’, serve as “empty vessels” 
which can be filled with different local meanings according to specific needs. 
 
World culture theory 
 
Instead of seeing ‘convergence’ as a result of common challenges and contexts 
(i.e. consensus model), proponents of ‘world culture’ theory, such as John Meyer 
and Francisco Ramirez, emphasise that the driving forces behind ‘convergence’ are 
“the logic of science and the myth of progress” (Carney, Rappleye & Silova, 2012, 
p. 366). This theory was first established by arguing that mass schooling systems 
around the world spread from a common source and share similar features over 
time (Meyer, Ramirez & Soysal, 1992). The education model has been 
subsequently developed into a more general culture model of the modern 
nation-state (Meyer, Boli, Thomas & Ramirez, 1997). As Rappleye (2012) argues, 
this is based on a belief that human society should be organised around “a set of 
‘rationalised myths’” – believing in process, rationality and science; and institutions 
– such as states, organisations, schools and firms – are supposed to “embody, 
reflect and promote” this consensus and eventually become ‘isomorphic’ (p. 124). 
In recent years, academics adopting the world culture stances have 
increasingly engaged in the discussion about EPB. For example, Wiseman and 
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Baker (2005) consider that ideas and concepts for policy-making, starting from a 
few nations, “flow out to others” and eventually “become a part of policy-makers’ 
fundamental understanding of educational systems and schooling” (p. 4). From this 
perspective, EPB is authentic and substantive (Rappleye, 2012). By employing the 
concept of ‘loose coupling’, they have, at least implicitly, acknowledged the 
existence of education divergence (Carney et al., 2012). As Meyer and Ramirez 
(2000) put it, “standardisation is a manual cut and paste process in which what 
exactly gets cut and how precisely it gets pasted varies” (p. 128). They have 
highlighted the generic themes promoted around the globe, such as decentralisation, 
marketisatoin, privatisation and accountability, and from this claimed that there is a 
convergence towards a ‘world model’ (Silova, 2012). 
However, world culture theory has triggered considerable criticisms. As 
Rappleye (2014) argues, the methodological strategy that it adopts sets its own 
conceptual categories and defines the “parameters” of those categories (p. 22); 
empirical evidence is then gathered in ways which confirm the convergence 
envisaged. Carney et al. (2012) note that it creates an ‘imagined world society’ 
characterised by consensus and homogeneity, but lacks a “deep engagement” with 
the world in which “one can experience coherence and chaos, ambition and 
ambivalence” (p. 385). Comparing to the conflict model, world culture theory fails 
to recognise the uneven flow from ‘powerful’ western countries to the rest of the 
world. As highlighted in the culturalist model, global models tend to be resisted, 
reinterpreted, and indigenised locally, which leads to ‘hybridisation’ and ‘new local 
particularities’ (Anderson-Levitt, 2003). Hence, Silova (2012) argues that education 
convergence, as a consequence of ‘world culture’ seems to be “primarily discursive 
and imagined” (p. 239). 
The stance of world culture theory and the position of culturalists and 
anthropologists seem to be the opposite, or as Carney, Rappleye and Silova (2012) 
put it, has reached “an impasse”. Nevertheless, Anderson-Levitt (2003) and 
Waldow (2012) both argue that these two approaches are complementary to each 
other and capture different but valid aspects of social reality. Schriewer (2003) thus 
conceptualises the ‘global/local nexus’ to examine EPB, which involves the 
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global-level interaction and the local context which interprets and recontextualises 
global forces. 
 
The ‘spatial turn’ 
 
EPB has been long examined in the geographical sense – how policy moves 
across national territorial borders (Lawn & Nóvoa, 2002). Many academics argue 
that there is a growing ‘spatial turn’ in education, which overlaps and integrates 
geographic and social space. For example, Carney (2012) coins the term 
‘policyscape’ to ‘decentre’ physical landscape and construct a ‘scape’ in which 
local education phenomena are “constituted mutually and dialectically” and 
“mediated through transnational bodies and agencies” (p. 350). Wiseman (2010) 
similarly acknowledges an “intellectual space” which is “bounded by the extent of 
the legitimated evidence used to support one decision or policy versus another” (p. 
18). Dale and Robertson (2012) take the Bologna Process as an example to 
illustrate how the global and the national interact relationally across “diverse 
cultural, political and economic topographies” (p. 35). With the growing influence 
of large-scale international surveys, Sellar and Lingard (2013a) specifically define 
the ‘global education policy field’ as a “commensurate space of measurement of the 
comparative performance of schooling systems” (p. 201). 
 
This section examines the perceived implication of EPB in a broader sense of 
education ‘space’. This is one of the foci in this study – whether EPB from East 
Asia in England results in education convergence between these two regions and 
whether East Asian education systems can be homogeneously portrayed as a 
‘world-class’ model reflecting international standards. After examining all the 
factors and elements involved in EPB, the next section specifically reviews 
postcolonial theories and conceptions to enunciate ‘East-to-West’ EPB. 
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2.7. Postcolonial approaches to understanding education policy borrowing 
 
In the field of comparative education, postcolonial approaches have been 
sought to examine education systems which have their origins in the colonial era 
and the continued hegemony of western forms of education (Tikly, 1999; Crossley 
& Tikly, 2004). Nevertheless, Takayama and Apple (2008) point out that there has 
been “little attempt to situate educational borrowing within the legacy of western 
cultural imperialism” (p. 290). This study aims to make a contribution in this 
respect. In doing so, this section gives a brief introduction to the concept 
‘postcolonialism’. It then specifically examines Edward Said’s conception of 
‘Orientalism’ as well as Homi Bhabha’s concept ‘ambivalence’. Lastly, how to 
approach the ‘East-to-West’ EPB is discussed from postcolonial perspectives. 
 
Postcolonialism 
 
The term ‘postcolonialism’ is also written with a hyphen as ‘post-colonialism’. 
As Blunt and McEwan (2000) explain, ‘post-colonialism’, refers to “a temporary 
aftermath”, that denotes the period after colonialism, while ‘postcolonialism’, refers 
to “a critical aftermath”, that indicates a challenge to colonialism but remaining 
closely influenced by it (p. 3). However, both of these two forms/meanings are 
controversial (Crossley & Tikly, 2004). With regard to ‘post-colonialism’, direct 
military occupation still exists in many parts of the world and there have emerged 
more indirect forms of political, economic and cultural domination, known as 
‘neo-colonialism’. A response to this criticism draws on the work of Quayson 
(2000), which suggests conceiving of post-colonialism as a gradual “process of 
post- colonialising”, rather than “chronological supersession”, which characterises 
it as “a process of coming-into-being and of struggle against colonialism and its 
after-effects” (p. 9). 
‘Postcolonialism’ is often criticised as it has reinforced rather than resisted the 
western dominance of interpreting non-western world. As Hall (1996) argues, 
postcolonialism is represented as the kind of language and knowledge that can only 
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be comprehended by westernised intellectual elites. Moreover, Tikly (1999) notes 
that ‘old binaries’ (e.g. First/Third World and ‘Black’/‘White’) are not replaced by, 
but rather intertwined with, ‘new binaries’ (e.g. hegemony and counter-hegemony) 
and continue to engage in current political struggles. Notwithstanding these 
critiques, I prefer the unhyphenated version for this study for two reasons. Firstly, it 
appears dominant in academic discussions. Secondly and more importantly, it goes 
beyond the geographical and historical sense and gets closer to the issues of power, 
hierarchy and hegemony, which signifies an epistemological shift in the way that 
the ‘East/West’ relationship is described and interpreted. 
A wide range of topics have been examined within postcolonial frameworks, 
including migration, slavery, suppression, resistance, representation, difference, 
race, gender, language and identities in colonial and neo-colonial contexts 
(Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin, 1995). In contemporary postcolonial studies, Said 
(2003) identifies a binary geopolitical division – Occident/ Orient, us/other and 
normal/abnormal – created by western European. However, one of the critiques to 
Said’s work is that he fell into the same trap of binarism which he himself 
attempted to oppose and transcend (Chakrabarti, 2012). Taking up Said’s work, 
Bhabha (1994) develops a series of interconnected concepts to elaborate the 
resistance of the colonised people who hybridises the colonial identity and culture. 
Said and Bhabha provide profound insights into the hierarchical and hybrid 
relationship between ‘East’ and ‘West’ for this study and are specifically reviewed 
below. 
 
‘Orientalism’ and ‘ambivalence’ 
 
The concept ‘Orientalism’ was not created by Said. But it has entered 
academic discourse since the publication of his book Orientalism in 1978, which 
has become one of the most influential texts for postcolonial studies. Central to this 
concept is the assumption that there has been a long tradition of prejudiced western 
interpretations of the Orient, shaped by the attitudes of European Imperialism, 
which has little to do with the reality of the ‘Orient’. As Said (2003) puts it, 
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“…that Orientalism makes sense at all depends more on the West than on the 
Orient, and this sense is directly indebted to various western techniques of 
representation that make the Orient visible, clear, ‘there’ in discourse about it. 
And these representations rely on institution, traditions, conventions, agreed- 
upon codes of understanding for their effects, not upon a distant and 
amorphous Orient.” (p. 22) 
 
According to Said, the purpose of knowing the Orient is to help the West to 
define itself. In western interpretations, all Oriental societies are simply and 
imaginarily envisioned as significantly similar to one another, whether Near, 
Middle or Far East, but fundamentally antithetical to Occidental societies. Drawing 
on Gramsi’s concept of ‘cultural hegemony’, Said argues that these interpretations 
are based on the idea of European identity as superior and predominant. Thus, the 
Oriental is portrayed as “irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ‘different’”, 
whereas European is “rational, virtuous, mature and ‘normal’” (p. 40). The 
Occident gains strength through this preconceived archetype which sets itself 
against, and beats, the Orient. The Orient is accordingly alienated and marginalised 
as the ‘other’. 
Based on Foucault’s theory of ‘power/knowledge’, Said develops the idea of 
the West’s privileged position in defining and articulating the Orient, which is a 
process of “Orientalising the Orient” (p. 49). As he elaborates, “…because his 
[West’s] was the stronger culture, he could penetrate, he could wrestle with, he 
could give shape and meaning to the great Asiatic mystery…” (p. 44) and “the 
Oriental country – since we know it and it exists, in a sense, as we know it” (p. 32). 
In other words, the western knowledge of the Orient is the Orient. Furthermore, 
since “to have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it”, we “have 
authority over ‘it’” (p. 32). Colonial rule is therefore legitimated. 
Images of the Orient, constructed and interpreted by the West, precede 
experience. Even though empirical evidence is included in the description of the 
Orient, it was only fitted into western knowledge frameworks to support and verify 
the West’s expectations and needs. In addition, the power is generated and 
maintained by the knowledge produced through a whole system of “scholarly 
discovery, philosophical reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and 
53 
sociological description” (p. 12). Orientalism is developed to be “a career” for 
Orientalists (p. 3) who do not seek to renew or deepen the perception of the Orient, 
but rather to stymie the challenge of the existing interpretation. 
In his book The Location of Culture, Bhabha (1994) argues that Said revealed 
the strategy/logic that the West/powerful used to create and heighten its superiority 
over the ‘East’/powerless; but he succumbed to it and failed to acknowledge the 
resistance from the colonised, which confirmed and consolidated western 
hegemonic control. Starting from this critique, he develops a range of the field’s 
neologisms and concepts, such as ‘hybridity’, ‘ambivalence’ and ‘mimicry’, to 
emphasise that the colonised translates the culture that the coloniser imposed on 
them rather than simply submit to it; cultural difference remains, which 
distinguishes the oppressed colonised from the dominant coloniser. Thus, for the 
coloniser, the imagination, construction and interpretation of the colonised are by 
no means straightforward, but rather characterised by ‘ambivalence’. The coloniser 
expects a reformed and recognisable ‘other’, but as an inferior, which is, in 
Bhabha’s words, “a subject of difference… almost the same, but not quite” (p. 86). 
The colonised is thus an object of both desire and derision and ‘ambivalence’ 
results in the coloniser experiencing mastery and pleasure on the one hand, and 
anxiety and defence on the other. 
 
Understanding education policy borrowing from postcolonial perspectives 
 
As mentioned earlier, comparative education has made limited efforts to study 
EPB from postcolonial perspectives. One of the notable exceptions is the work of 
Takayama and Apple (2008), which investigates how Japanese conservatives 
criticised yutori reform
11
 and reconstitute people’s common sense about the current 
situation and future course of Japanese education by borrowing the “crisis-and- 
success narrative of British education” (p. 289). They argue that, although Japan 
has become one of the most important economic powerhouses since the 1980s, it 
                                                             
11 ‘Yutori education’ can be translated as ‘relaxed education’ or ‘education free from pressure’. It was 
introduced in the 1970s and has since reduced the hours and content of curriculum in primary education. 
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has remained a passive and marginal recipient of western ‘advanced’ knowledge. 
This is corroborated by the work of Apple, Kenway and Singh (2005), which points 
out that the deterritorialisation of economic power has not changed the fact that the 
‘global standard’ stemming from the ‘West’ continues to normalise ‘other’ people’s 
ways of being and knowing. 
Another exception is Rappeley’s (2007) study of American ‘feverish’ 
attraction to Japanese education during the 1980s, which, similar to this study, 
observes a flow in contrast to the long tradition of ‘West-to-Rest’ EPB. He argues 
that this attraction was driven by Japanese economic competitiveness and the US’ 
domestic political agendas; and notes that it resulted in the loss of the US’ 
self-superiority and the worries of being left behind. The portrayal and 
interpretation of Japan as a model at that time seem to share some common features 
with that of East Asia in the current western education debates. However, as 
Rappleye is specifically concerned with cross-national attraction, whether the 
attraction leads to policy being ‘borrowed’ and how to understand the ‘power/ 
knowledge’ relationship embedded in the representations of East Asian education 
have not been explored, which are focused in the present study. 
 
The above six sections have discussed the concept, process, nature, rationale 
and implication of EPB from various theoretical and conceptual perspectives/ 
approaches. The following three sections review the meaning of, the rationales and 
motives of, and the conceptual frameworks for, school autonomy. 
 
2.8. Clarification of the concept: school autonomy 
 
Education reforms designed to increase school autonomy have spread globally 
since the 1980s. Nevertheless, the concept ‘school autonomy’, used extensively by 
policy-makers and intellectuals, has remained vague and been used interchangeably 
with the concepts ‘decentralisation’ and school-based management. The meanings 
of, and the relations between, school autonomy and these associated concepts are 
elaborated in this section. Additionally, school accountability is described as a 
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mechanism that ensures education quality particularly in a relatively autonomous 
system. This section also examines the concept ‘accountability’ and how it 
interplays with ‘autonomy’ in the school context. 
 
School autonomy 
 
Literally, the term ‘autonomy’ derives from ancient Greek and means 
‘self-legislation in the sense of self-administration or self-governance’ (Berka, 2000, 
p.4). ‘Self-’ does not exist within a vacuum. Being ‘self-’, as Katz (1964) and 
Lindley (1986) argue, particularly means being independent from external controls. 
For example, in Europe, the notion of autonomy historically served the desire to 
emancipate education from the control of the Church. With the rise of the modern 
state in the 19
th
 century, the acquisition of autonomy resulted from confrontation 
with the State. During recent decades, the State has stepped back and left increasing 
room for market power (Berka, 2000). 
As Lindley (1986) points out, the concept of ‘autonomy’ has its root in 
individuals mastering “over one’s self” and “not being subservient to others” (i.e. 
‘individual autonomy’); and may also indicate social groups “being in control of 
their own affairs” (i.e. ‘group autonomy’), such as nations, government departments, 
professional associations and committees (pp. 5-6). More specifically, Berlin (1958) 
elaborates on the meaning of an individual being autonomous:  
 
“I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, 
bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to 
my own ideas and purposes.” (p. 131)  
 
For Kant, this is possible and important because human beings possess 
rationality – the capacity for autonomy – and should be morally and equally treated 
as an end rather than a means. Similarly, Hume argues that the ultimate ends of 
human beings are diverse and thus they should have the right to run their own lives 
as long as one does not use faulty reasoning. These philosophical perspectives on 
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individual autonomy significantly shape liberal democratic thought and justify the 
basic features of political systems in Anglo-Saxon countries.  
In contrast, Asian cultures and values, profoundly influenced by Confucian 
ethics, are often thought to emphasise the centrality of interpersonal relationships 
and membership of communities rather than the self (Rosemont, 2004; Ihara, 2004). 
Until the late 19
th
 century, the view of human beings as free autonomous 
individuals was introduced to Asian societies by academics, such as Yan Fu and Hu 
Shi, who studied abroad (Lin, 1991). Nevertheless, individual autonomy has often 
been promoted on the premise that it would contribute to the common good (Wong, 
2004). 
Shirley (1984) and Oslen (2008) both describe autonomous social groups, 
including educational institutions and schools, as the ones with freedom to define 
their mission and strategic plan, manage fiscal affairs and determine organisational 
and personnel actions, according to their own normative principles and behavioural 
logic. With regard to school autonomy, a similar definition is provided by Arcia, 
Macdonald, Patrinos and Porta (2011): 
 
“School autonomy is a form of school management in which schools are given 
decision-making authority over their operations, including the hiring and firing 
of personnel, and the assessment of teachers and pedagogical practices.” (p. 2) 
 
Drawing on this definition and the discussion above, school autonomy first 
and foremost denotes the power to make decisions within the school as a unit. 
Secondly, it probably can only be understood as a form of ‘relative autonomy’, 
given the extent to which schools are subject to external influence and higher 
authorities have the ultimate power to transfer decision-making powers to 
individual schools. Thirdly, there are a range of areas of school management that 
autonomy can be transferred to. Moreover, although this definition is only 
concerned with the power in “operations”, many academics (e.g. Lauglo, 1995; 
Karlsen, 1999) make a distinction between different types of power. Among them, 
Winstanley, Sorabji and Dawson (1995) use the terms ‘criteria power’ and 
‘operational power’ to respectively designate the power of defining the aims, 
57 
purpose and framework of service provision and the power of deciding how service 
is delivered. 
Therefore, references to school autonomy seem often to be of generic nature. It 
is necessary to determine the precise context and socio-political setting in which it 
operates so as to, clarify to what degree and in which areas the school is authorised 
to make what kind of decisions, and illustrate who grants power, to whom, and 
within what limits. 
 
Decentralisation 
 
The process of transferring power from a higher authority to a lower authority 
can be defined as ‘decentralisation’ (Hanson, 1998; Bray, 1999). In theory, 
decentralisation, as a reform strategy, brings about an increase of autonomy at the 
local/site level (Bottani, 2000; Sayed, 2010). School autonomy in this sense can be 
understood as an outcome of decentralisation when power is delivered to individual 
schools. As McGinn and Welsh (1999) argue, decentralisation implies ‘dispersal’, 
‘increased space’ and ‘a permit for individuality or diversity’ (pp. 19-20). 
Nevertheless, the motives and specific initiatives adopted for decentralisation vary. 
For example, as Hanson (2006) observes, decentralisation reforms range from 
introducing market forces as in Chile in 1980 to empowering local educators and 
parents as in Nicaragua in 1994. 
A completely decentralised system seems not to exist. Turner and Hulme 
(1997) argue that almost all decisions in the process of governance retain degrees of 
centralisation and decentralisation. According to Tatto (1999), the processes of 
centralisation and decentralisation are often interwoven with ‘recentralisation’ to 
ensure against the loss of central/state control. The concept ‘decentralised 
centralism’ was introduced by Karlsen (2000) to refer to the paradoxical and 
dynamic interactions between decentralisation and centralisation. Bray (1999) 
emphasises that decentralisation is a dynamic ‘-isation’ process rather than a ‘static 
situation’ (p. 208). It probably occurs in systems which are previously centralised; 
but also applies to systems which are already decentralised but become more 
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decentralised. By means of establishing various regulatory frameworks and quality 
assurance mechanisms, the central government can govern and supervise local 
authorities and schools at a distance, without detailed control (Neave, 1995). The 
concept ‘centralised decentralisation’ is employed to portray this phenomenon in 
education (e.g. Watkins, 1993; Mok, 2002). 
Therefore, drawing on the work of Simkins (1997), it is crucial to ask three 
questions in examining decentralisation: who is empowered and who is 
disempowered by the reform actions; in respect to what are their powers increased 
or decreased; and under what forms of control and constraint must these powers be 
exercised? 
 
School-based management 
 
In the words of Malen, Ogawa and Kranz (1990), school-based management 
can be viewed conceptually as: 
 
“…a formal alteration of governance structures… [and] a form of 
decentralisation that identifies the individual school as the primary unit of 
improvement and relies on the redistribution of decision-making authority as 
the primary means through which improvement might be stimulated and 
sustained.” (p. 290) 
 
Nonetheless, as Arcia et al. (2011) note, schools implementing school-based 
management are usually responsible for “most managerial decisions” (p. 3). 
Moreover, Caldwell (2005) emphasises that those ‘operational/managerial’ 
decisions are made “within a centrally determined framework of goals, policies, 
curriculum, standards, and accountability” (p. 1).  
School-based management in terms of the curriculum is specifically termed as 
school-based curriculum development (SBCD). As many studies (e.g. Bolstad, 
2004; Marsh, Morris & Lo, 2014) demonstrate, while SBCD has been promoted as 
an effective means to empower teachers on the design and delivery of curriculum, it 
does not necessarily vary significantly from the central curriculum. For example, 
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Brady (1992) argues that, SBCD in Australia is “selective or adaptive rather than 
creative” (p. 24). 
Murphy and Beck (1995) identify three forms of school-based management. In 
‘administrative control school-based management’, school leaders are given the 
main decision-making power over managing schools, while, according to Caldwell 
(2005), they are expected to respond to policies initiated by higher authorities. 
‘Professional control school-based management’ encourages teachers to develop 
their professionalism especially with regard to curriculum and pedagogy, although 
Marsh (1992) argues that, in reality, their power is restricted by the shortage of time, 
expertise and resources, and influence from other stakeholders. ‘Community 
control school-based management’, driven by market forces, stresses local values 
and preferences in the curriculum. In particular, the promotion of parental choice 
and education privatisation is an example for this form (Leithwood & Menzies, 
1998). 
In a nutshell, school-based management and SBCD are the most widespread 
forms of decentralisation reform, including in East Asia and England. In studying 
them, it should be borne in mind that the power enjoyed by schools is “managerial” 
(operational) and restricted by various central control mechanisms. It is also 
necessary to identify whom school-based management empowers (e.g. principals, 
teachers, or parents) to and in which areas. 
 
Accountability 
 
In parallel to the global promotion of school autonomy, accountability has 
been seen as an indispensable mechanism of guaranteeing education quality in 
increased autonomous systems (Arcia et al., 2011). As Simkins (1997) illustrates, 
Party A is accountable to Party B suggests an expectation that A should act in ways 
which are consistent with the legitimised rules and requirements of B; A is 
supposed to report to B who has the oversight authority over the school; and B has 
the legitimised power to influence the behaviour of A. School accountability, 
according to Wossmann, Ludemann, Schutz and Martin (2007), is specifically 
60 
composed of achievement standards, measurement of achievement and 
consequences (rewards or sanction) for measured achievement. 
Anderson (2005) distinguishes three types of school accountability 
differentiated by ‘for what’ and ‘to whom’. In the first type, educators are 
accountable for adherence to legislation and regulations, and accountable to the 
bureaucracy. For example, the central government determines the aims and 
purposes of education through national curriculum and examinations. The second 
type requires compliance with professional norms. Educators are accountable for 
adherence to standards of good practice set by professionals and accountable to 
their peers. The third type is driven by the learning results of pupils. Simkins (1997) 
terms this as ‘market accountability’, as educators find themselves accountable to 
their customers – the general public. 
As contended by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (2011a), the best-performing education systems are the ones 
that have combined greater autonomy with a culture of accountability. However, 
Hannaway (1993) argues that, the tight school accountability framework adopted in 
decentralisation reforms might mitigate the degree of school autonomy. Thus, the 
key issue in examining school accountability is to identify how schools are 
evaluated and/or inspected and how this influences the nature and degree of school 
autonomy (Macpherson, 1998; Skrla & Scheurich, 2004). 
 
This section has clarified the key concepts related to school autonomy. I shall 
now move to discuss why school autonomy has become popularised globally. 
 
2.9. Rationales and motives for promoting school autonomy 
 
This section is concerned with the underlying rationales and motives of 
reforms designed to transfer greater autonomy to schools from administrative, 
political and philosophical perspectives. It is noted that, in practice, reforms have 
been often fuelled by multiple driving forces which may complement or contradict 
one another. 
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Administrative perspectives 
 
Increasing autonomy is adopted as a vehicle for improving the efficiency of 
managing education services, and particularly public funds (Sleegers & Wesselingh, 
1995). As McGinn and Welsh (1999) point out, the rationale is that the school, 
which is closer to its ‘clients’, is better able to identify diverse needs, local issues 
and appropriate solutions, allocate resources and reduce bureaucracy. Meanwhile, 
centralisation and bureaucratisation of decision-making are considered to account 
for the lack of motivation for schools’ self-improvement (Fitz, Halpin & Power, 
1993). Consequently, there has emerged a global movement towards marketisation 
and implementing New Public Management. It is ideologically driven by 
neo-liberalism, applying private sector principles, managerial culture and business 
management techniques to the creation of a ‘free market’ / ‘quasi-market’ in the 
education sector to enhance its productivity and competitiveness (Apple, 2000). 
This sentiment, and variants of it, has been used in official documents and 
discourse to legitimate increasing school autonomy and competition in many 
countries (Bolstad, 2004). 
From this perspective, high levels of school autonomy and competition have 
been used to explain the effective delivery of education services and further the 
high performance of education systems (e.g. Clark, 2009; Machin & Vernoit, 2011). 
For example, based on the 2009 PISA results, the OECD (2011b) concludes that: 
 
“…a student who attends a school with more autonomy in allocating resources 
than the average school tends to score five points higher on the PISA reading 
test than a student who attends a school with less autonomy.” (p.480) 
 
Nevertheless, whether schools with more autonomy outperform their less 
autonomous counterparts, or whether high levels of school autonomy and 
competition bring about high attainment, and to what extent they are relevant, are 
still controversial (Grosskopf & Moutray, 2001; Allen, 2010). 
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Political perspectives 
 
The political perspectives can be divided into four categories. Firstly, the 
demands for autonomy in education are linked with the promotion of 
democratisation and citizen participation (Hanson, 2006). According to Eurydice 
(2007a), this was the case in Europe during the 1980s, which required schools to be 
more open to their local communities; and in Latin America during the 1990s, 
which attempted to reduce the role of ideology in the content of public education. 
McGinn and Welsh (1999) point out that people want to be “consulted and involved 
in decision-making that concerns them directly” (p. 9). Decentralised systems seem 
to be more likely to encourage and enable stakeholders from different cultural, 
political and social groups to express their desires (Sleegers & Wessingh, 1995). 
Secondly, Weiler (1990) argues that governments freely choose to give up a 
portion of their power in order to gain ‘compensatory legitimation’ in the political 
arena (p. 441). Based on a series of theoretical works (Habermas, 1975; Wolfe, 
1977; Offe, 1984), he argues that politicians, policy-makers and administrators are 
aware that the modern state faces an increasingly serious erosion of legitimacy. 
Therefore, the purpose of designing policy is not just to achieve outcomes such as 
efficiency, equality and democracy, but also to recapture compensatory legitimacy 
from being or at least appearing to be efficient, equal and democratic. Nevertheless, 
he recognises a dilemma between the benefit of enhancing legitimacy and the cost 
of losing control. 
Thirdly, decentralisation reforms essentially lead to the redistribution of 
decision-making power among different levels of authorities. Certain groups (e.g. 
teacher unions) may be included or excluded from the exercise of control (Bray, 
1999). As Bjork (2006) notes, “protecting the power that you enjoy is a natural 
political reflex” (p. 241). Thus, redefining a power relationship might result in 
competition and resistance. Fourthly, decentralisation reforms are sometimes driven 
by financial considerations (Rhoten, 2000). Bray (1999) similarly states that 
reducing the central power can be a way of discarding the state’s responsibilities for 
education, in particular, when the central government confronts fiscal stringency. 
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McGinn and Welsh (1999) argue that although fiscal decentralisation allows the 
participation of new resources, it may result in local disparities. 
 
Philosophical perspectives 
 
In the West, especially Anglo-Saxon countries, autonomy per se is an 
inherently persuasive, even seductive concept. Like ‘freedom’, it is highly esteemed 
in society (Berka, 2000) and seen as a fundamental principle of the western liberal 
tradition (Lindley, 1986). Since the 19
th
 century, school autonomy was specifically 
developed in Europe and later in East Asia where academic freedom was promoted 
(Eurydice, 2007a) and believed to be an essential necessity for the pursuit of true 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1958). It seems that if an action is taken in the name of 
‘autonomy’, which then would be seen as worthwhile and praiseworthy; autonomy 
therefore justifies itself. Although the definition of ‘autonomy’ is rather ambiguous 
and varied in different reform contexts, the emphasis has remained ubiquitous. As 
Berka (2000) argues, autonomy, like an ‘empty jar’, can be “filled with different 
spirits” needed in the discourse of education reform to mobilise the public’s 
emotion and camouflage vested interests and political purposes (p. 5). 
 
With reference to East Asia, the causal link between the high level of school 
autonomy and outstanding pupil performance has been claimed as the reason for 
increasing school autonomy in England. This section has investigated the rationales 
and motives for such reforms from different perspectives. Below, a new conceptual 
framework for analysing school autonomy is created and elaborated on the basis of 
the review of previous work. 
 
2.10. Conceptual frameworks for analysing autonomy 
 
A number of academics have developed frameworks to analyse autonomy and 
the transfer of autonomy – decentralisation – in education. This section illustrates 
three of them; each has a different emphasis. Drawing on these previous studies, a 
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new conceptual framework is proposed for this study, which is specifically 
designed to examine the nature and degree of autonomy at the school level. 
Bray: three modes of transferring autonomy. 
Bray (1999) distinguishes three modes of territorial decentralisation which 
refers to the transfer of autonomy among “different geographic tiers of 
governments” (p. 176): 
 
Deconcentration The transfer of authority for the implementation of 
rules, but not for making them; 
Delegation The transfer of decision-making authority from higher 
to lower hierarchical levels, but that authority can be 
withdrawn; 
Devolution The transfer of authority to an autonomous unit which 
can act independently and only informing the centre, 
but not asking permission, and the centre is responsible 
for collecting and exchanging information. 
 
This framework indicates three degrees of autonomy, increasing from 
‘deconcentration’ to ‘delegation’, and then to ‘devolution’, between hierarchical 
levels. Moreover, there are two types of power transferred – the power in 
implementation and the power in decision-making. In other words, a decentralised 
system can be a unit only given great power to decide how the service determined 
by higher authorities should be delivered. Similar frameworks can also be seen in 
other studies, such as Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema (1984) and Hanson (1998). 
Bray does not include privatisation as one of the forms of decentralisation as other 
academics do (e.g. Turner & Hulme, 1997). He explains that, in some cases, the 
authority is centrally controlled by private organisations or churches, which is still a 
kind of centralised organisation. 
 
OECD: three dimensions of examining autonomy 
 
The OECD has conducted a number of surveys on decision-making patterns 
since the early 1990s (Bottani, 2000). The key findings of the most recent were 
summarised in the 2012 Education at a Glance. According to this report, 
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decision-making autonomy can be examined, in terms of levels (loci), fields 
(domains) and modes (degrees): 
 
Levels of 
decision 
Central government, state governments, 
provincial/regional authorities or governments, 
sub-regional or inter- municipal authorities or 
governments, local authorities or governments, and 
schools or school boards or committees; 
Fields of decision Organisation of instruction, planning and structure, 
personnel management, and resource allocation; 
Modes of 
decision 
Full autonomy, after consultation with bodies located at 
another level within the education system, independently 
but within a framework set by a higher authority, and 
other. 
 
Overall, this framework is characterised by taking three dimensions into 
account, which demonstrates the division of power between levels of authorities, 
among different areas, with (no) limits/control. 
 
Karstanje: task areas of school management in three different grades of 
autonomy 
 
Karstanje’s (1999) framework outlines how systems, differing in their degrees 
of autonomy, work in a range of task areas of school management. Two dimensions 
are used for analysing autonomy – the degree and the areas – are combined in an 
analytical table. From it, five major task areas are identified, namely, teaching and 
curriculum, staff, school organisation, finances, buildings and facilities, and 
external relations; and each major area contains several sub-areas. To be specific, in 
a centralised and regulated system, the government regulates school management in 
all areas; in a moderately centralised and regulated system, the government only 
executes its control over some specific areas; and the government in the 
decentralised and deregulated system allows schools to make decisions with their 
own resources and limited by few/no rules. In particular, this framework is helpful 
in developing the interview design for this study. I shall provide more details about 
this in the methodology chapter. Table 2.1 shows part of this analytical table: 
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Table 2.1. Examples of task areas of school management in three different grades of 
autonomy 
Areas Sub-areas Centralised 
+ regulated 
Moderately 
centralised + 
moderately 
regulated 
Decentralised + 
deregulated 
Teaching 
and 
curriculum 
Subjects Prescribed 
subjects 
Compulsory + 
optional school 
subjects 
Free choice of 
subjects + groups 
of subjects 
Timetable Prescribed 
timetable 
Prescribed for the 
total number of 
lessons for the entire 
school period 
Free timetable 
                                                (Karstanje, 1999, p. 39) 
 
A new conceptual framework for analysing school autonomy 
 
Overall, there are two key dimensions of ‘autonomy’ identified in the 
aforementioned frameworks and in earlier conceptual discussions: the nature of the 
power that is transferred to the lower authority and the external mechanisms used to 
regulate the power transferred. It is necessary to create a new conceptual 
framework which combines these two themes, but with a specific focus on the 
autonomy enjoyed at the school level.  
Firstly, drawing on the ‘operational power’ and ‘criteria power’ defined by 
Winstanley et al. (1995), I distinguish the nature of school autonomy between 
‘operational power’ and ‘policy and operational power’ for the new framework. 
‘Operational power’, similarly, refers to the power that enables schools to 
determine how to implement policies formulated by the higher authority. ‘Policy 
and operational power’, covering both ‘operational power’ and ‘criteria power’, 
means that schools are able to make policies in terms of goals, standards and 
frameworks of school management and how to implement these policies. Secondly, 
these two types of power are exercised with strong or weak control imposed by the 
higher authority. Thus, four degrees of school autonomy are identified as shown in 
Table 2.2: 
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Table 2.2. Degrees of school autonomy in the new framework 
1. Operational power 
+ 
Strong control 
3. Policy and operational power  
+ 
Strong control 
2. Operational power  
+ 
Weak control 
4. Policy and operational power  
+ 
Weak control 
 
In addition, there are another two extreme degrees: (1) no autonomy: when no 
power is given to schools; and (2) full autonomy: when all kinds of decisions are 
made by schools. Thirdly, the analysis of school autonomy has to be made with 
reference to a specific area of school management. Based on the previous 
frameworks, six major areas and 29 sub-areas are identified and presented in Table 
2.3: 
 
Table 2.3. Areas of school management in new conceptual framework 
Areas Sub-areas 
Organisation and 
governance 
Organisation structure and functions; governance mechanism; 
and types of schools 
Finance Source(s) of funding; expenditure; land, buildings and facilities; 
and financial report and its availability 
Curriculum, 
teaching and 
examination 
Textbooks; subjects; content of subjects and curriculum 
delivery; SBCD; curriculum time allocation; school calendar; 
and entrance exams 
Teachers Qualification and training; hiring and dismissal; continuing 
professional development; appraisal; promotion; salary and 
bonuses; and legal status 
Accountability  Goals and standards; evaluation and inspection; annual report; 
and availability of information 
Pupil admission 
and external 
relations 
Pupil admission; relationship with other schools and business; 
level of parents’ involvement; and relationship with mass media 
(or interview requests in general) 
 
The nature and degree of school autonomy can only be meaningful when a 
certain type of power granted by a higher authority is assessed in a specific area. 
For example, if a school can only choose a textbook from a list of approved 
textbooks, it means that this school is given operational power with weak control; if 
a school can decide teachers’ salary within its budget, but the budget plan needs to 
be approved by a higher authority, then this school can be categorised as enjoying 
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policy and operational power with strong control. It is possible that a school enjoys 
different degrees of autonomy in different areas of school management. 
Figure 2.5 shows a complete picture of this new conceptual framework, which 
is constituted by reference to the nature and degree of the power, the external 
control and the area of school management. A benchmarking scheme is drawn up 
and presented in Appendix 1, which provides detailed descriptions of different 
natures and degrees of school autonomy in each sub-area. Later in this thesis, the 
three East Asian education systems are graded according to the scheme, drawing on 
the analysis of policy documents, literature and interview data.  
 
Figure 2.5. New conceptual framework for analysing school autonomy 
 
2.11. Conclusion 
 
    This chapter firstly investigated why and how EPB has emerged, developed 
69 
and spread, what elements and factors facilitate the production and management of 
evidence with regard to ‘what works’ in ‘reference societies’, how to understand 
the (political) motives and nature of EPB, the implications of this global trend and 
how to understand EPB from East to West from postcolonial perspectives. Two 
critical features of EPB are identified, which inform the analysis in this study. 
Firstly, the ‘socio-logic’ of domestic systems determines why external 
references are made, what evidence from ‘reference societies’ is considered as 
‘good’ and selectively ‘borrowed’, and how policy-makers manipulate the selective 
‘good’ evidence to reform their education systems. Secondly, an emerging ‘global 
policy network’ has increasingly intervened in the production, interpretation and 
circulation of deterritorised and decontextualised ‘world-class’ models and 
international standards in different national settings. These two features can assist 
the examination of why and how East Asian education systems have been imagined, 
constructed and utilised in the ‘global education policy field’, whether the policies 
and practices in East Asia have been ‘borrowed’ in England or merely ‘referenced’ 
for legitimacy seeking and who has dominated the knowledge production about 
East Asia as a ‘world-class’ system and ‘reference society’. 
School autonomy is taken as an illustrative example to examine EPB in this 
study. In official discourse, school autonomy reform is promoted as an 
administrative decentralisation strategy; however, it may also be employed to 
camouflage fiscal considerations and political purposes as ‘autonomy’ is seen as 
intrinsically moral and good. In understanding school autonomy, it is crucial to 
examine what type of power (operational and/or policy-oriented) is granted from 
higher authorities to schools in which areas, with or without external controls. 
These dimensions constitute a new framework created for this study to assess the 
nature and degree of school autonomy in East Asian societies. 
The theoretical, conceptual and explanatory foundations of understanding EPB 
and school autonomy have been established in this chapter. The next chapter 
demonstrates the design and process of collecting and analysing empirical data to 
address research questions.
70 
Chapter 3. Methodology and methods 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Thus far, I have elaborated the research questions, reviewed the literature on 
EPB and school autonomy, and developed a conceptual framework for answering 
my overall research question: how is school autonomy in East Asia represented by 
policy-makers in England since 2010 and does it accord with the ‘reality’ as 
perceived domestically. This chapter explains my methodological approach. 
Section 3.2 clarifies the ontological and epistemological stances adopted for 
perceiving reality, knowledge and ways to gain knowledge. Section 3.3 presents an 
overview of the research design in terms of three research questions, explains the 
accessibility issues faced collecting data and corresponding adjustments, and then 
specifically illustrates the development of the interview design. The data is 
introduced in section 3.4 through providing examples and enunciating the ways of 
collection. In section 3.5, the employment of qualitative document analysis and 
qualitative content analysis in data analysis is demonstrated. Ethical issues are 
considered in section 3.6. 
 
3.2. Ontological and epistemological stances 
 
In general, the acknowledgment of ontological and epistemological stances, 
which address questions of the nature of reality and what is (should be) accepted as 
knowledge (Flew, 1984; Guba & Lincoln, 1994), underlies researchers’ 
perspectives, approaches and methods, and guides research design and process 
(Trede & Higgs, 2009; Savin-Baden & Major, 2013). These considerations are of 
particular significance to the present study as it specifically aims to examine the 
‘reality’ of East Asian education systems as well as its English representation. 
Positivism advocates that reality is objective and external to social actors; 
‘genuine’ knowledge exists in natural phenomena; and researchers gain knowledge 
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through identifying neutral facts (Miller & Brewer, 2003). From this perspective, 
the quantitative approach and methods of natural sciences can and should be 
applied to the study of social world (Bryman, 2012). A researcher locating 
himself/herself in this tradition, as Alderson (1998) depicts, is like: 
 
“A scientist gazing through a microscope symbolises positivist objective 
examination, the distance and difference between the observer and the 
observed, the effort to examine intensely the tiniest part isolated from its 
context, the use of reliable, visible ‘hard’ data.” (p. 1007) 
 
In contrast, from the view of social constructionists, such as Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) and Gergen and Gergen (1991), reality is socially constructed 
through shared objects and activities and reciprocal interactions between 
individuals and groups. Accordingly, knowledge is not a “mirror of reality”, but 
rather “the interpretation and negotiation of the meaning of the world” embedded 
within history, context, culture, language and experiences (Kvale, 1996, p. 41). To 
gain knowledge is thus to “examine the process by which social world is 
constructed” (Walsh, 1972, p. 19) and “understand shared and co-constructed 
realities” by employing qualitative methodology (Savin-Baden & Major, 2013, p. 
62).  
Nevertheless, objectivism and a qualitative methodology are not mutually 
exclusive. As Ratner (2002) argues, “subjectivism is often regarded as the sine qua 
non of qualitative methodology. However, this is untrue. Qualitative methodology 
has an objectivist strand as well”. According to him, many qualitative 
methodologists accept objectivism in the sense that it is an “impersonal, reified, 
distorting concept” and able to “discount the subjectivity of subjects and 
researchers”. From this perspective, the ‘reality’, or more specifically, how school 
autonomy is operationalised and understood in each of the three East Asian 
societies, is approached by qualitatively collecting and analysing data. In other 
words, this study presents things as they are through gathering and examining the 
descriptions in documents and of interviewees. Besides, qualitative data provides 
‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973) and has “strong potential for revealing 
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complexity” of real life (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014, p. 11). In this sense, 
qualitative approach and data enable me not only to capture the ‘real’ state of 
school operational affairs, but also to understand the socio-political meaning behind 
it. 
These methodological considerations draw me to regard the researched and the 
researcher – myself – as “co-constructors of knowledge rather than conveyors and 
receivers of it” (Savin-Baden & Major, 2013, p. 63). In addition, I am aware that a 
gap might exist between interviewees’ ‘on-message’ utterances and their actual 
perceptions. Therefore, the ‘reality’ of school autonomy in East Asia is studied by 
analysing the data collected from various sources and perspectives. Its validity and 
reliability are warranted through triangulation that they are interwoven with each 
other to provide as in-depth a picture of the ‘reality’ as is possible. Meanwhile, as 
Cameron, Frazer, Harvey, Rampton and Richardson (1992) stress, researchers are 
“socially located persons” who “inevitably bring biographies and… subjectivities to 
every stage of research process” (p. 5). Inherent in this view of social research is 
the need of a further validation of data analysis, or as Miles et al. (2014) term 
‘conclusion drawing and verification’. By doing so, the meanings emerging from 
the data is tested for their confirmability. 
Moreover, this study is concerned with the representation of the ‘reality’ of 
school autonomy in East Asia by the UK Coalition Government, which involves the 
analysis of policy papers, official documents and politicians’ statements producing 
and delivering the ‘knowledge’ about foreign societies. According to Mannheim 
(1936), knowledge can be distorted and ideological if it is coloured by specific 
interests, purposes and points of view. Foucault (e.g. 1974, 1980 and 1982) 
emphasises that what counts as reality/truth is determined by the interaction 
between knowledge and power. Central to this argument is that knowledge and 
power are inseparable: “no power can be exercised without the extraction, 
appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge” (Foucault, quoted in 
Sheridan, 1980, p. 131); and knowledge is in turn produced and constrained by 
power.  
Saarinen (2008) observes that policy documents are often mistaken as 
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something that really exists, but rather what is seen as ‘real/true’ largely depends on 
what is constructed as ‘reality/truth’ by policy-makers. The socio-political 
understandings of reality and knowledge lead me to paying specific attention to the 
selection and interpretation of the ‘knowledge’ used as evidential basis in the 
political arena and linking this to the examination of the rationales and motivations 
of EPB in England. 
 
3.3. Research design, accessibility issues and adjustments 
 
Drawing on the philosophical stances and correspondent methodological 
considerations explained above, this section illustrates how this study, especially 
the interview, was designed and implemented to address the three research 
questions. It also elaborates the accessibility issues faced during the data collection 
and the adjustments adopted to solve them. 
 
Overview of the research design 
 
The first research question investigates the representation of school autonomy 
in East Asia by policy-makers since 2010. Qualitative document analysis is adopted 
to analyse the texts collected from: (1) official documents (i.e. policy papers, 
government-commissioned reports and announcements); (2) politicians’ statements 
published in or reported by mass media; and (3) key sources of evidence for official 
documents and politicians’ statements. 
Public-funded secondary schools in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai are 
focused to answer the second question – the ‘reality’ of school autonomy perceived 
within East Asia. Three sources of data are collected and analysed by using 
qualitative content analysis to determine the nature and degree of school autonomy 
in the three societies studied. The first is policy papers in relation to school 
governance and management; the second refers to academic literature that provides 
analyses of school autonomy in East Asia; the third involves interviews with school 
leaders, academics, policy-makers and education journalists. 
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Drawing on these three sources of data, I grade areas of school management in 
each system, according to the conceptual framework created in the literature review 
chapter. Then, I formulate three models of school autonomy for respective societies. 
Two school leaders from each society are invited to review and validate the models. 
In addressing the third research question, the English representation and the ‘reality’ 
perceived domestically, models of the three East Asian societies, are respectively 
compared and discussed. A diagram demonstrating the research design is shown as 
Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Overview of the research design for this study 
 
Accessibility issues and adjustments 
 
A major problem emerging from the process of data collection was access to 
interviewees which rendered necessary adjustments of the interview design. In 
Singapore, researchers are strictly required to apply for permission from the 
Ministry of Education to conduct data collection in schools. The application 
documents include a form explaining the purpose, methodology, sample and time 
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period of the research, a list of interview questions and a reference letter from the 
supervisor. Before submitting the application, my interview request was accepted 
by four Singaporean principals whom I was introduced to through personal contacts. 
However, my research request was rejected by Singapore Ministry of Education 
without explanation. When I arrived in Singapore, I again attempted to gain 
permission to carry out my research. The rejection was repeated. Because of this, 
the four principals were no longer officially able to contribute to my study, as 
teachers and principals are civil servants in Singapore and are required to comply 
with the rule. 
The situation in Shanghai was better, although still not ideal; there was no 
formal application required, but ‘restrictions’ were manifested in another way. I 
provided a detailed information sheet and a consent form in advance to explain that 
this study would not be making any political judgement, a number of measures 
would be in place to protect private information, and interviewees’ rights would be 
always prioritised during the interview. However, school autonomy is still a 
politically sensitive topic from some potential interviewees’ points of view. In the 
end, the number of school leaders that I managed to talk to was fewer than I had 
hoped. The data collection in Hong Kong went much more smoothly than that in 
Singapore and Shanghai. As I demonstrate in the analysis chapters, compare to their 
counterparts in the other two societies, Hongkongers, including school leaders and 
teachers, are more used to freely express their opinions in public. 
In order to cope with the insufficient interview data in Singapore and Shanghai, 
firstly, I changed the interview sample by including more sources of interviewees, 
such as academics who have worked in secondary schools and/or are experts in 
school governance and management, policy-makers from education authorities and 
experienced education journalists. 
This adjustment has in fact broadened and deepened my interview design and 
the whole study. Academics can perceive education systems in the historical and 
social background, and some of them, who have been worked in more than one East 
Asian society, were able to provide a comparative perspective. Additionally, the 
accessibility issues demonstrate a powerful example of autonomy in school settings 
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and in the broader political and social contexts of East Asia – there appear to be 
both visible and invisible hands controlling school leaders’ (or in general 
individuals’) speech and actions. Whether or not schools can achieve high levels of 
autonomy in a relatively less autonomous and democratic society, or what kind of 
school autonomy is possible in this kind of society, although they are beyond the 
scope of this thesis, may to some extent further my understanding of school 
autonomy in East Asia. 
Secondly, I managed to informally meet those Singaporean principals who 
initially agreed to my interview requests and had conversations with them about 
school management at their schools. During these informal ‘interviews’, I was 
asked not to record and quote the data directly in my thesis due to the lack of 
official permission. Nevertheless, the data, kept as footnotes, significantly facilitate 
my understanding of school governance and management and the whole education 
system in Singapore. Therefore, I still counted them as the ‘interviewees’. This is 
further discussed in the section of ethical considerations. 
 
Interview design 
 
The use of interviews in qualitative research is to understand what – the 
activities of everyday life, as well as how – people make meanings of their 
activities of everyday life (Fontana & Frey, 2003; Seidman, 2013). The purpose of 
the interview in this study is to explore the nature and degree of autonomy that 
schools enjoy at the implemented level in various areas of school management. The 
focus is more on interviewees’ experience as ‘avenues’ to reliable factual 
information rather than their own perspectives upon the events (Kvale & Brikmann, 
2009). Thus, the interview questions developed here were structured and 
standardised to a certain extent; that is, they were initially based on the analysis of 
the different elements of school management identified in Karstanje’s (1999) 
conceptual framework of school autonomy which was explained in the literature 
review chapter. 
Nevertheless, the interviews also required some flexibility for two reasons. 
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Firstly, each of the three East Asian education systems has different types of 
schools, organised and managed according to different legislations and frameworks. 
It is necessary to adjust the interview questions in terms of specific national settings. 
Secondly, the interview seeks to elicit rich and detailed answers, as “deep 
information” allowing the interviewer to achieve the same level of knowledge and 
understanding as the “real-life members” of the events focused (Johnson, 2002, p. 
106). Therefore, the interviews were designed to be semi-structured, which enabled 
me to follow pre-set questions but also to flexibly react to interviewees’ replies 
(Savin-Baden & Major, 2013). Drawing on Bryman’s (2012) description of 
semi-structured interview, the list of interview questions in this study was referred 
as an interview guide specifying the areas to be covered; the order of the questions 
was not fixed; and “similar wording” was used from interviewee to interviewee (p. 
471). 
As mentioned above, school leaders, including principals, vice-principals, 
recently retired principals and heads of department, academics, policy-makers and 
education journalists were targeted as the sources of interviewees. I did not 
establish a number as to how many interviewees would be ‘enough’ for my study. 
As Seidman (2013) suggests, “‘enough’ is an interactive reflection of every step of 
the interview process… [and] practical exigencies of time, money, and other 
resources also play a role, especially in doctoral research” (p.58). Therefore, I was 
prepared to be open to all the potential interview opportunities during data 
collection. Most interviews were carried out face-to-face; but in order to overcome 
the limitations of time and space, I also did four interviews via email and telephone, 
as interviewees’ social cues are not critical information sources in this study 
(Opdenakker, 2006). 
 
Interview questions 
 
In the literature review chapter, I have developed a conceptual framework for 
analysing school autonomy. But when I first started to design the interview 
questions, that framework had not been created. At that time, I was interested in 
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Karstanje’s framework and organised the interview questions preliminarily 
according to 21 sub-areas of school task identified in that framework, as shown in 
Table 3.1: 
 
Table 3.1. School task areas and sub-areas in Karstanje’s framework  
Task areas Sub-areas 
Teaching and 
curriculum 
subjects, timetable, content, and exams 
Staff qualification of staff, in-service training, appointment and 
dismissal, and appraisal 
School 
organisation 
structure of school, differentiation (streaming and setting) and 
decision-making structure 
Finances, buildings 
and facilities 
source of finances, management of finances, responsibility for 
buildings and facilities, information system, salary of staff, 
and legal status of staff 
External relations recruitment of pupils, competition between schools, 
relationship with other schools and business, and negotiations 
with unions 
 
As elaborated in the literature review chapter, Karstanje’s framework also 
describes three different levels of school autonomy in each sub-area, which further 
facilitated the refining of the interview questions. Table 3.2 shows the examples of 
the interview questions developed in the task area of ‘Teaching and Curriculum’. 
 
Table 3.2. Examples of the interview questions derived from Karstanje’s framework 
Sub-areas Centralised 
+ regulated 
Moderately 
centralised + 
moderately 
regulated 
Decentralised + 
deregulated 
Interview 
questions 
Subjects Prescribed 
subjects 
Compulsory + 
optional school 
subjects 
Free choice of 
subjects + 
groups of 
subjects 
Can school make 
the decision 
about which 
subjects should 
be taught? 
Timetable Prescribed 
timetable 
Prescribed for 
the total number 
of lessons for the 
entire school 
period 
Free timetable Who make the 
timetable about 
school terms and 
days and the 
timing for school 
events and 
examinations? 
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Content Content of 
lessons is 
prescribed 
National core 
curriculum 
specified 
Indications of 
broad aims 
How do teachers 
in your school 
plan and deliver 
their lessons? 
 
Karstanje’s framework provides a comprehensive list of areas of school task. 
However, there are still some areas missing but worthy of consideration. Therefore, 
when I was designing the interview questions, I added one new area and three sub- 
areas to Karstanje’s categories (as shown in Table 3.1). They are: 
- ‘Textbooks’ in ‘teaching and examination’: day-to-day teaching and learning in 
East Asia are mainly based on textbooks (Morris & Adamson, 2010; Ho & 
Gopinathan, 1999). Here, I focus on who approves textbooks can be used in 
schools and who chooses textbooks for a specific school. 
- SBCD in ‘teaching and examination’: SBCD has been increasingly promoted 
in East Asia since the 1980s (Marsh et al., 2014; Gopinathan & Deng, 2006; 
Tan, 2013). The interview is concerned with how SBCD is organised in schools 
in terms of the teaching materials, time allocation and examinations. 
- ‘Parents’ in ‘external relations’: to what extent that parents have the power over 
managing schools in East Asia is of particular interest in this study, as their 
counterparts in England are allowed to set up schools. 
- ‘Accountability’ – the increase of school autonomy has been companied by the 
promotion of school accountability in many societies, including East Asia (Law, 
2007; Ng, 2008; Tan, 2013). In this study, I mainly concentrate on how schools 
are evaluated, what are the domains and criteria evaluated, who is responsible 
for determining the criteria and to what extent the information from evaluations 
is made available to the public. 
As more interviewees from different backgrounds have been included in this 
study, questions related to the historical development of school autonomy, the 
tension between the central government and local authorities regarding the 
redistribution of power, and the contextual factors impacting on school autonomy, 
were particularly raised in the interviews with academics, policy-makers and 
education journalists. The revised categories of school task areas and the full list of 
80 
interview questions are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
3.4. The data 
 
The sources of the data used to answer the research questions are briefly 
mentioned earlier. This section demonstrates the ways of collection and presents 
examples of the data collected. 
 
The English representation of school autonomy in East Asia 
 
EPB is likely to be initiated in order to promote and legitimate new policy 
reforms. Thus, one way of collecting the data to answer the first research question 
is to identify the key official texts related to significant changes of school autonomy. 
The terms such as ‘autonomy’, ‘accountability’, ‘competition’, ‘decentralisation’, 
‘Academies’ and ‘Free Schools’ were employed as keywords to narrow down the 
searching scope. In addition, specific East Asian societies (namely Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Shanghai and China), ‘East’ (or Far East) and ‘Asia’ were used as 
another group of keywords. The data were sought on: (1) the UK Government 
website (https://www.gov.uk/) which stores all policy papers, announcements, 
publications, statistics and consultations; and (2) the websites of various 
mainstream mass media in England, such as the BBC, Times Educational 
Supplement, The Telegraph and The Guardian. From the official documents, their 
key sources of evidence were then identified and gathered. Examples are shown in 
Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3. Examples of the data for analysing the English representation  
 
Nature of the 
documents 
Documents 
Policy papers - White Paper: Higher standards, better schools for all: More 
choice for parents and pupils (Department for Education and 
Skills, 2005) 
- White Paper – The Importance of Teaching (DfE, 2010) 
- National Curriculum (DfE, 2013) 
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Announcements
(speeches and 
press release) 
Speeches: 
- Michael Gove’s speech to the Policy Exchange on free schools 
(Gove, 2011a) 
- Education Minister Elizabeth Truss speaks about delivering 
world-class schools (Truss, 2014a) 
- The fruits of autonomy (Gibb, 2014) 
Press release: 
- More than one million children now taught in academies (DfE, 
2014, July 9) 
- Hundreds of ‘coasting’ schools to be transformed (DfE, 2015, 
June 30) 
Government- 
commissioned 
reports 
 
- Could Do Better: Using International Comparisons to Refine 
the National Curriculum in England (Oates, 2010) 
- The Framework for the National Curriculum. A report by the 
Expert Panel for the National Curriculum Review (DfE, 2011) 
Politicians’ 
statements 
published in and 
reported by 
mass media 
- Pisa slip should put a rocket under our world-class ambitions 
and drive us to win the education space race (Gove, 2010, 
December 17) 
- My revolution for culture in classroom (Gove, 2010, December 
28) 
- British schools need a Chinese lesson (Truss, 2014, March 4) 
Key sources of 
evidence for 
official 
documents and 
politicians’ 
statements 
- 2007 McKinsey report: How the World’s Best Performing 
School Systems Come Out Up (Barber & Mourshed, 2007) 
- OECD 2010 PISA report: PISA 2009 Results: What Students 
Know and Can Do – Student Performance in Reading, 
Mathematics and Science (Volume I) (OECD, 2010a) 
- Policy Exchange report: A Rising Tide: The Competitive 
Benefits of Free Schools (Porter & Simons, 2015) 
 
‘Reality’ of school autonomy in East Asia perceived within domestic contexts 
 
In addressing the second research question, the existing literature examining 
the historical and current development of school autonomy in East Asia was 
reviewed, through which part of the key policy papers were identified. The 
keywords, such as ‘autonomy’, ‘school-based management’ and ‘decentralisation’, 
were also employed to search policy papers on governments’ websites of selected 
East Asian societies. The analysis of these papers provides an understanding of the 
rationales and motives of decentralisation reforms, the operation of central 
regulation frameworks, and the power and responsibility of schools described at the 
policy level. Governments’ websites and examples of policy papers are respectively 
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shown in Table 3.4 and 3.5: 
 
Table 3.4. Governments’ websites of Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai (China) 
Country/region Websites 
Hong Kong Government Record Service 
http://www.grs.gov.hk/ws/english/home.htm 
Education Bureau http://www.edb.gov.hk/en/index.html 
Singapore National Archives of Singapore: http://www.nas.gov.sg/ 
Ministry of Education http://www.moe.gov.sg/ 
Shanghai 
(China) 
Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 
http://www.shmec.gov.cn/ 
People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Education  
http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_27
92/index.html 
 
Table 3.5. Examples of the data for examining the ‘reality’ perceived in Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Shanghai (China) 
Country/region Documents 
Hong Kong - Codes of Aid for secondary schools (Hong Kong Government, 
1994) 
- Report of the Bills Committee on Education (Amendment) Bill 
2002 (Legislative Council, 2004) 
Singapore - Singapore learning, creating and communicating: A 
curriculum review (Singapore Ministry of Education, 1997) 
- The school excellence model: A Guide (Singapore Ministry of 
Education, 2000) 
Shanghai 
(China) 
- Regulation on primary and secondary school teachers’ 
continuing professional development (Chinese Ministry of 
Education, 1999) 
- Shanghai’s Middle and Long Term Education Reform and 
Development Plan (2010–2020) (Shanghai Municipal 
Education Commission, 2010) 
 
In addition to policy papers which provide a portrayal of official intention, the 
data derived from interviews is also gathered to interrogate how policy was 
interpreted and operationalised within schools. There are 29 interviews conducted 
from November 2012 to May 2013; during this period, I was in Shanghai for two 
months, Hong Kong three months and Singapore six weeks. Each interview lasted 
approximately one hour. The places for interview were chosen by interviewees, 
mainly in their office rooms; four of them were interviewed through emails and 
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telephone. 
The choice of interviewees was expedient; all of them were approached 
through personal contacts – introduced by my supervisor, colleagues and friends. 
Nonetheless, in each society, I managed to make the sample cover the main types of 
schools and took diversity into consideration. Moreover, school leaders were 
selected because, apart from being responsible for school daily operation, they have 
also been active in various policy advisories and/or principal representative bodies 
that are part of the broader policy community; and other interviewees were selected 
as they are specialists in, and have commented publicly on aspects of, school 
governance.  
More specifically, in Hong Kong, I interviewed four principals from aided 
schools and two principals from direct subsidy schools. Due to the accessibility 
problem in Singapore, I formally interviewed one principal
12
 and informally 
‘interviewed’ four principals; all of them were from government schools (two were 
principals of autonomous government schools). In Shanghai, six principals from 
government schools and one head of department from a private school were 
interviewed
13
. On top of these, I interviewed nine academics, one policy-maker and 
one senior education journalist. The descriptive summary of the composition of 
interviewees is provided in Appendix 3. 
 
3.5. Data analysis 
 
Hatch (2002) explains that “data analysis is a systematic search for meaning” 
(p. 148). The ultimate goal of qualitative data analysis is “to make sense out of the 
data” (Merriam, 2009, p. 203) by “breaking data into meaningful parts” 
(Savin-Baden & Major, 2013, p. 434) in a way that “allow[s] researchers to see 
patterns, identify themes, discover relationships, develop explanations, make 
interpretation, mount critiques, or generate theories” (Hatch, 2002, p. 148). This 
                                                             
12 I was introduced to this principal outside of Singapore. He accepted my interview request after I informed 
him that I did not receive the official permission. 
13 More details about the nature and proportion of these aforementioned types of schools are provided in the 
chapters examining respective East Asian societies. 
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section is to demonstrate the analysis methods used in this study, which are 
determined according to the nature of the data and the purposes of the research 
questions. 
 
Qualitative document analysis 
 
The adoption of qualitative document analysis is to address the first research 
question. Atkinson and Coffey (2011) define ‘documents’ as ‘social facts’. From a 
similar perspective, Silverman (2014) points out that constructionists who study 
documents focus on “the process through which texts depict ‘reality’” (p. 285). 
Throughout this study, concrete texts with regard to ‘school autonomy’ and 
particularly ‘school autonomy in East Asia’ were extracted from official documents 
and politicians’ statements. Then, five categories, serving as ‘inductive codes’, 
emerged from these texts, in terms of the ways that reforms of increasing school 
autonomy were legitimated. Table 3.6 presents the examples and frequency of the 
texts in the key policy paper – the 2010 Schools White Paper (DfE, 2010); and 
Table 3.7 shows the examples in politicians’ statements. 
 
Table 3.6. Examples and frequency of the texts promoting school autonomy in the 
2010 Schools White Paper 
Category Example (s) Frequency 
Citing East 
Asian societies 
- “Finland and South Korea – the highest 
performing countries in PISA – have clearly 
defined and challenging universal standards, 
along with individual school autonomy.” (p. 4) 
1 
Making general 
statements 
(including 
generally citing 
‘international 
evidence’) 
- “Across the world, the case for the benefits of 
school autonomy has been established beyond 
doubt.” (p. 11) 
- “Analysis of the international evidence also 
demonstrates that, alongside school autonomy, 
accountability for student performance is critical 
to driving educational improvement.” (p. 12) 
6 
Citing societies 
other than East 
Asia (including 
citing national 
evidence) 
- “In many of the highest performing jurisdictions, 
school autonomy is central. In high-performing 
US States, Charter Schools…” 
- “In Sweden, pupils who attend state-funded 
independent Free Schools outperform those in 
5 
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other state schools.” (pp. 51) 
- “In this country, the record of independent state 
schools provides a striking testimony to the 
power of autonomy.” (p. 51) 
Citing evidence 
from specific 
research sources 
- “The OECD has shown that countries which give 
the most autonomy to head teachers and teachers 
are the ones that do best.” (pp. 3-4) 
- “Analysis of PISA data shows that the features of 
the strongest education systems combine 
autonomy (e.g. over staffing powers at school 
level) with accountability (e.g. systematic and 
external pupil-level assessments).” (p. 51) 
3 
Providing 
details of school 
autonomy 
enjoyed in 
high-performing 
systems
14
 
- “Across the world, the case for the benefits of 
school autonomy has been established beyond 
doubt. In a school system with good quality 
teachers, flexibility in the curriculum and clearly 
established accountability measures, it makes 
sense to devolve as much day-to-day 
decision-making as possible to the front line.” (p. 
11) 
- “Analysis of PISA data shows that the features of 
the strongest education systems combine 
autonomy (e.g. over staffing powers at school 
level) with accountability (e.g. systematic and 
external pupil-level assessments).” (p. 51) 
2 
 
Table 3.7. Examples of the texts promoting school autonomy in politicians’ 
statements 
Category Examples 
Citing East 
Asian societies 
- “In Singapore… Schools where principals are exercising a 
progressively greater degree of operational autonomy are 
soaring ahead.” (Gove, 2011a) 
- “The third reform imperative is greater autonomy for head 
teachers. There is a strong correlation in these league tables 
between freedom for heads – in systems like Singapore, 
Shanghai and Hong Kong – and improved results.” (Gove, 
2013) 
- “The fifth pillar of reform is freedom for heads to recruit and 
reward the best. Shanghai, the world’s best-performing 
education system, has a rigorous system of 
performance-related pay.” (Gove, 2013) 
Making general - “Across the world, then, autonomy is proving a key driver of 
                                                             
14 Texts fell under this category provide comparatively more information about school autonomy in specific 
societies; however, as I shall demonstrate and argue in the following analysis chapters, the information is still 
vague and limited. 
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statements 
(including 
generally citing 
‘international 
evidence’) 
success.” (Gove, 2011b) 
- “… if we look at many of the high-performing and 
fast-improving education systems certain common features 
recur…there is a high level of autonomy from bureaucracy for 
headteachers.” (Gove, 2013) 
Citing societies 
other than East 
Asia 
- “And in America - where the Charter Schools system 
implemented by New York and Chicago is perhaps the 
quintessential model of school autonomy - the results are 
extraordinary.” (Gove, 2011a) 
Citing evidence 
from other 
sources 
- “As the OECD points out, two of the most successful countries 
in PISA – Hong Kong and Singapore – are among those with 
the highest levels of school competition.” (Gove, 2010, 
December 17) 
- “To quote from the OECD: “In countries where schools have 
greater autonomy over what is taught and how students are 
assessed, students tend to perform better.” (Gibb, 2012) 
Providing 
details of school 
autonomy 
enjoyed in 
high-performing 
systems 
- “In Singapore… Schools where principals are exercising a 
progressively greater degree of operational autonomy are 
soaring ahead.” (Gove, 2011a) 
- “Shanghai, the world’s best-performing education system, has 
a rigorous system of performance-related pay.” (Gove, 2013) 
 
By categorising the texts, large amounts of data were condensed into “a 
smaller number of analytic units”, which helped me to develop “a cognitive map” 
to understand “local incidents and interactions” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 86). Within 
each category, I further investigated: (1) the descriptions of school autonomy in 
‘reference societies’ provided by the UK Government and its key sources of 
evidence; and (2) the nature, degree and management areas of school autonomy 
promoted in England with reference to East Asia. 
 
Qualitative content analysis 
 
Qualitative content analysis is adopted to answer the second research question, 
which is defined by Hsieh and Shannona (2005) as “a research method for the 
subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic 
classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (p. 1278). To be 
specific, it attempts to preserve the advantages of its quantitative origin – content 
87 
analysis – to make “replicable and valid inferences” (Krippendorf, 1980, p. 21). 
This is achieved by establishing a coding frame containing a set of categories 
(Patton, 2002; Schreier, 2012). Further, as Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) argue, 
unlike the quantitative version merely counting words of random sampling, it 
allows researchers to understand social reality through exploring the “meanings 
underlying physical messages… purposively selected… which can inform the 
research question” (p. 308). These characteristics of qualitative content analysis 
enable the present study to categorise and analyse the nature and degree of school 
autonomy in specific contexts according to the developed conceptual framework. 
Mayring (2000) identifies two approaches of qualitative content analysis in 
terms of how a coding frame develops, namely, ‘inductive category development’ 
and ‘deductive category application’. The inductive approach requires the initial 
formulation of category definitions (criterion of selection), based on theoretical 
background and research questions, which determine “the aspects of the textual 
material taken into account”. Following these definitions, researchers immerse 
themselves in the data to tentatively draw inductive categories and constantly revise 
them until no additional new concepts can be found. The deductive approach differs 
from the inductive one as it “works with prior formulated, theoretical derived 
aspects of analysis, bringing them in connection with the text”. It requires “explicit 
definitions, examples, and coding rules for each deductive category” in order to 
identify “under what circumstance a text passage can be coded with a category”. 
These category definitions constitute the coding agenda employed to work through 
the data. 
The analysis of school autonomy in East Asia was divided into two stages of 
coding; the two approaches of qualitative content analysis were both used at the 
second stage. More specifically, the first stage of coding was assembling chunks of 
the data under the same topic, categorising it into corresponding management areas 
identified and conducting ‘descriptive coding’ (Miles et al., 2014). Examples of this 
stage of coding are shown in Table 3.8. 
 
 
88 
Table 3.8. Examples of the first stage of coding 
Area of 
school 
management 
Original texts Coding 
 
Textbooks - “The textbooks / learning materials shown 
on this Recommended Textbook List have 
been vetted by the appropriate Reviewing 
Panels of the Bureau's Textbook Committee 
and are recommended for use in schools.” 
(Extracted from the website of Hong Kong 
Education Bureau [EDB]) 
- “We are required to choose textbooks from 
the recommended book list”; “Each subject 
department exercises their own 
professional judgment in choosing what 
textbook they would like to have.” 
(Principal Q from Hong Kong, extracted 
from the interview transcript) 
Schools choose 
textbooks from 
the 
recommended 
list 
Appointment 
and dismissal 
of teachers 
- “There are some requirements of academic 
qualification set by the Education Bureau. 
Every school in Hong Kong follows 
that…degree holders plus professional 
teachers’ training”; “It’s up to me to 
employ those teachers…” (Principal Q 
from Hong Kong, extracted from the 
interview transcript) 
- “Any person who wishes to teach in a 
school must be registered under the 
Education Ordinance as either a registered 
teacher or a permitted teacher. Registered 
teachers are persons who possess the 
approved teacher qualifications laid down 
in the Education Ordinance, whereas 
permitted teachers are in possession of 
academic qualifications only” (Extracted 
from the EDB website) 
Education 
Bureau 
determines the 
number of 
teachers 
 
Schools make 
decisions on the 
appointment of 
teachers 
following the 
requirements set 
by the Education 
Bureau 
 
At the second stage, the deductive approach was applied primarily; the 
categories and coding rules were derived from the benchmarking scheme of the 
conceptual framework developed for this study. Table 3.9 and 3.10 respectively 
show the categories and coding rules in the areas of ‘textbooks’ and ‘appointment 
and dismissal of teachers’. 
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Table 3.9. Examples of the deductive categories and coding rules for analysing 
school autonomy with regard to the ‘textbooks’ 
Category 
(nature and degree 
of school autonomy) 
Coding rule 
No autonomy (0) Determined by a higher authority 
Operation –  
strong control (1) 
Textbooks are determined by a higher authority; deviation 
needs to be approved 
Operation –  
weak control (2) 
A list of approved textbooks from which schools may choose 
Policy and operation 
– strong control (3) 
Textbooks are determined by schools, but need to be approved 
by a higher authority 
Policy and operation 
– weak control (4) 
Textbooks are determined by schools, in compliance with 
guidelines issued by a higher authority 
Full autonomy (5) Freely determined by schools 
 
Table 3.10. Examples of the deductive categories and coding rules for analysing 
school autonomy with regard to the ‘appointment and dismissal of teachers’ 
Category  
(nature and degree 
of school autonomy) 
Coding rule 
No autonomy (0) Selected, appointed and dismissed by a higher authority 
Operation –  
strong control (1) 
Contract is signed with and terminated by a higher authority; 
schools may selected qualified candidates, approved by a 
higher authority 
Operation –  
weak control (2) 
Contract is signed with and terminated by a higher authority; 
schools may selected qualified candidates, in compliance with 
guidelines issued by a higher authority 
Policy and operation 
– strong control (3) 
Selected, appointed and dismissed by schools, but need to be 
approved by a higher authority 
Policy and operation 
– weak control (4) 
Selected, appointed and dismissed by schools, in compliance 
with guidelines issued by a higher authority 
Full autonomy (5) Selected, appointed and dismissed by schools freely 
 
Based on the first stage of coding, I graded school autonomy in each 
management areas according to the deductive categories and coding rules, which is, 
as Miles et al. (2014) term, ‘evaluation coding’. These grades combined with 
summative descriptions form the models of school autonomy in selected East Asian 
societies. It is noteworthy that the real situation sometimes covers two coding rules. 
For example, in Singapore, the majority of teachers are selected and assigned by the 
Ministry of Education, while schools can hire a small number of contact teachers. 
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Half point was given in this case; that is, the degree of school autonomy regarding 
teachers’ appointment and dismissal in Singapore should be 0.5. Examples of the 
second stage of coding are provided in Table 3.11. 
 
Table 3.11. Examples of the second stage of coding 
Area of school 
management 
First stage of coding Second stage of 
coding 
Textbooks Schools choose textbooks from a 
recommended list 
Operational – weak 
control (2) 
Appointment and 
dismissal of teachers 
Education Bureau determines the 
standards and number of teacher 
appointment 
Operational – strong 
control (1) 
 
Atkinson (1992) describes a given set of categories as “a powerful conceptual 
grid” which helps organise the data analysis, but may also results in the ignorance 
of uncategorised activities (p. 459). Although this ‘grid’ is difficult to “escape” 
(Silverman, 2014, p. 118), I tried to minimise this defect by being flexible and open 
to new information emerged from the data and accordingly revising the conceptual 
categories. A few inductive categories were integrated into the conceptual 
framework as new (sub-) areas of school management. For example, during the 
interviews, many principals mentioned that they have been restricted to promote 
teachers as the ratio of the professional entitlement is strictly set by the higher 
authority. Therefore, teachers’ promotion was added to the conceptual framework. 
 
3.6. Reflection on researcher positionality 
 
Kezar (2002) notes that “people have multiple overlapping identities… thus 
[they] make meaning from various aspects of their identity…” (p. 96). In this sense, 
my position as a researcher, both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ in the three Asian societies, 
came into play to set up a ‘dialectic relationship’ (Freire, 2000) in a ‘shared space’ 
(England, 1994) with the researched. More specifically, these Asian societies are 
primarily considered as part of the Greater China region, profoundly influenced by 
Confucian heritage. Thus, the common ethnic and cultural background enabled me, 
as an ‘insider’, to quickly establish a kind of sense of familiarity with most of 
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interviewees and to better understand their underlying messages. Nevertheless, this 
may also lead to a tacit understanding between us. For example, some interviewees 
said that ‘as a Chinese, you know…’ and then stopped explaining. In this case, I 
was aware that I had to dig further about their perceptions rather than make 
assumptions as to what they meant. 
I was introduced as an ‘academic researcher’ from one of the top UK 
universities to my interviewees through personal contacts. This seemed to facilitate 
the establishment of trust even before I formally met them. At the same time, my 
position also raised the suspicion of talking to an ‘outsider’ from a western 
university, especially in Singapore and Shanghai, which seemed to reflect the lack 
of autonomy in the school setting in these two East Asian societies. Although this 
issue prevented many potential interviewees from participating in this study, as a 
result, people who accepted the interview request were usually more critical and 
open-minded than their counterparts, and felt freer and more comfortable about 
providing details and explanations on their answers.  
In addition, I worked as a voluntary teacher in a Chinese secondary school 
before I came to the UK. Thus I had experience of building good relationships with 
Chinese school principals. This is important in this study because principals in East 
Asia are at the top of the school internal hierarchy and enjoy social respect due to 
the Confucian heritage. As Robson (2002) argues, elites and professionals expect to 
express their particular views. During the interviews, I had a strong impression that 
principals would like to be heard. Therefore, I added some open-ended questions at 
the end of interviews. Thomas (1995) describes his feeling in interviewing 
‘powerful people’: “…like a suppliant granted audience with a dignitary. I must 
admit to have felt ‘honoured’ to be granted time with a well-known executive…” (p. 
7). Similarly, I found that a degree of flattery and appreciation of being granted an 
interview seemed to encourage their participation.  
 
3.7. Ethical considerations 
 
Obtaining informed consent is in many respects central to most ethical 
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guidelines (Bryman, 2012; Silverman, 2013). In the present study, a detailed but 
non-technical (in a format that is easy to understand) information sheet, shown in 
Appendix 4, was provided when I first contacted potential interviewees. It 
illustrates the background of the researcher, the aims of the research and the way of 
conducting the interview, and provides examples of the interview questions. This 
was to make sure that potential interviewees were fully aware of the nature and 
implication of the research, and their roles within it at the outset (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009; Oliver, 2014). In the information sheet, I also explained the ways 
in which confidentiality and anonymity would be guaranteed and further promised 
that interviewees can skip any questions that they do not want to answer, terminate 
the whole interview at any point, or even withdraw the interview records if they 
change their minds afterwards (Ryen, 2007). 
A consent form, shown in Appendix 5, was used to obtain interviewees’ 
official agreement of their participation and confirm whether they would like to be 
informed about how their records are used in the research analysis and the 
outcomes of the research (Marzano, 2012). It serves as protection for both 
interviewees and interviewer (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Therefore, at the very 
beginning of every interview, I made sure that interviewees had read the 
information sheet and had no further questions about the interview as well as the 
whole research, and then asked them to sign the consent form. However, some 
interviewees do not mind being interviewed for this study, but prefer not to sign the 
form out of many considerations such as being identified by other people. I showed 
my understanding and followed their requests. 
As I failed to gain official permission to collect data in Singapore, another 
ethical issue is what I should do when I got chance to ‘talk’ to Singaporean school 
leaders. Through personal contact, my requests for interview were accepted by four 
principals before I was informed about the permission application result. I decided 
to tell the truth and see whether they were willing to engage in this research in some 
other ways. They still informally met me and helped me to understand school 
governance and management in Singapore. As promised, I strictly followed their 
requests – no type records were made and no direct quotations were used in this 
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thesis. The only Singaporean principal formally interviewed and quoted in this 
thesis was fully informed the situation of the official permission before I invited 
him to participate in this study and the interview was taken outside of Singapore. 
All personal information in transcription was removed and pseudonyms were 
used to eliminate the risk of identification of the interviewees. In the case of the 
interviews related to Hong Kong and Shanghai, the information about the school 
was also carefully obscured. The majority of schools in Hong Kong are operated by 
a range of school sponsoring bodies. Some massive sponsoring bodies own a great 
number of schools, while some of them only have one or two schools. In Shanghai, 
many schools have their distinctive specialities, such as arts, foreign languages and 
science. It would not be difficult to identify the school and then the principal 
through the hint of the names of the sponsoring bodies and the specialities. In 
considering confidentiality, I deliberately omitted this kind of detail when I was 
transcribing the interviews, although I acknowledge that this may erode the 
consistency of the interview data to some degree. 
 
3.8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has elaborated the methodological considerations, approaches and 
methods adopted in this study. To be concrete, I have drawn on perspectives that 
the ‘reality’ and the knowledge representing the ‘reality’ are socially-constructed 
and intrinsically-interwoven with power. Therefore, this study has been designed as: 
(1) qualitative document analysis is used to investigate the English representation 
of school autonomy in East Asia (research question one); (2) the ‘reality’ of that 
perceived by insiders is approached by qualitative content analysis (research 
question two); and (3) these two examinations are then compared and discussed 
(research question three). 
In order to guarantee the validity and reliability, I have collected data from a 
range of sources and various perspectives, including official documents, politicians’ 
statements, and their key sources of evidence; academic literature; and interview 
with school leaders, academics, policy-makers and educational journalists. 
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Furthermore, two school leaders from each society were invited to validate the 
analysis of the data. The accessibility of the potential interviewees was a major 
problem and the main ethical concern during the data collection. The lack of 
interviewees in Singapore led to the adjustments of research design – more 
interviewees were included. This change has broadened and deepened the interview 
and the whole study in that East Asian education systems have been approached 
from more perspectives. 
The following chapters respectively answer the research questions, starting 
from examining the English representation. 
95 
Chapter 4. School autonomy in East Asia: the English 
representation 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In addressing the first research question presented in the introductory chapter, 
this chapter examines the evidential basis on which school autonomy has been 
promoted by the Coalition Government, particularly with regard to the 
high-performing education systems in East Asia. It begins by reviewing EPB in 
England from 1985 to 2010, which explores how foreign exemplars increasingly 
inspired or legitimated significant policy changes before the Coalition Government 
took office (section 4.2). Then, it traces the development of school autonomy in 
England from 2000 to 2010 before the Schools White Paper (SWP) was published; 
by doing so, the recent reforms and the nature of policy intent can be understood 
from a historical perspective (section 4.3). 
Subsequent to these two historical reviews, this chapter specifically focuses on 
the English representation of school autonomy in East Asia (section 4.4), drawing 
from: (1) the SWP – the key policy paper that set the Government’s policy direction 
and principles; and (2) official statements, extracted from government- 
commissioned reports, politicians’ speeches and press release, which have 
reiterated and reinforced the Government’s claims in the SWP. It then investigates 
three of the key sources of evidence on which the English representation has been 
based – the OECD, Policy Exchange15 and McKinsey & Company (McKinsey), to 
probe how evidence has been selected to support the Government’s policy agendas 
(section 4.5). The policy initiatives legitimated by the English representation, 
particularly in relation to Academies and Free Schools, are also analysed (section 
4.6). Lastly, this chapter explores the images of East Asian education represented in 
different western countries to examine a broader ‘East-to-West’ EPB in the 
prevailing discourse of global competition (section 4.7). 
                                                             
15 Policy Exchange is an influential British centre-right think tank, which aims to develop and promote policy 
ideas in the public, especially education, sector. 
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4.2. Education policy borrowing in England: 1985-2010 
 
Before the 1980s, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate (HMI) had represented a crucial 
source of ‘professional advice’ on education policy-making in England, primarily 
drawing on national inspection materials (Department of Education and Science, 
DES, 1982). According to Reynolds and Farrell (1996), little overseas evidence was 
referenced in England’s education debates, except for occasional 
acknowledgements of the success of Scandinavian comprehensive schools and 
German vocational training. 
As Smith and Exley (2006) note, regular overseas study visits of HMI began in 
the late 1980s and ended in 1992 when the HMI was replaced by the Office for 
Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted). These visits 
usually took two to three weeks; focused on specific aspects of a foreign education 
system, such as teacher training in the US (HMI, 1989, 1990), primary education in 
France (HMI, 1991a) and vocational education in Germany (HMI, 1991b); and 
resulted in a short report. During that time, there was a proliferation of HMI reports 
– four to five a year and many more were unreleased. Although the HMI was said 
to be “partially autonomous”, a senior Inspector admitted that “we couldn’t have 
gone overseas if the government wasn’t interested in our findings” (quoted in Smith 
& Exley, 2006, p. 584). However, little evidence shows that the HMI visits led to 
any specific reform initiatives. 
During this period, Germany became the most prominent European exemplar 
that England was interested in, mainly due to its soaring economy, which has been 
comprehensively reviewed by Phillips (2011). He argues that, as “a perennial 
factor”, Germany was repeatedly referenced when evidence was of need for 
education changes. For example, from 1983 to 1985, the HMI team visited 
Germany five times. In 1986, a report concerned with its curriculum and 
examination was published (HMI, 1986). Later this year, the German education 
system generally and this report specifically were discussed in a Government 
internal seminar, preparing for the 1988 National Curriculum reform (Phillips, 
2000). However, as Lawton (1994) argues, the descriptions of the German system 
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were often superficial and not accompanied by any detailed analysis. Phillips (2011) 
argues that few subsequent initiatives in the 1988 education reform bore 
resemblance to the German model, which was more likely to be admired rather than 
emulated. 
In contrast, a number of education reforms in England since the mid-1980s 
were informed or inspired by the US experience, as similar policy initiatives would 
be announced in England a short time after HMI study trips and politicians’ visits to 
the US (Finegold et al., 1993). For example, the introduction of City Technology 
Colleges was justified by ‘Magnet Schools’ in New York (Green, 1993); the then 
Education Secretary Kenneth Baker (1986-1989) and his colleagues visited the US 
three times to study its student loans system in the late 1980s, which was heavily 
referenced in the 1988 White Paper Top-up Loans for Students (DES, 1988); and 
the establishment of Training and Enterprise Councils in England was based on 
Michael Dukakis
16’s experience working with the US private industry councils 
(Bailey, 1993). 
To be accurate, there seemed to have a mutual attraction which resulted in a 
kind of ‘policy convergence’ between England and the US. A number of studies (e.g. 
Finegold et al., 1993; Halpin & Troyna, 1995) have suggested three factors driving 
the transatlantic policy ‘borrowing’. Firstly, both countries confronted similar 
problems, such as high drop-out rate and low levels of attainment in reading, 
Mathematics and science, compared to their international competitors. Secondly, 
they shared common political and economic situations in addition to historical and 
cultural connections. Thirdly, similar understanding and interpretation of the role of 
the state played in the education sector – the neo-liberal faith – distinguished them 
from Continental Europe and Asia. 
However, Levin (1998) argues that these two countries only appeared to adopt 
similar policies; in fact, variations existed and they seldom learned from each 
other’s experience. Although Whitty and Edwards (1998) demonstrate the evidence 
of direct policy exchange across the Atlantic through shared policy networks, they 
                                                             
16 Michael Dukakis was an American politician who was seconded to the UK Employment Department in the 
late 1980s. 
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point out that “detailed ‘borrowing’ of specific policies and practices was much less 
in evidence… than policy makers working within similar ideological frames of 
reference producing parallel policy initiatives” (p. 221). Smith and Exley (2006) 
opine that these two countries were “in a form of dialogue”, but such dialogue 
seems to have been “confirmatory” rather than “transferring” (p. 588). Similarly, 
Whitty (2012) argues that policy-makers from both sides of the ocean have in fact 
‘borrowed’ policies that had originally been legitimised with reference to policies in 
their own context. 
The mid-1990s saw an emergence of using international achievement data. In 
fact, large-scale international surveys can be traced back to the 1960s. The pioneer 
was the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement 
(IEA), which has conducted more than 30 research studies of cross-national 
achievement in various subjects. However, as Alexander (2010) points out, these 
surveys were not taken seriously by English policy-makers until the 1990s. For 
example, two months before Major’s 1992 Election, Robin Alexander, Chris 
Woodhead and Jim Rose were commissioned to produce a report on curriculum and 
classroom practice in primary school, which became known as The Three Wise Men 
report. It looked through the available international survey reports (i.e. IEA and 
International Assessment of Educational Progress) for evidence on the “downward 
trends in important aspects of literacy and numeracy” (p. 17) and justified one of 
Major’s campaign statement – a return to streaming and more formal teaching 
methods in primary schools (Gillard, 2011). 
Another important example is the Ofsted-commissioned report, Worlds Apart? 
A Review of International Surveys of Educational Achievement Involving England 
(Reynolds & Farrell, 1996). It signalled a high point of citing international 
comparative studies and making a generic and collective reference to a number of 
East Asian systems. In particular, Japan and Taiwan were highlighted due to their 
pupils’ high performance and the assumed causal relationship between education 
success and economic growth. Their key features were categorised as cultural, 
systemic, school and classroom factors for England’s consideration, such as 
Confucian heritage culture, longer time in schools, mixed ability classes and whole 
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class teaching. 
Alexander (1996) immediately and scathingly accused the World Apart report 
of reducing the whole education system to a statistical calculation of inputs and 
outputs, condensing culture to one factor among many and basing arguments on 
measuring a few areas and reviewing limited comparative studies. However, Chris 
Woodhead, the then Chief Inspector of Schools in England and Wales (1994-2000), 
welcomed the ‘borrowing’ of whole class teaching promoted in the Worlds Apart 
report (Eliott, 2014) and continued to cite it to support specific reform initiatives 
(e.g. Woodhead, 2000). Even in a report commissioned by the Coalition 
Government, Could do better (Oates, 2010), it was still heavily referenced. In 
practice, these identified features of high-performing East Asian systems have 
rarely been transformed into any policy initiatives; only whole class teaching was 
adopted as a main pedagogical approach in the National Literacy Strategy and 
National Numeracy Strategy (Beard, 1999). 
During the New Labour period, a group of ‘international…’ terms were 
superficially and vaguely used to promote perceived goals and initiatives of 
education. For example, the 1997 White Paper, Excellence in Schools, stated that 
the Government would make efforts to “learn the lessons of international research 
projects that provide insight into best practice in other countries” (Department for 
Education and Employment, DfEE, 1997, p. 43). The 2001 White Paper, Schools: 
achieving success, asserted that the pilot of the Academy programme “will be 
developed in light of international experience”. However, no details about the 
international lessons and experience were provided. Since the 2000s, the term 
‘world-class’ has become dominant in the discourse of policy-making (Alexander, 
2010). For example, it was mentioned 34 times in the 2007 White Paper, The 
Children’s Plan: Building Brighter Future (Department for Children, Schools and 
Families, DCSF, 2007). Similar to the ‘international…’ terms, Wolf (2002) argues 
that there was “little attempt” to define the meaning of this “political and marketing 
slogan”. 
The pursuit of ‘world-class’ education service was significantly promoted by 
the launch and popularisation of OECD’s PISA survey. Since 2000, Andreas 
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Schleicher, the Director of the OECD and called by The Guardian the “PISA 
delivery man” (Wilby, 2013, November 26), has proselyted the value of PISA. In 
England, the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair (1997-2007), certainly took the 
satisfactory performance of English pupils in PISA 2000 as New Labour’s 
achievement. He commented that “the country should be very proud of the OECD 
survey, which is a tribute to the hard work of pupils, heads, teachers, governors and 
parents across the country’ (European Network, 2004, p. 13). Nonetheless, both 
Grek (2009) and Sellar and Lingard (2013a) argue that PISA did not occupy central 
position during the New Labour era, as ‘modernisation’ was already well used in 
producing legitimacy for new reforms and Labour was confident about the quality 
of national data and their worldwide leading role in making policy on the basis of 
national data. 
After three rounds of survey, PISA had drawn considerable attention from all 
over the world and been accepted as the most important benchmark against which 
the success or failure of national education policy could be verified. In this scenario, 
the ‘dropping’ of England’s ranking in PISA league tables since 2003 was largely 
used by the then Opposition to question and criticise New Labour’s education 
policies, strategies and achievements. Media coverage at the time was dominated 
by doubts and criticism, and pressured politicians to respond (Lingard & Rawolle, 
2004), especially in the election campaign. However, a fact was ignored by 
politicians that England had difficulty in reaching the required response rates in that 
survey; and the low reliability of results led to the exclusion of the English data 
from the trend comparisons by the OECD (OECD, 2013a). 
The New Labour Government in its late period increasingly used international 
comparative evidence to prove the improvement of pupils’ performance and defend 
its leadership. For example, the 2009 White Paper, Your Child, Your Schools, Our 
Future, stated that “since 1997, school standards in England have gone from below 
to above average in comparison with advanced countries…” (DCSF, 2009, p. 17) 
Drawing on international comparisons, it identified that “a relatively low post-16 
participation rate” remained a main problem of English education system, however, 
“we are making good progress” (p. 18). By citing the Trends in International 
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Mathematics and Science Survey 2007, the Government asserted that England is 
“the most consistently high-performing European country” (p, 17). Although it 
admitted that PISA revealed “one of the widest spreads of performance” between 
England’s highest and lowest achievers, the Government stressed that England “had 
one of the highest proportions of very high achieving 15 and 16 year-olds” (p. 17). 
Ball and Exley (2010) identify the governance shift from the government to 
the government joined by multiple agencies and sites under the New Labour 
leadership. Slater (2005, July 22) similarly observes the influence from the 
Government’s consultants and states in the Times Educational Supplement that: 
 
“If you want to influence Labour’s education policy, you could do worse than 
target a think-tank and a management consultancy. More than London 
University’s Institute of Education, the teaching unions or even the Labour party, 
the Institute for Public Policy Research and McKinsey have the ear of people in 
high places.” 
 
As Alexander (2011) argues, the pursuit of ‘world-class’ education service 
may not be new; but the availability and application of international achievement 
data produced and advocated by the global policy network in achieving that has 
been unprecedented. 
An array of foreign countries and cities was quoted in various official 
documents and statements at the time. Among them, Sweden and the US were most 
frequently used in the production of legitimacy for promoting school autonomy and 
parental choice which were central to New Labour’s reform agenda. As one of the 
well-acknowledged ‘world-class’ models, East Asia has received growing attention 
since the late 2000s. For example, the then Education Secretary Ed Balls (2005- 
2007) was impressed by an appreciation of Confucian culture in Hong Kong, which 
influenced the practices of teaching and learning, and family attitudes towards 
education. However, he did not think England could, or should, ‘borrow’ that 
(Forestier & Crossley, 2014). In contrast, the then Schools Minister Jim Knight 
(2007-2009) proposed to set up centres to teach Mandarin and Chinese culture in 
English state schools on his return from a visit to China in 2009 (Knight, 2009). But 
102 
this insight was not translated into any policy actions due to the impending general 
election (Morris, 2012). 
A major policy concern in the late New Labour era was the National 
Curriculum. Three curriculum reviews involving wide international comparisons 
were produced or commissioned by the Government in this period (National 
Foundation for Educational Research, NFER, 2008; Rose, 2009; The Children, 
Schools and Families Committee, 2009). Drawing on relevant research, such as that 
undertaken by the OECD and NFER
17
, curricula in a range of high-performing 
countries, including Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Ontario, British Columbia, Italy and Sweden, were examined and compared with 
that in England. In summary, the key findings of these reviews commonly included: 
less prescription of curriculum content, less centrally-directed teaching instruction 
and more emphasis on essential subject knowledge. These reviews did not result in 
any specific policy actions immediately; rather, in the 2010 Election campaign the 
symbolic meaning of conducting reviews and proposing reforms seemed more 
significant than taking policy actions. 
In summary, the selection of countries, features and sources of evidence and 
the levels of ‘borrowing’ have been consistent with the perceived domestic policy 
agendas, primarily in relation to the National Curriculum, pedagogy, school 
autonomy and parental choice. In contrast to the symbolic and rhetorical 
‘admiration’ to Germany, the US has continuously had de facto ‘impact’ on 
England’s education reforms, mainly because of the shared neo-liberal ideology. 
Since the 2000s, two trends of EPB have emerged in England: (1) ‘world-class’ 
systems (e.g. East Asia) have replaced individual nations as a synonym for 
‘reference societies’; and (2) the global policy network, instead of individual policy 
actors, has increasingly engaged in the production and circulation of international 
comparative evidence. 
 
 
 
                                                             
17 It is an independent charity working on education research and development in England and Wales. 
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4.3. School autonomy in England: 2000 to 2010 
 
In the Learning and Skills Act 2000, the New Labour Government introduced 
City Academies to inner cities to break “the cycle of under-performance and low 
expectations” (Chitty, 2013, p. 93). This new type of secondary school was 
operated under a funding agreement; that is, the major proportion was provided 
directly by the Government, instead of transferring by local authorities, and a small 
contribution was required from sponsors. Modelled on City Technology Colleges
18
, 
the idea ‘borrowed’ from the US as mentioned above, City Academies had no 
formal connection with local authorities; but unlike City Technology Colleges 
focusing on technological and practical skills, they were able to determine their 
own curriculum emphasis drawing from a wider scope of subjects (Eurydice, 2007b; 
Glatter, 2012). 
The 2001 Green Paper, Schools: Building on Success, set out strategies for 
improving secondary education and one of them was that every school should have 
“a distinct mission, ethos and character, and the autonomy to manage its own 
affairs provided it demonstrates success” (DfEE, 2001, p. 6). In so doing, the paper 
proposed to continue to accelerate the creation of City Academies and: 
 
“significantly enhance the ‘earned autonomy’ of successful schools, by further 
increasing the delegation of budgets to them, restricting needless bureaucratic 
burdens (including those associated with the inspection process), and by 
allowing them the greater freedoms over the curriculum and teachers’ pay and 
conditions…” (p. 7) 
 
The idea of ‘earned autonomy’ suggesting granting greater/extra autonomy for 
excellence was further articulated in the subsequent White Paper, Schools 
Achieving Success, published a few months later. However, it was never 
implemented in reality (Eurydice, 2007b). Instead, the Education Act 2002 renamed 
City Academies ‘Academies’ and expanded them to cover all ages and 
disadvantaged rural areas. 
                                                             
18 The programme of City Technology Colleges was not successful, which was hampered by the refusal of 
local authorities to provide suitable school sites. By 2000, only 15 colleges were established; three of them 
converted to Academies in later years.  
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The 2004 DfES report, Five Year Strategy for Children and Learners, 
confirmed that giving “freedom and autonomy to the front line” would be the key 
theme in the next phase of reform (p. 19). As announced in the 2005 White Paper, 
Higher Standards, Better Schools for All: More Choice for Parents and Pupils, 200 
Academies would be established or in the pipeline by 2010. Meanwhile, by 
“mirroring the successful experience of Academies”, the Government introduced 
‘Trust Schools’ – a new type of maintained schools, operated together by governing 
bodies and outside trusts and given the power to set their own admission policies 
and manage staff and assets independently
19
(DfES, 2005, p. 23). As Chitty (2013) 
points out, many of the freedoms granted to Trust Schools are those enjoyed by the 
new Academies promoted by the Coalition Government. As The Guardian (Smith, 
2007, February 9) reported, the Government planned to have 100 Trust Schools by 
the spring of 2007 and about 70 schools were in the process of finding their trusts. 
Notwithstanding these promoting initiatives, Academies were highly 
controversial. The Education and Skills Committee, appointed by the House of 
Commons conducted a detailed examination of Academies from 2002. The 
committee report released in 2005 criticised Academies on the grounds that they 
were merely added to “an already diverse system of secondary education”; and 
although the Government asserted that “this policy will lead to a rise in standards”, 
it “failed to produce the evidence to support the expansion of its diversity initiatives” 
(The Education and Skills Committee, 2005a, p. 3). Drawing on the 2005 annual 
report of PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) evaluation, the Government responded 
that Academies were located in “areas of real and historical underachievement” and 
were “popular with parents and pupils” (The Education and Skills Committee, 
2005b, p. 5). Recognising the problems and challenges, the Government also 
averred that Academies were “beginning to make solid progress in raising 
educational standards”. However, in its 2008 government-commissioned report, 
PwC admitted that the evidence of Academies as a model for school improvement 
                                                             
19 Similar freedoms have also been enjoyed by the existing Foundation Schools. In this respect, Trust Schools 
can be classified as a type pf Foundation Schools. The difference between them is that Foundation Schools are 
only run by their governing bodies. By introducing Trust Schools, more schools would be able to enjoy higher 
levels of autonomy. There are 699 Foundation Schools (including Trust Schools) operating in England by 
January 2015 (DfE, 2015). 
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was insufficient. 
By 2007, the Government had established 83 Academies with 133 more 
expected to be open in 2008. The 2007 White Paper affirmed that “we are 
expecting every secondary school to have specialist, trust or academy status and 
every school to have a business or university partner, with 230 Academies by 2010 
on the road to 400” (DCSF, 2007, p. 10). The 2009 White Paper further extend the 
power of strong school governing bodies to directly sponsor Academies and 
propose new schools. Before the 2010 Election, 203 Academies were in operation 
(DCSF, 2009). Compared to maintained schools, Academies were allowed to opt 
out of the National Curriculum, possess their own land and buildings, determine a 
subject specialism and whether to adopt a religious character or not, and take 
responsibility for admissions under the Student Admission Code. 
The Academy Act was issued in July 2010, shortly after the Coalition 
Government took office. This Act made it possible for all schools, including 
primary and special schools, to become Academies, and legislatively brought a new 
type of school – Free Schools – into the Academy framework of England20. In other 
words, Free Schools were set up as Academies; there was no essential difference 
between them. But parents and teachers were encouraged to open Free Schools if 
they were dissatisfied with maintained schools in a certain local area. The New 
Schools Network was established in 2009 by Rachel Wolf after visiting Charter 
Schools in New York. It was given £500,000 by the Government to promote Free 
Schools through providing information and advice (Murray, 2011, February 15) and 
Wolf later became an adviser to Michael Gove. According to Hatcher (2011), its 
trustees and advisers were advocates of the marketisation of education system; 
three of them were even engaged in the chain business of Academies. This 
organisation was thus suspected of and criticised for not being an independent or 
neutral body (Syal, 2010, October 28). 
Three months after the introduction of the Academies Act, the first group of 25 
Free Schools was given permission to proceed. The establishment of new Free 
Schools was not required to consult or inform those may be affected, including 
                                                             
20 There is no provision of free schools in Scotland, Wales and North Ireland. 
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local authorities, residents and other neighbouring schools (Rustin, 2011, February 
1). As Hatcher (2011) observes, the existence of applications for Free Schools were 
usually not made public until the approval was announced by the Secretary of the 
State. Whilst the overall schools capital budget was cut by 60%, the DfE allocated 
£50 million as the funding for running Free Schools. However, the expansion of 
Free Schools has raised considerable criticism and controversy. Firstly, they have 
been accused of having taken money away from maintained schools. Critics have 
argued that maintained schools, funded on a per capita basis, lose their pupils and 
accordingly funding; in other words, the funding for Free Schools actually comes 
from local authorities’ budgets (Hatcher, 2011). 
Secondly, they have been accused of being socially exclusive. The promotion 
of Free Schools was underpinned by the rationale of reducing social inequality in 
education. As the Times Educational Supplement reported (Vaughan, 2011, June 
10), Gove stated that “all of the free school applications we have received are either 
in areas of deprivation, educational under-achievement or areas where pupil 
numbers are rising fast and there’s a desperate need for places”. Among the first 25 
Free Schools, nine were in the 50% least deprived areas of the country, 15 in the 50% 
most deprived areas, but only two of them in the bottom 10%. Through selecting 
their catchment areas, the all-ability Free Schools are able to select pupils. 
According to Hatcher (2011), for example, the Bolingbroke Academy once 
excluded pupils from a struggling primary school serving a deprived council estate; 
and the West London Free Schools adopted a curriculum which is likely to be 
appropriate for children from professional middle-class families. 
Nevertheless, a more significant expansion of Academies and Free Schools 
has been initiated since the publication of the SWP. 
 
4.4. The English representation of school autonomy in East Asia 
 
The SWP was published in November 2010 – six months after the new 
Coalition Government came into power. This was its first White Paper on education, 
which outlined a wholesale reform plan, particularly regarding school autonomy, 
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based on considerable international evidence including East Asia. Subsequent to the 
SWP, the policy initiatives aiming to increase school autonomy have been further 
legitimated in official speeches, announcements and press releases by frequently 
referencing East Asia. These documents and statements have constructed an image 
of highly autonomous schools in East Asia. 
 
The SWP 
 
In the first Foreword to the SWP (DfE, 2010), the Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, and the then Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, clarified the nature of 
the educational ‘crisis’: 
 
“…what really matters is how we’re doing compared with our international 
competitors. That is what will define our economic growth and our country’s 
future. The truth is, at the moment we are standing still while others race past. 
In the most recent OECD PISA survey in 2006 we fell from 4
th
 in the world in 
the 2000 survey to 14
th
 in science, 7
th
 to 17
th
 in literacy, and 8
th
 to mathematics.” 
(p. 3) 
 
This ‘crisis’ was primarily identified according to the UK’s poor performance 
in PISA, although many academics (e.g. Goldstein, 2004; Micklewright & Schnepf, 
2006) have specifically criticised its methodological deficiencies and generally 
questioned that the quality of education can be validly and reliably measured by 
large-scale surveys. 
Subsequently, the solution was identified: 
 
“The only way we can catch up, and have the world-class schools our children 
deserve, is by learning the lessons of other countries’ success.” (p. 3) 
 
The then Education Secretary, Michael Gove, in the second Foreword, stated 
that the top performers of PISA “from Alberta to Singapore, Finland to Hong Kong, 
Harlem to South Korea” have been the “inspiration” for education reforms in 
England (p. 5). He emphasised that although “each of these exemplars has their 
own unique and individual approach to aspects of education, their successful 
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systems all share certain common features” (p. 7). Three “common features” were 
identified in the SWP: 
 
“The most successful countries already combine a high status teaching 
profession; high levels of autonomy for schools; a comprehensive and effective 
accountability system and a strong sense of aspiration for all children, whatever 
their background.” (p. 5) 
 
This suggested that East Asia, which includes many of “the most successful 
countries”, enjoys high levels of school autonomy and that has contributed to its 
educational ‘success’. In other words, being supported by East Asian exemplars, 
changes in school governance and management have been described as the key to 
improving the quality of education services. However, there was little direct 
reference to specific East Asian exemplars to substantiate the claims about school 
autonomy; only South Korea was mentioned once: 
 
“Finland and South Korea – the highest performing countries in PISA – have 
clearly defined and challenging universal standards, along with individual 
school autonomy.” (p. 4) 
 
Singapore and South Korea were however cited four times respectively to 
highlight the weakness of England’s education system, and to support the need to 
reform schooling and the need for high quality teachers. Furthermore, despite their 
low PISA rankings, Charter Schools in the US, Free Schools in Sweden, and City 
Technology Colleges and Academies in England were often cited to substantiate 
the assertion that “in many of the highest-performing jurisdictions, school 
autonomy is central” (p. 51). For example, 
 
“In high-performing US States, Charter Schools – publicly funded independent 
schools set up by a legal ‘charter’ – have been engines of progress.” (p. 51) 
 
“In Sweden, pupils who attend state-funded independent Free Schools 
outperform those in other state schools and a higher proportion (eight per cent 
more) goes on to higher education.” (p. 51) 
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“CTCs [City Technology Colleges] are now among the best schools in the 
country…Twenty-six per cent of Academies this year were judged to be 
outstanding by Ofsted, compared to 18 per cent of all maintained schools.” (pp. 
51-52) 
 
The last example implied that schools enjoying high levels of autonomy 
perform better than those state-controlled schools with less autonomy. However, as 
Whitty (2012) notes, a fact that have been forgotten is that grant maintained schools 
in England were the model and reference for charter schools in the US. Most 
statements were either made as self-evident ‘common knowledge’ or generally 
based on ‘international evidence’. For example, 
 
“Across the world, the case for the benefits of school autonomy has been 
established beyond doubt.” (p. 11) 
 
“Analysis of the international evidence also demonstrates that, alongside 
school autonomy, accountability for student performance is critical to driving 
educational improvement.” (p. 12) 
 
Moreover, little attempt in the SWP was made to specify the precise nature, 
scope and form of school autonomy in any of the systems referenced. This left 
ample space for the Government to cite evidence relating to the generic concept. 
For example, 
 
“Across the world, the case for the benefits of school autonomy has been 
established beyond doubt. In a school system with good quality teachers, 
flexibility in the curriculum and clearly established accountability measures, it 
makes sense to devolve as much day-to-day decision-making as possible to the 
front line.” (p. 11) 
 
“Analysis of PISA data shows that the features of the strongest education 
systems combine autonomy (e.g. over staffing powers at school level) with 
accountability (e.g. systematic and external pupil-level assessments).” (p.51) 
 
In spite of descriptions such as “flexibility in the curriculum”, “day-to-day 
decision-making” and “over staffing powers at the school level”, the SWP did not 
explain: (1) how flexible schools could be in terms of curriculum (e.g. freely 
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adopting curriculum for some subjects or creating new curriculum for all subjects); 
(2) in which areas of school management (e.g. personnel, finance and student 
admission) schools could make day-to-day decisions and what is the precise nature 
of decision-making (i.e. operational or policy-oriented); and (3) what do ‘staffing 
powers’ specifically designate (e.g. the power over staff appointment, appraisal or 
promotion). 
Additionally, it was often highlighted in the SWP that more autonomy should 
be devolved to schools while high levels of accountability retain. For example, 
 
“The best performing and fastest improving education systems in the world… 
combine high levels of autonomy for teachers and schools with high levels of 
accountability.” (p. 18) 
 
However, similar to the promotion of school autonomy, no further 
explanations about school accountability in the ‘best’ systems were provided. 
 
Official statements 
 
Following the publication of the SWP, East Asia has been explicitly and 
increasingly cited in numerous official announcements, speeches and press releases 
(e.g. Gibb, 2012; Truss, 2013a; Gove, 2014a). In these statements, the attainment 
gap between English pupils and their counterparts in East Asia have been 
highlighted. For example, as Truss (2014b) stated: 
 
“In Hong Kong, just under 9% of all pupils achieved the lowest levels in 
the PISA Mathematics assessment. In Singapore, it’s just above 8%. In 
Shanghai, it’s under 4%. In England, it’s 22% – almost a quarter.”  
 
The educational ‘crisis’ revealed by international comparisons has been 
directly linked to the ‘disadvantages’ in global economic competition. For example, 
as Truss (2013b) stressed in another speech, 
 
“This is an era of unprecedented competition... [and] an era where human 
capital is more important than physical capital, it means we need to improve 
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education. The evidence is quite clear here: countries with higher attainment 
have higher growth rates.” 
 
On this basis, policy initiatives have been extensively legitimated by 
referencing the evidence from economically-soaring East Asia. For example, in 
commenting on PISA 2009, Gove (2010, December 17) wrote an article for the 
Times Educational Supplement on the need for more autonomous schools: 
 
“Schools will enjoy new freedoms and will shed unnecessary bureaucratic 
burdens. Expanding the number of Academies together with new Free Schools, 
some promoted by groups of teachers, will further extend autonomy and 
choice… As the OECD points out, two of the most successful countries in 
PISA – Hong Kong and Singapore – are among those with the highest levels of 
school competition.” 
 
In this statement, School competition was particularly intertwined with school 
autonomy, which has been frequently repeated in Gove’s other speeches (e.g. Gove, 
2012a; Gove, 2012b). Three years later, England seemed not to have made progress 
and still lagged far behind its East Asian references in PISA 2012. In responding to 
UK’s “stagnancy”, Gove (2013) in one of his oral statements to the Parliament 
shifted the responsibility by declaring that the low performance was “a reflection on 
the education policies of the previous government” and then reaffirmed five lessons 
that England should draw from high-performing (i.e. Shanghai, Singapore, Hong 
Kong and South Korea) and fast-improving (i.e. Taiwan, Vietnam, German and 
Poland) systems. Among them, two were directly related to school autonomy: 
 
“The third reform imperative is greater autonomy for head teachers. There is a 
strong correlation in these league tables between freedom for heads – in 
systems like Singapore, Shanghai and Hong Kong – and improved results. That 
is why we have dramatically increased the number of Academies and Free 
Schools – and given heads more control over teacher training, continuous 
professional development and the improvement of underperforming schools.” 
“The fifth pillar of reform is freedom for heads to recruit and reward the best. 
Shanghai, the world’s best-performing education system, has a rigorous system 
of performance-related pay. We’ve given head teachers the same freedoms 
here.” 
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The performance-related pay in Shanghai was specifically taken as an example 
of great autonomy enjoyed by East Asian school leaders. However, as I shall 
describe in the Shanghai chapter, it is far more complex than it appears and only 
bring about very limited extra autonomy. Another specific example with regard to 
Singapore was given by Gove (2011a), but the nature of the autonomy exercised by 
principals was narrowed: 
 
“In Singapore, often cited as an exemplar of centralism, the Government has 
deliberately encouraged greater diversity in the school system – and dramatic 
leaps in attainment have been secured as a result. Schools where principals are 
exercising a progressively greater degree of operational autonomy are soaring 
ahead.” (Emphasis added) 
 
As discussed earlier, ‘operational autonomy’ designates the power to decide 
how a policy is implemented. The following chapters demonstrate that the 
autonomy granted to Free Schools in the SWP goes beyond the ‘operational 
autonomy’ enjoyed by principals in Singapore as well as the other two East Asian 
societies. 
The School Reform Minister Nick Gibb (2014) more recently claimed that the 
“academisation” (conversion to academy status) of schools in England since 2010 
had significantly improved the performance of schools in the inspections by Ofsted 
and of pupils in the General Certificate of Secondary Education examinations. He 
ascribed this achievement to the granting of “real” autonomy to schools to “vary 
their curriculum, extend the length of their school day and employ the best teachers 
– regardless of whether they have received formal qualified teacher status”.  
Similar to the SWP, the necessity of school accountability in autonomous 
system has also been reinforced in official statements. For example, as Truss 
(2013a) emphasised: 
 
“We are learning from the best in the world. And we will combine more 
autonomy for schools with better accountability.” 
 
Instead of East Asia or any other ‘high performers’, with reference to the US, 
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Gibb (2015a) justified the Ofsted Schools Inspection framework which aims to 
improve accountability through “publicly grading state schools”. This is 
contradictory to the feature of school accountability systems in East Asian societies 
studied later. 
In parallel to the reform of school autonomy has been the reform to create a 
more demanding but less prescribed National Curriculum (DfE, 2011), which has 
also relied heavily on evidence from East Asia. For example, Gove (2012a) stated 
that “our curriculum reforms were inspired by the high expectations for all children 
in Singapore and Hong Kong”. However, neither Academies nor Free Schools are 
required to follow the National Curriculum. A number of English politicians have 
made study visits to Singapore, Hong Kong and China, and identified various 
features of these high-performing systems such as the Confucian culture, long 
school days and rigorous curriculum (e.g. Gove, 2010, December 28; Truss, 2014, 
March 4). However, there seems to have been little attention paid to school 
governance and autonomy enjoyed by East Asian schools. 
 
In short, England’s low rankings in international surveys have been taken as 
evidence to substantiate the criticism narrative of schools failing to deliver what 
was required and expected. East Asia has been identified as the source of lessons to 
deal with this educational crisis and further to prepare qualified workforce for 
global competition. Although little detailed evidence has been provided, in the 
SWP and official statements, East Asian societies have been represented as a model 
with high levels of school autonomy, accountability and competition which can 
improve pupils’ performance and eventually lead to a prosperous economy. 
 
4.5. Key sources of evidence for the English representation 
 
The Government’s efforts to justify the general approach to education reforms 
and specific initiatives with regard to school autonomy have largely relied on the 
work of the OECD and Policy Exchange. In contrast, the McKinsey reports that the 
Government cited extensively to reform teacher education were often ignored in the 
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promotion of school autonomy. 
 
OECD 
 
Over the last five decades, the OECD’s education research and data have been 
highly acknowledged and widely used within academic circles, by politicians and in 
the media (McGaw, 2008), particularly with the rising influence of PISA since 2000. 
In the SWP, ‘OECD’ and ‘PISA’ were cited 11 times; and its references included 
three OECD documents, namely, the PISA 2006 report, 2009 Teaching and 
Learning International Survey report and 2010 Education at a Glance. As the 
Government stated: 
 
“One of the most valuable ways we have of understanding the standards our 
children and young people are attaining in comparison with children in other 
countries is the regime of sample tests organised by the OECD and IEA.” (DfE, 
2010, p. 46) 
 
Gove also frequently cited the OECD analysis in his speeches. For example: 
 
“In its most recent international survey of education, the OECD found that ‘in 
countries where schools have greater autonomy over what is taught and how 
pupils are assessed, pupils tend to perform better’.” (Gove, 2011a) 
 
Andreas Schleicher, the OECD’s Director of Education, was described by 
Gove (2012b) as “the most important man in the British education system” and “in 
world education”, and “the father of more revolutions than any German since Karl 
Marx”. When the results of PISA 2012 came out, Schleicher commented that it was 
too early to use this (disappointing) result to judge the Coalition Government’s 
ongoing reforms (Coughlan, 2013, December 3). 
However, the evidence from the OECD has sometimes been used selectively. 
For example, Education at a Glance (OECD, 2010b) was cited as the source for the 
following assertion in the SWP: 
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“Analysis of PISA data shows that the features of the strongest education 
systems combine autonomy (e.g. over staffing powers at school level) with 
accountability (e.g. systematic and external pupil-level assessments).” (DfE, 
2010, p. 51) 
 
As Morris (2012) notes, although the OECD identified that a growing number 
of countries have established more autonomous schools, it did not make any claims 
about their impact on educational outcomes. The relationship between pupil 
performance and school autonomy seemed to be oversimplified by the Government. 
As the OECD argues in its report, PISA 2009 Results: What Students Know and 
Can Do: 
 
“…some features of autonomy and accountability are associated with better 
performance. However, this is not a simple relationship under which any policy 
to increase autonomy, accountability or choice will improve student outcomes.” 
(OECD, 2010a, p. 105) 
 
Moreover, the assertions made in the SWP have not always been in accord 
with the arguments of the OECD studies. For example, the OECD stated that: 
 
“Countries that create a more competitive environment in which many schools 
compete for students do not systematically produce better results... there is no 
clear relationship between performance and the use of standardised tests or the 
public posting of results at the school level.” (OECD, 2010a, p. 14) 
 
This contradicts what Gove (2010, December 17) contended in his speech, 
namely that Hong Kong and Singapore were characterised by the “highest levels of 
school competition”. Additionally, in its report, PISA 2012 Results: What Makes 
Schools Successful, the OECD (2013b) concluded that “school systems with high 
overall levels of performance tend to grant more autonomy to schools in designing 
curricula and assessments and seek feedback from pupils for quality-assurance and 
improvement” (p. 4). However, according to the school context questionnaire 
conducted along with PISA 2012, schools in England were reported to enjoy 
greater autonomy than their East Asian counterparts in almost all surveyed aspects, 
such as appointing and dismissing teachers, setting teachers’ salaries, choosing 
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textbooks, determining subjects and establishing assessment policies. 
However, when it comes to the case of Sweden, a country that “has already 
gone very far in autonomy” (Schleicher, 2015) and been referenced by England in 
detail to promote Free Schools, the OECD seems to rectify its opinion on school 
autonomy. In the report presented in the Swedish Government press conference, 
Schleicher (2015) clarified that school autonomy can only work positively when 
there is great accountability. For school accountability, by taking Singapore as an 
example, he meant shared curriculum policies and a set of quality assurance 
mechanisms, including internal and external evaluation, written specification of 
pupil-performance standards and education goals, teacher mentoring and systematic 
recording of data. 
All in all, although there has been a lack of consistence with regard to its 
statements about school autonomy, the OECD has become the most important 
source of evidence for legitimating the UK Government’s policy agendas. 
 
Policy Exchange 
 
Policy Exchange, established in 2002, is an influential British centre-right 
think tank which holds a deep faith in the role of free market to solve public policy 
problems. Although claiming to be independent, it has maintained manifold links 
with successive UK governments since its inception. For example, Michael Gove 
was its first chairman and its authors have included a number of former government 
policy advisors. After becoming education secretary, Gove often cited the work of 
Policy Exchange to justify Academies and Free Schools. For example, he (2014b) 
stated that: 
 
“I’d like also to thank Policy Exchange for the intellectual leadership it’s given 
to education reform…The expansion of the academy programme has ensured 
that communities denied a choice of good schools have at last been given the 
schools they deserve. The introduction of Free Schools has set a new – and 
higher – bar for quality and innovation in state education. …All of these 
reforms have been part of a long-term plan for our schools - shaped and 
supported by Policy Exchange’s work – and driven by a clear sense of moral 
purpose.” 
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David Cameron was re-elected as the Prime Minister in May 2015. As he 
(2015) pledged in one of his campaign speeches, the new Conservative Government 
would open 500 new Free Schools. Just one day before that speech, the Policy 
Exchange published a new report A Rising Tide: The Competitive Benefits of Free 
Schools (Porter & Simons, 2015) which gave Cameron the ‘evidence’ to press 
ahead with the reforms. As he stated: 
 
“As Policy Exchange said this week, Free Schools don’t just raise the 
performance of their own pupils, they raised standards in surrounding schools 
in the area too.” 
 
This report mainly argues that: (1) Free Schools “do not drag down results of 
neighbouring schools”; (2) they “do not only benefit the middle class”; (3) 
competition from them “does seem to be driving a response”; (4) they are “not 
taking money away from where schools are ‘needed’”; and (5) “there is no clear 
educational rationale for just limiting them to areas where there is a need for new 
schools” (pp. 6-7). It seems like a ‘mantra’ of the Government’s policy agenda on 
promoting Free School. Moreover, these arguments were often based on 
government reports. For example, as the report stated: 
 
“The Department of Education’s recent research report on Free Schools 
reported that 72% of Free School Headteachers believe that they have an 
impact on the local schools, with a third thinking local standards are improving 
through competition, and a third believing they are improving through 
collaboration.” (p. 7) 
 
It seems that the Government and Policy Exchange have formed a 
mutual-referential circle to support each other towards the same end. 
 
McKinsey  
 
McKinsey, a consulting company, has produced two high-profile reports on 
how to achieve ‘world-class’ education systems in recent years. The first, How the 
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world’s best- performing school systems come out on top, was published in 2007. 
Although, as Morris (2012) argues, it “excluded an analysis of key variables, was 
selective in the evidence provided and was methodologically flawed” (p. 104), this 
report has been widely used by policy-makers across the world, including England. 
It was quoted seven times in the first 20 pages of the SWP relating to teacher 
education  
In contrast, the 2007 McKinsey report was ignored in the promotion of school 
autonomy. This is understandable as it stated that, “few of the most widely 
supported reform strategies (for instance, giving schools more autonomy, or 
reducing class sizes) have produced the results promised for them” (Barber & 
Mourshed, 2007, p. 10). It also specifies that the reason for Singapore’s success is 
its “strong central control” (p. 13) and pointed out that the US experimented with 
decentralisation reforms and Charter Schools, however “the results were 
disappointing” (p. 11). 
The subsequent 2010 McKinsey report, How the world’s most improved 
school systems keep getting better, adopted a more favourable attitude towards 
school autonomy. This report confirmed the negative correlation between “a 
system’s performance level and the degree of tightness of central control over its 
school processes” (p. 24). Further, it divided the developmental process of 
education systems into five stages and argued that top performers such as Singapore 
and Hong Kong have exercised looser control when their education systems have 
become ‘great’ (Mourshed, Chijioke & Barber, 2010). Notwithstanding the 
incongruence between two McKinsey reports, in one of Gove’s (2012b) speeches, 
they were vaguely cited to legitimate greater autonomy: 
 
“The PISA and McKinsey reports clearly show that the greater the amount of 
autonomy at school level, with headteachers and principals free to determine 
how pupils are taught and how budgets are spent, the greater the potential there 
has been for all-round improvement and the greater the opportunity too for the 
system to move from good to great.” 
 
Michael Barber, who served as an academic, government advisor, partner and 
119 
head of the global education practice at McKinsey and now the Chef Education 
Advisor to Pearson, was centrally involved in both two reports. As Gove (2011b) 
admitted, “one of the most profound influences on me in doing this job has been Sir 
Michael Barber. And Sir Michael Barber’s work for McKinsey has reinforced in 
my mind what so many studies have also underlined”. 
 
In sum, the assertions with regard to school autonomy in the OECD and 
McKinsey reports have sometimes been contradictory. Policy Exchange, closely 
tied with policy-makers, has consistently supported reforms of school autonomy. 
The Government has selected its preferred sources of evidence and the favourable 
evidence, in order to promote a highly autonomous and competitive education 
system. As Morris (2012) argues, this is “indicative of a highly expedient and 
opportunistic enterprise” (p. 104). 
 
4.6. Policy initiatives legitimated by the English representation 
 
Although the English representation of school autonomy in East Asia was 
highly selective and problematic as demonstrated above, a series of policy 
initiatives were claimed to be formulated on that basis in the SWP to increase 
school autonomy in England. These initiatives included: (1) removing unnecessary 
central prescription about curriculum and qualifications; (2) increasing autonomy 
for all schools; (3) dramatically extending the academy programme by getting 
existing schools to convert to Academy status; and (4) supporting teachers, parents, 
charities and enterprises to set up new Free Schools. 
Following the SWP, the Education Act 2011 further provided legislation for 
Academies and Free Schools, and removed the requirement for Academies to have 
an emphasis on a particular subject area. The number of Academies increased from 
203 to 2591 in March 2013 (Higham & Earley, 2013). By January 2014, 57% of 
public secondary schools achieved academy status, catering for 59% of all 
secondary pupils (DfE, 2014; DfE, 2014 July 9). In 2015, more than 240 Free 
Schools were operating (Wintour, 2015, March 6), and the new Conservative 
120 
Government launched its plan to create 270,000 extra places in Free Schools over 
the next five years (Coughlan, 2015, May 22). 
According to the review of the SWP and official statements above, the policy 
initiatives of school autonomy promoted in England have involved changes to three 
main areas of school management, which can be further divided into six sub-areas, 
as shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1. Areas and sub-areas of school management in which policy initiatives 
have been promoted to increase school autonomy in England 
Area Sub-areas 
Governance and 
management 
School establishment (i.e. who can set up schools) 
School governance (i.e. who run schools) 
Curriculum and 
school calendar 
National Curriculum adoption (i.e. who can decide whether to 
follow the National Curriculum) 
School calendar (i.e. who can set the school terms and hours) 
Teachers Teachers’ appointment (i.e. whether schools are able to hire 
untrained/unqualified teachers) 
Teachers’ pay (i.e. who can set teachers’ pay) 
 
Table 4.2 summarises the autonomy that Academies and Free Schools enjoy in 
these six sub-areas and compares them with maintained schools. 
 
Table 4.2. School autonomy in Academies, Free Schools and maintained schools 
Area Academies Free Schools Maintained schools 
School 
establishment 
Businesses, faith 
groups, charitable 
trusts and private 
schools 
Teachers, parents, 
charitable trusts, 
universities and faith 
groups 
Local education 
authorities 
School 
governance 
Trustees/Governing 
Body; free from the 
control of Local 
education authorities 
Trustees/Governing 
Body; free from the 
control of Local 
education authorities 
Local education 
authorities 
National 
Curriculum 
adoption 
Exempt from 
following the 
National Curriculum 
Exempt from 
following the 
National Curriculum 
Must follow the 
National Curriculum 
School 
calendar 
Determined by head 
teachers 
Determined by head 
teachers 
Depends on Local 
education authorities 
Teachers’ 
appointment 
Allowed to hire 
untrained/unqualified 
teachers 
Allowed to hire 
untrained/unqualified 
teachers 
Qualified Teacher 
Status required 
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Teachers’ pay Determined by head 
teachers 
Determined by head 
teachers 
Following national 
pay 
 
From this table, it can be seen that, overall, Academies and Free Schools have 
been given greater autonomy than their maintained counterparts. 
In parallel to the increase of school autonomy, a set of policy initiatives in 
terms of school accountability were also developed in the SWP: (1) providing more 
information about schools, particular their performance, to parents, governors and 
the public; (2) setting performance tables for pupils and attainment and progress 
measures for schools; and (3) empowering Ofsted to categorise (rate) all schools. 
As the Conservative Government announced more recently, schools rated 
inadequate by Ofsted will be forced to turn into Academies under the Education 
and Adoption Bill 2015 (DfE, 2015, June 30). Moreover, by introducing the new 
category of ‘coasting school’ into the Ofsted Schools Inspection framework, 
hundreds of schools are targeted for improvement and those fail can be required to 
convert to Academy status. In this way, it seems that, in England, the promotion of 
school accountability has largely supported the expansion of schools with greater 
autonomy. 
 
4.7. The English representation of East Asian education and beyond 
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the English interest in East Asian 
education is not limited to school autonomy; amongst western countries, England is 
not the sole ‘admirer’ of East Asia; and, rather than pure admiration, there seems to 
have emerged diverse and complex patterns of ‘looking-East’ in West. Although 
EPB from East Asia in England is the main focus in this study, a broader 
‘East/West’ framework could provide deeper insights into examining this specific 
case as well as understanding the essence of EPB. This section begins with the 
English representation of East Asian education in general and then moves to other 
western countries’ responses to East Asia’ educational ‘success’, particularly 
compared with that to an European PISA star – Finland. 
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As demonstrated above, the outstanding performance of East Asian education 
systems in international surveys has caught the eye of English policy-makers with 
admiration. In addition to the portrayal of school autonomy in official documents 
and statements, politicians’ study trips have provided more detailed descriptions of 
the whole education systems in that region. For example, after visiting three schools 
and a teacher training institution in Shanghai accompanied by a team of British 
Mathematics teachers and experts, Truss (2014, March 4) in her article for The 
Telegraph claimed that she got “a first-hand look” at how pupils there have 
achieved the best in the world at Mathematics: 
 
“In every lesson I saw… teachers explained the concepts clearly; students then 
practised the questions for short, concentrated bursts and were given instant 
feedback…topics were dissected and discussed to a much greater extent. 
Examples got progressively harder throughout the lesson… children in China 
are in school all hours…” 
 
Therefore, she contended that ‘Britain’s schools need a Chinese lesson’. 
Similarly, the Schools Minister, Nick Gibb, compared classes in England and Hong 
Kong based on his ‘field-study’ experience: 
 
“What I notice in all the school visits is the seriousness of the classes and the 
attitude of the students. If you come to the weaker state schools in England you 
will see the extreme outcome of an approach to pedagogy that is based on 
creating happy children, and the opposite is the case. All I see in such 
classrooms is amateurism, a lack of professionalism, a lack of seriousness.” 
(Quoted in Forestier & Crossley, 2014, p. 12) 
 
Because of the admiration of East Asian education systems, the first group of 
29 Mathematics teachers were ‘imported’ from Shanghai to England in November 
2014 and the second phase started several months later. These pioneering teachers 
are supposed to spend three weeks in a number of selected English primary schools 
and demonstrate their ‘world-class’ approaches to Mathematics teaching. In one of 
Gibb’s (2015b) speeches, he spoke highly of Harris Primary Academy, a school 
adopting Singapore Mathematics textbooks and participating in this programme, 
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and described a lesson delivered by a Chinese teacher: 
 
“… last week I was fortunate enough to observe a lesson at the Harris Primary 
Academy… led by Lin Lei. In a 35 minute lesson, with all pupils facing the 
teacher and engaged throughout, Lin taught all of the pupils to carry out 
complex types of long multiplication through clear explanation of calculation 
methods… I think that reflects something truly positive.”  
 
He then articulated the ‘mastery’ learned from Asian models: a meticulous 
approach to arithmetic, whole class teaching and focused 35 minute lessons, 
immediate and tailored in-class questioning and scaffolding techniques, frequent 
practice and homework. In a most recent BBC documentary Are our kids tough 
enough? Chinese school, five Chinese teachers adopted Chinese-style in 
Mathematics, Science and Mandarin teaching for a month at a comprehensive 
school in Hampshire, which exactly reflected what Gibb described as ‘mastery’. 
According to the final test, English pupils from the ‘Chinese school’ performed 
better in all three subjects than their counterparts taught in ‘English ways’. This 
highly controversial documentary seems to support the UK Government’s 
representation of and admiration for East Asian models. 
However, this is not the whole story; East Asia, a top performer in 
international league tables and, more importantly, an economic miracle in global 
markets, has also generated considerable insecurity and anxiety in England. 
Although as Grek (2008) notes, “most of the media focused on where the UK 
education system ranked internationally”, the dissatisfaction with the English 
education system has been heightened in stark contrast to the high performance of 
its East Asian counterparties. For example, as the BBC News headline on the day of 
the announcement of PISA 2012 states “Shanghai tops global school tests, UK 
‘stagnates’” (Coughlan, 2013, December 3). Words, such as ‘beating’, ‘falling 
behind’ and ‘fighting’, have frequently appeared in official and media discourse. 
For example, the headlines in The Telegraph (Paton, 2014, February 17) read, 
“China’s poorest beat our best pupils”, and in The Daily Mail (Levy, 2014, 
February 17) read, “Middle-class British pupils are worse at Mathematics than 
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children of Shanghai cleaners”. Truss (2014, March 4) also commented on her visit 
to Shanghai in The Telegraph: 
 
“…the ‘Shanghai method’ should be brought into to improve Britain’s schools 
and excuses should not be made for falling behind the levels of the ‘East’.” 
 
In the context of the “widespread contemporary imagination of education as a 
global ‘race’ for economic competitiveness” (Sellar & Lingard, 2013b, p. 717), 
East Asia has been seen as a major competitor of, and even a threat to, England in 
the socio-economic arena. For example, as the BBC (Burns, 2013, April 19) 
reported, Gove stated that: “We are fighting or actually running in this global race 
in a way that ensures that we start with a significant handicap”. In commenting on 
this speech, a Whitehall source said: “we can either start working as hard as the 
Chinese, or we’ll all soon be working for the Chinese”. An article in The Financial 
Times warned that “UK universities [are] under increasing threat from Asian 
institutions” (Warrell, 2014, October 1). In addition to official and media discourse, 
the BBC (2006, February 6) reported that “in a study of public attitudes to global 
economic competition, 79% of 2,704 people identified fast-growing China as the 
largest threat to the UK”. In a sense, the purpose of learning from East Asia seems 
to ‘fight’ against East Asia. 
In contrast, the Finnish success has never stirred the same kind of anxiety in 
England, although it has also been often described as a model worthwhile 
emulating. The following is a typical description of Finland taken from one of 
Gove’s (2012b) speeches: “We have learnt from Finland – a consistently strong 
performer in PISA studies”. Rather than highlighting the competition and any 
resulting consequences, the media reports have been more concerned with the 
lessons/facts about Finnish education, such as the titles ‘Why do Finland’s schools 
get the best results?’ (Burridge, 2010, April 7) and ‘How Finnish schools shine’ 
(Lopez, 2012, April 9). A comparatively ‘aggressive’ statement about Finland, 
given by John Cridland (2013, March 15), the Chief of the Confederation of British 
Industry, is that “UK needs to match Finland’s education system to drive the 
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economic growth” (emphasis added), instead of ‘beating’ or ‘fighting’ in the 
descriptions of East Asia. More recently, Finland’s performance in PISA has not 
been as outstanding as formerly. In one of Truss’ (2014a) speeches, England 
seemed to send Finland a kind of ‘reminding’: “Even some of the high-performing 
Scandinavian countries are seeing their absolute results dropping – and like 
everyone else, they have to be careful of complacency. Just look at Finland…” 
A similar rhetoric of the global ascendency of East Asian education systems 
and economic-political challenges from East Asia has also emerged in other 
Anglo-Saxon countries. In Australia, as Waldow et al. (2014) note, there has been 
an increasing media attention to Asian education since 2007. In particular, 
Shanghai’s success in PISA 2009 was taken as a “wake-up call” (Harrison, 2012, 
February 20), although Australia’s rankings were actually not bad in the PISA 
league tables; the nervous was from the imaginary competition with its Asian 
neighbours. As quoted in The Australian (2012, January 24), the Prime Minister 
Julia Gillard claimed that Australia needs to “win the education race” in which 
“four of the top five performing school systems in the world” are involved (quoted 
in Sellar & Lingard, 2013a). In parallel to the massive media reaction was the 
publication of the 2012 White Paper, Australia in the Asian Century, which aimed 
to help Australia “navigate the Asian century”, seize the opportunities it provides 
and meet the challenges it poses (Australian Government, 2012, p. 8). 
In the US, as Sellar and Lingard (2013a) observe, subsequent to the release of 
the PISA 2009 results, the media coverage on the outstanding performance of 
Shanghai pupils was extensive. They note a report in the New York Times (Dillon, 
2010, December 7) titled “Top Test Scores from Shanghai Stun Educators”. This 
report quoted a comment from Chester E. Finn Jr, former Head of President 
Reagan’s Department of Education: “Wow, I’m kind of stunned, I’m thinking of 
Sputnik… I’ve seen how relentless the Chinese are at accomplishing goals, and if 
they can do this in Shanghai in 2009, they can do it in 10 cities in 2019 and 50 
cities by 2029”. The term ‘Sputnik moment’, used to refer to the threat of the Soviet 
Union, was mentioned again in the US President Barack Obama’s address to 
describe challenges from Asia and legitimate education reforms to gain “the most 
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educated workers” who can “compete for the jobs and industries of our time” 
(Dillon, 2010, December 7). 
Contrary to the ‘utopian’ representation of East Asian education systems in 
Anglo-Saxon countries, Germany seems to have held a stereotypical ‘dystopian’ 
interpretation. Waldow et al. (2014) examine a variety of German media materials 
and summarise that, firstly, schooling in East Asia has been commonly described 
as: 
 
“Parents coach children like professional athletes to secure their success in 
examinations (school entrance, school leaving or university entrance 
examinations) that are decisive for their future career. In addition to ‘regular’ 
school, children cram in institutions of shadow education or with private tutors. 
A large part of what pupils learn for examinations consists of mindless rote 
learning. This merciless routine leaves children and youths very little time for 
play and leisure, or even sleep. Many pupils crack up under the pressure and 
take their own lives.” (p. 5) 
 
Secondly, Germany has shown far less admiration of East Asian education 
systems as of Finland, although its PISA rankings have been similar. Thirdly, ‘Asia’ 
has been set against ‘Europe’ in terms of education traditions. For example, 
 
“Two different educational traditions turn out to be equally successful in the 
international PISA-tests: on the one hand school cultures building on 
performance and industriousness or even drill, such as China and South Korea. 
On the other hand more liberal, progressively inspired school systems such as 
Finland.” (Schultz, 2010, Süddeutsche Zeitung, quoted in Waldow et al. 2014, 
p. 7) 
 
Fourthly, according to them, Shanghai’s PISA success seemed to strengthen 
Germany’s considerable insecurity about China which has been seen as its “main 
industrial competitor” (p. 6). Similar anxiety about East Asia and admiration for 
Finland, at least in England and Germany, can be reflected by the titles of two 
books both focusing on ‘world-class’ education systems and published in the same 
year: one was Surpassing Shanghai: An Agenda for American Education Built on 
the World’s Leading Systems (Tucker, 2011), whereas the other was Finnish 
Lessons: What Can the World Learn From Educational Change in Finland 
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(Sahlberg, 2011). 
All in all, East Asian education systems, either ‘utopia’ (should be borrowed) 
or ‘dystopia’ (should not be borrowed), have become an unavoidable topic in 
reform debates in western countries. Furthermore, these debates have been linked to 
and reinforced by the descriptions of East Asia as an imaginary competitor and 
threat, in striking contrast to the portrayals of and attitude towards Finland. 
 
4.8. Conclusion 
 
From 1985 to 2010, ‘what works elsewhere’ was used more or less / directly 
or indirectly / discursively or silently by English policy-makers depending on 
specific political needs. The promotion of school autonomy, primarily legitimated 
by Charter Schools in the US and Free Schools in Sweden, has long been on the 
policy agenda in England. Academies and Free Schools were introduced 
respectively in 2000 and 2010, have been largely expanded ever since and are 
expecting an even more prosperous future. A series of reforms have enabled all 
schools to convert to Academy status and raised the levels of autonomy in all 
schools, accompanied by the promotion of Ofsted-dominated school accountability 
and school competition. These policy initiatives have been largely formulated and 
advocated on the basis of the English representation which has identified high 
levels of school autonomy as the key feature explaining East Asia’s high 
performance. However, as demonstrated in this chapter, this representation has not 
been supported by sufficient details and primarily drawn from highly selective 
sources and evidence. Moving beyond school autonomy in England, East Asian 
education systems have triggered strong reactions among western countries, either 
admiration or disagreement, and a shared fear for Asia’s economic power and 
potential. In order to keep the traditional advantage in global markets, the necessity 
of learning from successful competitors is rationalised in England, Australia and the 
US. 
 
The next three chapters investigate the ‘reality’ of the nature and degree of 
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school autonomy in three East Asian societies, namely, Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Shanghai, which are compared with the English representation in the last chapter. 
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Chapter 5. School autonomy in Hong Kong secondary education 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
As one of the selected East Asian societies studied to answer the second 
research question, Hong Kong is among the richest and well-developed societies in 
the world. It was ruled by the British Colonial Government for a century and a half, 
and then reintegrated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1997 under the 
principle of ‘One Country, Two Systems’. Correspondingly, it has been influenced 
by Chinese culture and British colonialism. These characteristics have been 
reflected in and refracted into its education development. This chapter examines the 
nature and degree of autonomy in Hong Kong secondary schools. Section 5.2 
provides an overview of economic, socio-political and cultural development and 
how the education system has been shaped in this broader context over time. 
Section 5.3 investigates the historical evolution of school autonomy in Hong Kong. 
Subsequently, a model of school autonomy in the current system is created in 
section 5.4, drawing on policy documents, literature and interview data. Four 
features of school autonomy in Hong Kong are lastly identified and discussed in 
section 5.5. 
 
5.2. Context 
 
Geographically, Hong Kong is located at the tip of the Pearl River Delta and 
adjacent to the city Shenzhen in Southern China. It is one of the most densely 
populated cities in the world – over seven million people living in a land of 1,104 
km
2
 (Hong Kong Government, 2015). The vast majority of the population are 
ethnically Chinese. Only 5% are of other ethnic groups – either South-east Asian 
(e.g. Indian, Pakistani, and Filipino) mainly employed as domestic helpers; or 
Europeans, North Americans, Australians and Japanese often employed in the 
financial sector (OECD, 2011b). It was a colony of the UK from 1842 until its 
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return to the PRC in 1997 as a Special Administrative Region (SAR)
21
. Its pre-1997 
education system was mainly a product of the colonial power. The handover was 
designed to promote a high degree of autonomy in most matters including 
education
22
 (Postiglione & Lee, 1997), although Holliday, Ngok and Yep (2002) 
argue that Hong Kong’s ‘autonomy’ has since been largely contingent on the needs 
and preferences of the Central Government in Beijing. 
 
Economic miracle 
 
The dominant historiography outlines the economic development in Hong 
Kong as a legend that “a barren rock was turned into a capitalist paradise” (Ngo, 
1999, p. 120). It represents one of the greatest success stories of the second half of 
the 20th century (Sweeting, 1995). Before the Second World War, Hong Kong 
flourished by serving initially as a settlement for the opium business and 
subsequently as a free trading and entrepôt centre. During the post-war period, its 
accessibility, stability and relative absence of government regulation in economic 
life attracted a massive influx from Mainland China escaping from the civil war and 
the turbulence in the early years of the PRC (Morris, 2009). Refugees, along with 
capital and technology, largely promoted economic explosion and the 
transformation to an industrial and export-oriented economy (Youngson, 1982). 
However, there was no major structural development in the education sector 
responding to the demands for economic growth. Sweeting (1995) argues that in 
fact “the existence of a reasonably literate and numerate workforce, most of whom 
had basic schooling, contributed as a factor conducive to Hong Kong’s ‘economic 
miracle’” (p. 71). During the post-war period, the attention of policy-makers was 
mainly on the provision of primary education. Moreover, Morris and Adamson 
(2010) note that, teaching methods at that time encouraged pupils to be “quiet, 
respectful and hard-working”, as workers were expected to be “diligent, dextrous, 
punctual and obedient” in addition to basic academic skills (p. 23). By 1978, Hong 
                                                             
21 Hong Kong was occupied by Japan from 1941 to 1945. After the Second World War, the UK resumed its 
colonial control. 
22 Except for foreign relations and military defence.  
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Kong had achieved nine-year universal compulsory education – the first region in 
Asia to do so; and the 1980s witnessed that more people had access to mass 
education (Sweeting, 2004). 
Since the late 1970s, when the PRC started to hasten its economic 
modernisation, Hong Kong has shifted to develop its service, financial and 
commercial sectors in order to deal with the loss of manufacturing to the Mainland 
(Sweeting, 1995). This shift was successful. By the early 1990s, Hong Kong’s per 
capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had surpassed that of the UK and it became 
one of the ‘Tiger Economies’ (World Bank, 1993). From the late 1990s onwards, it 
has been far more exposed to ever-increasing challenges especially from regional 
competitors such as Shenzhen, Shanghai and Singapore (Cullinane, Song, Ji & 
Wang, 2004). Goodstadt (2014) even argues that it has become “the main market 
for exploitation” since the 2000s, especially in the fields of property business, 
labour force and retail consumers (p. 66). Notwithstanding these changes, Hong 
Kong remains one of the world-leading finance, tourism and trade centres and the 
world’s freest economy (Heritage Foundation, 2015). 
Schooling in Hong Kong long focused on the academic disciplines, even when 
its economy relied heavily on manufacturing. Only a small proportion of junior 
secondary leavers would choose technical and vocational tracks (Hong Kong 
Government, 2002). Although the number of tertiary education places has increased 
from 2% to 18% of the age cohort since 1989, the levels of university admission 
have not expanded much (Law, 2007). A large number of pupils seeking limited 
university places have reinforced a highly competitive exam-oriented education 
system. With the advent of the knowledge economy, more workers are expected to 
be able to use another language and advanced information technology, 
communicate effectively and think creatively (Morris & Adamson, 2010). The 
Government thus published the report Learning to Learn in 2000 to help pupils 
“attain all-round development and life-long learning” (Curriculum Development 
Council, CDC, 2001). 
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Political stability and sensitivity 
 
In contrast to its dramatic economic growth, one salient feature of Hong 
Kong’s political system in the post-war period, as Sweeting (1995) argues, was “the 
lack of development” (p. 59). Unlike other former colonies, there was no 
large-scale decolonisation movement for independence after the reversion of Hong 
Kong’s sovereignty to the UK in 1945. In addition, demands for democratisation 
obtained little public attention and support (Lau, 1982). As for the Colonial 
Government, instead of gaining political legitimacy from constitutional reforms or 
developing British identity, preventing the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) infiltration and subversion was its political priority, particularly since 
the CCP took over the Mainland in 1949 (Morris, 2009; Ortmann, 2010). 
From the 1950s to the early 1980s, as Morris (2009) argues, de-politicisation 
was adopted as a governance strategy which can be divided into two distinct phases 
in terms of different tactics used. From 1945 to 1966, the Government primarily 
enacted stringent legislation against political organisations, trade unions, and other 
associations which could challenge colonial rule (Sweeting, 1995; Scott, 2010). 
After the riots of 1966 and 1967, the direct actions stemming the Communist 
influence were reduced; more efforts were made to maintain social harmony and 
avoid conflicts by co-opting dissenting voices, promoting advisory bodies and 
using symbolic policies that relied on exhortation rather than compulsion (Ortmann, 
2010). 
With the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 which signalled 
that Hong Kong would return to Chinese sovereignty, the belated participatory and 
representative democracy reforms started to be placed on the agenda (Sweeting, 
1995). The pressure for greater democracy was also intensified by a more affluent 
population with higher expectations and an increased pessimism spread after the 
events in Tiananmen Square on 4
th
 June 1989 (Morris, 2009). Along with the 
memories of the Cultural Revolution, this political turmoil resulted in a crisis of 
legitimacy for the Central Government and further distanced Hong Kong people 
from their ‘motherland’. Therefore, the urgent tasks for the Central Government 
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after the handover included safeguarding political stability, winning public support 
and forming a much stronger sense of patriotic national identity (Morris & Scott, 
2003). However, merging Hong Kong into the Mainland has not proceeded 
smoothly. According to the latest People’s Ethnic Identity Poll compiled by the 
Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong, 63.7% of Hong Kong 
people consider themselves Hong Konger and/or Hong Konger in China, while only 
35.2% consider themselves Chinese and/or Chinese in Hong Kong (Hong Kong 
University Pop Site, 2015, June 15-18). 
Meanwhile, as Ghai (2000) argues, the principle of ‘One Country, Two 
Systems’ has actually protected Hong Kong’s capitalist economic system and ‘way 
of life’ rather than sustaining its autonomy. The Central Government has dominated 
Hong Kong’s political system. The introduction of Article 23 of the Basic Law23 
whipped up the public’s long-term discontent over the ever-tightening central 
control and limited democracy and transparency of the political system. This 
triggered a gigantic protest on the 1
st
 July 2003, which resulted in Article 23 being 
withdrawn. The tension between the Central Government and the mass of the 
populace has even since increased. For example, from September to December 
2014, hundreds of thousands people protested to clamour for universal suffrage 
with public nominations. 
The Hong Kong education system has both reflected the political environment 
and served as a political tool (Morris, 2009). Before 1997, the main concern of 
schooling shifted from de-politicisation and desensitisation to developing a distinct 
sense of Hong Kong identity (Luk, 1991; Morris & Chan, 1997). Accordingly, the 
content of the curriculum shifted from teaching about ‘other cultures and distant 
time periods’ to ‘the culture and contemporary politics of Hong Kong’ (Morris & 
Morris, 2002). After 1997, increased efforts have been made to foster patriotism, 
loyalty and national identity by using the strategy of emphasising a shared Chinese 
cultural and ethnic heritage but avoiding developing an allegiance to the CCP 
(Morris, 2009). However, this quest has still faced strong local resistance. For 
                                                             
23 This Article was criticised that it empowers the SAR government to enact laws to prohibit any act against the 
central government (i.e. restriction).  
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example, Moral and National Education, perceived as ‘brainwashing’ by the public 
and promoting the victories of the CCP, was changed from a compulsory to optional 
subject in 2012 after meeting fierce public opposition (Morris & Vickers, 2015). 
 
Centralised bureaucratic governance 
 
According to Miners (1995), the concentration of power in the hands of the 
Governor and senior civil servants started at the very beginning of the colonial 
period and continued even after the introduction of direct elections in 1991. 
Ortmann (2010) argues that both the Legislative Council and the Executive Council 
“resembled the Executive and Legislature in name only” (p. 45). This centralised 
governing system was also characterised by hierarchy, obedience and top-down 
approaches to policy-making (Scott, 2010). According to Morris and Scott (2003), 
the Colonial Government saw its educational responsibility as “the provision of 
resources, the formulation of programmes and the identification of key values” and 
schools were expected to open “following government instructions” (p. 73). To 
avoid conflicts with stakeholders and pressure groups, policies were made either 
symbolically and rhetorically; or in consultation with advisory bodies, especially 
the Curriculum Development Council and the Education Commission, although 
both bodies have been effectively controlled by the Government (Morris & 
Adamson, 2010). 
Scott (2010) argues that the structure and functions of the government have 
not been essentially changed since the handover. Its major concern has remained as 
ensuring that “statutory bodies and public corporations are acting consistently with 
overall policy” (P. 3). Nevertheless, he also points out that the professional civil 
service has been weakened by political appointment after the 1997 retrocession. 
Meanwhile, compared to its predecessor, the SAR Government seems to be keener 
to bring about real changes (Morris, 2009). However, the political system 
characterised by disarticulation and polyarchy
24
 have led to a lack of unity and 
                                                             
24 As Morris and Scott (2003) demonstrate, after the handover, messages from “the Chief Executive, the 
various branches of the civil service, the Education Commission and other parts of the policy-making 
community” have been “contradictory, or at least inconsistent” in many areas of education policy (p. 80). 
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coherence between different components and weakened its capacity for policy 
formulation and implementation (Scott, 2000; Morris & Scott, 2003). Morris (2009) 
points out that the education policy-making system in the post-1997 period became 
relatively closed – interested parties which used to play advisory roles have lost 
their voices, as the Government has increasingly operated on the maxim “if you are 
not for us you are against us” (p. 88). 
 
A hybrid of British colony and Chinese community 
 
Hong Kong was formed primarily by immigrants from various parts of China. 
According to Lau (1982), throughout its colonial history, the society is an 
admixture that ingeniously combined “typical Chinese social features and features 
developed in the local setting” (P. 67). The social and behaviour patterns derived 
from traditional China, particularly the influence of the Confucian heritage in many 
aspects of education, emphasise diligence in studying to satisfy family expectations 
(Lee, 2014), parents’ heavy involvement (Lam, Ho & Wong, 2002), the respect to 
leaders and teachers from the community, parents, peers and pupils, and high 
power-distance culture in school management (Kwan, 2011). 
Meanwhile, living in a ‘borrowed place and borrowed time’ where there has 
been minimal government intervention in the economic sector (Hughes, 1976; Lau, 
1982), gaining quick material wealth through individual efforts has been seen as the 
basis of the pragmatic and realisable ‘Hong Kong Dream’ throughout the colonial 
era (Leung, 1996). Morris and Chan (1997) note that, as a “transient” society, social 
mobility in Hong Kong has been based on “achieved rather than ascribed criteria” 
(p. 250). Hongkongers firmly believe that the society has provided abundant 
opportunities for upward mobility and obtaining high educational qualifications has 
been seen as one of the viable and accepted approaches to that (Leung, 1996). 
The Colonial Government encouraged the emergence of local economic elites 
and built a structural relationship with them to maintain its rule (Zhang, 2006). This 
pro-elite strategy has been strengthened by the SAR Government since 1997 
(Holliday et al., 2002). Hongkongers have been described by Lau (1982) as 
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‘political aloofness’ who “keep themselves uninvolved” in political issues (p.102). 
A conservative brand of Confucianism has also been said to have promoted political 
quiescence and subservience to benevolent rulers and ‘collective harmony’. 
However, Morris and Vickers (2015) demonstrate that Hongkongers, especially the 
young generation, have increasingly engaged in political and civic movements in 
recent years (p. 313). 
 
Overall, in Hong Kong, the increase of education provision has followed 
economic success, the socio-political shifts have impacted on schooling and the 
curriculum, the power of education policy-making has been centrally maintained by 
the Government, and the hybrid of British colonialism and Chinese culture has 
reinforced the instrumental nature of education and conformity to hierarchical 
relationships and order. The next section focuses on how school autonomy has 
historically developed in this broader context. 
 
5.3. Historical development of school autonomy 
 
In this section, I divide the historical development of school autonomy in 
Hong Kong into three periods. From 1842 to 1945, the embryo of the colonial 
education system was characterised by a small-scale elitist provision, increased 
cooperation with diversified private sponsoring groups and slow process of 
institutionalisation. The period from 1946 to 1981 saw the promotion of mass 
education and strong control over schools to depoliticise schooling and the 
curriculum. From 1982 to the present, a set of decentralisation initiatives has been 
implemented in the education sector, which has reconstructed governance 
framework of schools and diversified education provision. 
 
The embryo of the colonial education system: 1842-1945 
 
Initially, the Colonial Government minimised its role to promoting a 
small-scale elitist education, while leaving charities, churches and Chinese 
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traditional civil organisations to take major responsibility for local education 
(Adamson & Li, 2004). After the late 1840s, the Government started to develop its 
leadership and control over education, albeit in a very limited way. The Education 
Committee was established in 1847 and then merged with the Education 
Department in 1860 to supervise schools that received grants from the Government. 
The Textbook Committee was founded in 1873 to review and approve teaching 
materials (Law, 2007). 
The 1873 Grant-in-Aid Scheme extended the scale and scope of land and 
financial subsidies to eligible private schools (Sweeting, 1990). Schools could 
decide whether to accept them or not. Aided schools in return were subject to 
government inspections (Yau, Leung & Chow, 1993). In consequence, control over 
private schools was gradually transferred from various school sponsoring bodies 
(SSBs) to the Government and a growing number of new aided schools were 
established with subsidies (Law, 2007). Since the late 19
th
 century, more pupils 
have been enrolled in aided schools than in government schools (Sweeting, 1990). 
The 1913 Education Ordinance was enacted in response to the establishment 
of the Republic of China in 1911. This was perceived to intensify Chinese 
nationalism and anti-British sentiments, especially in non-government schools, and 
consequently encouraged socio-political disturbance in Hong Kong (Adamson & Li, 
2004). Therefore, non-government schools were required to register with the 
Director of Education in order to ensure that they act congruously with the 
Government’s policies. In 1932, 25 education regulations were implemented to 
specify curriculum time, class size and pupils’ discipline (Law, 2007). Meanwhile, 
the Kuomintang and CCP continued to compete for political support between the 
1920s and the 1940s through schooling and curriculum (Bray & Tang, 2006). In 
brief, Hong Kong developed a diversified and autonomous colonial education 
system in this period. 
 
Depoliticisation and centralisation: 1946-1981 
 
After the UK resumed the control of Hong Kong in 1945, the Government 
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showed an increased interest in exercising its power to construct a local education 
system (Bray & Tang, 2006) and train a “local compradore class” through elite 
secondary schools (Morris & Vickers, 2015, p. 312). This was specifically 
interwoven with the attempts, including legislation and direct actions, to prevent the 
political influences of the Kuomintang and CCP as Civil War in the Mainland 
spilled over into Hong Kong (Sweeting, 1995; Adamson & Li, 2004). The 1948 
Education (Amendment) Ordinance empowered the Director of Education to: (1) 
close any schools; (2) refuse to register any teachers and de-register any registered 
teachers, principals and supervisors; and (3) control “school subjects, textbooks, 
and all other teaching materials, and any activities (salutes, songs, dances, slogans, 
uniforms, flags, documents, symbols, etc.) which were political in nature”. A 
Special Bureau was established within the Education Department to monitor 
schools for the count- Communist purpose since 1949. 
A new Education Ordinance was enacted in 1952 in response to the 
anti-British campaign heightened by the establishment of the PRC and promoted 
via schools run by the CCP. It re-clarified and reinforced the power of the Director 
of Education to ensure schools were not subject to any political indoctrination 
(Sweeting, 1990). In the same year, the Syllabuses and Textbooks Committee was 
set up to better supervise and adjudicate what was and should be taught to pupils 
(Morris & Vickers, 2015). Model timetables, syllabuses and textbooks were then 
produced, which largely unified schooling and the curriculum (Luk, 1991). 
Sensitive issues, such as Chinese history from 1911 to 1949, were removed from 
the curriculum. Civics Education was introduced as a compulsory subject to counter 
the anti-government propaganda through promoting the idea of ‘responsible 
citizenship’ and the constitutional relationship between Hong Kong and the UK 
(Morris & Chan, 1997). 
As mentioned above, the riots of 1966 and 1967 saw political tactics shifting 
from relying on direct intervention to policy exhortation. Morris and Adamson 
(2010) argue that the Government’s key concern, due to its low level of political 
legitimacy, was to “minimise conflict and survive, rather than to create a view of 
the future society” (P. 36). Two “countervailing strategies” were thus employed in 
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the field of education: laudable and desirable policies were made centrally, but 
schools could decide to accept or ignore them (Morris, 2009). As a result, a number 
of symbolic policies were launched. A prima facie example was the Government’s 
approach to the Medium of Instruction. Although since the late 1970s the 
Government declared that Chinese should be used in teaching, it was left to schools 
to choose and most of them maintained English as the Medium of Instruction 
(Morris & Sweeting, 1991). 
From the mid-1960s, to increase the number of public school places and 
improve the quality of private schools, the Government initiated the Bought Places 
Scheme to buy school places from private schools. By 1980, the government- 
bought places accounted for 51.2% of total pupil admissions (Hong Kong 
Government Secretariat, 1981). Meanwhile, SSBs were encouraged to establish 
new secondary schools with public funding. Under a contractual agreement with the 
Government, SSBs were entrusted with the responsibility of “setting the school 
objectives, developing annual and long-term plans, the recruitment of teaching and 
non-teaching staff, promotions and staff appraisal, teaching and learning activities, 
as well as the day-to-day administration” as long as their activities did not 
destabilise colonial rule (Leung, 2003, p. 24). The Government provided schools 
with land, buildings, most of the capital cost and almost the full recurrent cost. 
These financial incentives maintained its control on curriculum, pupil admission 
and teacher appointments (Sweeting, 2004; Morris, 2009). 
Centralisation was also strengthened by a high-stakes public examination 
system. The Secondary Schools Entrance Examination was introduced in 1977 for 
primary graduates and was later replaced with an academic aptitude test (Choi, 
1999). According to the result, pupils were classified into five academic capacity 
bands. Within a certain geographic area, the access to secondary schools depended 
on by pupils’ banding (Morris & Chan, 1997). In general, Band One represented the 
top cohort of pupils and Band Five represented the bottom cohort. Correspondingly, 
schools with majority of Band One pupils were ‘labelled’ as Band One schools and 
those with majority of Band Five pupils became Band Five schools (Cheng, 2009). 
Pupils at Secondary Five and Seven (ages 16 and 18) sat for the Hong Kong 
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Certificate of Education Examination and Hong Kong Advanced Level of 
Education Examination organised by the Hong Kong Examinations and Assessment 
Authority (HKEAA). 
By the end of the 1970s, the majority of secondary schools in Hong Kong 
were included in a regulated government-SSB governance framework and provided 
with approved textbooks, prescribed syllabuses and centralised public 
examinations. 
 
Diversification and decentralisation: 1982-present 
 
Since the 1980s, Communist penetration of schools was no longer seen as such 
a threat to colonial governance and the pursuit of political legitimacy and efficient 
administration became the priority of the Government (Leung, 2003). Cheng (2009) 
identifies two waves of education reforms in Hong Kong during this period. The 
first took place in the 1980s and was formulated through six Education Commission 
Reports from 1984 to 1996, which adopted “a top-down approach with an emphasis 
on external intervention or increasing resources input” (p. 66). The second started 
from the 1990s
25
. A series of policy initiatives relating to decentralisation and 
diversification have been designed and launched by the Government to satisfy 
stakeholders’ expectations by advocating marketisation, competition, accountability, 
school-based management (especially SBCD) and quality education. Below, 
relevant reports and initiatives are listed and analysed. 
 
Llewellyn Report (1982) 
 
An overseas Visiting Panel was invited to review education policies in 1982. 
The outcome was the Llewellyn Report (Llewellyn, Hancock, Kirst & Roeloffs, 
1982) in which “school-based” and “teacher-oriented” approaches were 
recommended as a strategy of reforming curriculum and the “over-administrated 
                                                             
25 As shown below, the rhetoric of school-based management and SBCD actually emerged in the 1980s, but the 
implementation and implication at that time were limited. 
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education system”: 
 
“A genuine drive towards school–based curriculum selection and adaptation, 
together with school–based programme and pupil evaluation, could open up 
new horizons for teacher participation… Every effort must be made to 
encourage innovation at the school level which, after all, is where the real work 
is being done.” (p. 56) 
 
The Government’s response to this report was limited – only recognised that 
teachers were the key people making decisions in their classrooms (Sweeting, 
2004). Marsh et al. (2014) argue that although the report “did have long-term 
impact” on the subsequent SBCD in Hong Kong, “decentralisation… was not 
readily acceptable to the centre at this stage” (p. 37). 
 
SBCD (1980s-present) 
 
The decades after the publication of the Llewellyn Report have witnessed the 
promotion of SBCD. The School-based Curriculum Project Scheme (1988-1999) 
was designed to encourage teachers to develop their own curriculum. However, it 
was criticised for undermining teacher professionalism, as the Government 
specified the types of projects that they would like to support and required teachers 
to take these projects as extra work in addition to their normal duties (Morris, 1990). 
The School-based Curriculum Tailoring Scheme (1994-2005) was initiated to 
provide remediation for junior secondary pupils who had difficulties to keep up 
with the central curriculum. In fact, teachers were only permitted to develop 
teaching materials following the same curriculum. Therefore, as Marsh et al. (2014) 
argue, it “was… merely a transfer of problems and tasks, but not authority, to 
schools” (p. 38). 
The setting up of School-based Curriculum Support Teams in 1998 marked the 
SAR Government’s intention to further promote SBCD. However, school-based 
activities had to be in compliance with the requirements of the central curriculum in 
terms of learning time, learning targets, and essential content (CDC, 2001). The 
‘Seed’ Projects initiated in 2001 attempted to support collaboration among teachers, 
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officials and experts. Nevertheless, those projects were selected because they 
complemented the central curriculum. Since 2004, an Education Development Fund 
of $550 million was set up to stimulate teachers and schools to participate in 
school-based professional programmes. Similar to other SBCD programmes, Marsh 
et al. (2014) argue that it does not involve de facto devolution of power; the 
Government exercises its control through resource allocation and performance 
evaluation. 
 
Direct Subsidy Scheme (DSS) (1991-present) 
 
The DSS was introduced in 1991, aiming to encourage the development of 
private education. This idea originated from the concept of market that parents and 
pupils (customers) buy educational services from schools and schools supply 
services according to customers’ needs and through market price signals (Tsang, 
2002). At that time, the egalitarian subsidy policy of schools was perceived to 
weaken the motivation for school improvement and limit parental choices for 
quality education (Law, 2007). The Government was also dissatisfied that, under 
the Bought Places Scheme, the role of private schools was restricted to providing 
cheap school places to be purchased by the Government for pupils who failed 
public schools entrance examinations. Besides, a number of leftist schools had long 
been marginalised and disbarred from obtaining government funding; the 
Government felt politically obligated to reintegrate them to the mainstream in 
anticipation of 1997 (Chan & Tan, 2008). 
In these circumstances, private schools, aided schools and brand-new schools 
which achieved sufficient education standards could voluntarily join the DSS 
(Education Department, 1991). However, the initial reaction was lukewarm – by 
1997, only 13 schools joined the scheme and most of them were ex-CCP schools. 
Law (2007) argues that this was mainly due to the fear of change and unforeseen 
consequences of converting to the DSS schools from teachers, principals and SSBs. 
In 1999, the Government launched a revised scheme which enabled DSS schools to 
determine their own tuition fees, receive government subsidies and obtain social 
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donations for their Endowment Funds (Chan & Tan, 2008). They were also given 
more autonomy to determine their curriculum, Medium of Instruction and 
admission requirements without restrictions from the central allocation system (Lo, 
2010). 
Consequently, more aided schools have been attracted to convert to DSS status, 
especially elite schools. By 2013, there were 62 DSS secondary schools; 
nonetheless, they only accounted for a small proportion out of 514 public-funded 
secondary schools (Census and Statistics Department, 2014). Chan and Tan (2008) 
point out that although the Government attempted to develop the private sector as 
“an alternative source in running education”, it had not yet become strong enough 
to be “a major education provider or operator in the marketplace” (p. 478). 
Furthermore, DSS schools were not totally free from the central control. They had 
to sign a service contract which could be revised or ceased by the Government 
according to official performance evaluations (EDB, 2015a). The scheme also 
aimed to increase school competition and the diversity of provision. However, it 
was criticised on the ground that the high tuition fees charged by a few famous DSS 
schools privileged pupils from affluent families (Law, 2007). 
 
School Management Initiative (SMI) (1991-1997) 
 
In 1991, the SMI, as a specific type of school-based management framework, 
was introduced by the Government to the aided sector (Leung, 2003). Particularly, 
the SMI report: (1) emphasised that the role of the Education Department should 
shift from “detailed control to support and advice”; (2) empowered the School 
Management Committees (SMC) to prepare a formal constitution “setting out the 
aims and objectives of the school and the procedures and practices by which it will 
be managed”; and (3) permitted schools to have discretion in spending their block 
grant, savings gained from freezing up to 5% unfilled vacancies for staff and 
non-staff purpose, and a small amount of fees (Tong Fai) collected from pupils for 
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school-related activities (EMB
26
 and Education Department, 1991). However, 
Leung (2003) notes that the financial flexibility under the SMI was in fact very 
limited, as the block grant, which did not include teacher salaries, only accounted 
for less than 15% of school funding. 
The implementation of the SMI, as Leung (2003) argues, mainly relied on 
“persuasion, lobbying and the goodwill of school administrators to join the scheme 
voluntarily” (p. 28). However, schools did not show much enthusiasm, even when 
the Government suggested that it would be eventually made compulsory for all 
aided schools. Wong (1995) explains that this was primarily due to strategic 
misplay – there was little public consultation beforehand, principals were asked to 
make decisions without being given sufficient information and they were unkindly 
criticised in the SMI report. Moreover, the lack of de facto autonomy in financial 
management as discussed above also restricted the spread of the SMI. Thus, from 
Leung’s (2003) point of view, the SMI was a “re-regulation exercise” rather than 
“decentralisation of authority” (p. 28). As a result, six years after the announcement, 
only 30% of schools had joined the SMI (Leung, 2003). 
 
School-based Management (SBM) Scheme (1997-present) 
 
In 1997, the Education Commission in its Report No. 7 recommended that the 
SBM in the spirit of the SMI should be implemented in all aided schools by 2000. 
More specifically, it (1) suggested maintaining the formal procedure for 
formulating school annual reports and profiles, the composition of the SMC and the 
flexibility of funding under the SMI; and (2) introduced self-evaluation, external 
inspection and a framework of performance indicators to measure and supervise 
educational outcomes (Education Commission, 1997). In contrast to the voluntary 
basis of its predecessor, the SBM was made compulsory, which was not welcomed 
by the major SSBs (Ng & Chan, 2008). 
The Education Department set up the Quality Assurance Inspection section in 
the same year to develop a quality assurance system. The initial composition of the 
                                                             
26 It was merged with the Education Department in 2003 and renamed the Education Bureau in 2007. 
145 
assessment was 20% school self-evaluation and 80% on-site full external inspection. 
The external school review team replaced the Quality Assurance Inspection in 2004, 
which was redefined as a validation of the school self-evaluation and reduced its 
contribution to 20% (Law, 2007). Additionally, in 2000, the Education Department 
abandoned the academic aptitude test for pupils and decreased the academic 
capacity bands from five to three. Cheng (2009) argues that under this new banding 
system, the individual differences of pupils within each band and within each 
secondary school were greatly increased. Schools were thus expected to be more 
responsive to more diverse needs and this further justified the promotion of the 
SBM. 
 
Incorporated Management Committee (IMC) (2005-present) 
 
As part of the school-based management reform, the Education (Amendment) 
Bill passed in 2004 required every aided school to establish an IMC, replacing the 
SMC, on or before 1
st
 July 2009, whereas this was not a compulsory requirement 
for DSS schools
27
. This 2004 Bill stipulated the composition of the new 
management committee – managers selected by the SSB (up to 60% total 
membership), the principal, alumni manager(s), independent manager(s), elected 
teacher manager(s) and parent manager(s). It also clarified the functions and power 
of the SSB and IMC under this new framework (Legislative Council, 2004). 
Various stakeholders were thus given power to take part in school decision-making. 
Proponents contented that the introduction of the IMC, which was characterised by 
transparency and accountability, was a significant move towards the 
democratisation of school management (Ng & Chan, 2008). 
However, resistance came from the major SSBs, especially the Catholic 
Church (which runs over 320 schools), the Anglican Church (about 90 schools), 
and the Methodist Church (18 schools). These SSBs objected to the requirement 
that all aided schools must establish the same management committee structure. 
They doubted whether their missions and vision could be realised if every school’s 
                                                             
27 DSS schools which do not establish IMCs are still managed by SMCs. 
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constitution required government approval (Law, 2007). They were also concerned 
that SSBs would lose their control of schools, as part of their power would be 
redistributed to individual schools’ IMCs which would be directly accountable to 
the Government and not the SSB (Pang, 2008). 
The tension between the Government and those SSBs who objected continued 
after the passage of the 2004 Bill, which resulted in a delay in setting up IMCs in a 
great number of schools. In 2005, the Church applied for a judicial review of the 
constitutionality of the 2004 Education Bill and stated that it would undermine 
religious freedom. In 2010, the Court of Final Appeal overruled Church’s claim. By 
2015, the majority of secondary schools had established their IMCs. 
After three decades, a number of SBCD programmes, the SBM scheme and 
the DSS have continued to serve the purpose of diversification and decentralisation 
in the education system. Nevertheless, these decentralisation reforms have 
essentially involved a redefinition of roles and a shift of power to tighten the 
Government’s control in the public education sector (Leung, 2003; Pang, 2011). 
Moreover, there has long been a tension between the maintenance of central 
governance and the use of school-based management for achieving this (Lam & 
Yeung, 2010; Marsh et al., 2014). 
 
Since the mid-19
th
 Century, the Hong Kong education system has evolved 
from a small elitist and autonomous system, to a highly centralised system, and 
then to a relatively decentralised system under a strong framework of central 
governance. The next section is concerned with the nature and degree of autonomy 
in secondary schools currently. 
 
5.4. Current model of school autonomy 
 
The current education system in Hong Kong provides 12 years free education. 
The New Academic Structure, introduced in 2009, consists of three-year junior 
secondary education and three-year senior secondary education, followed by four- 
year undergraduate education. Since 2012, the Hong Kong Diploma of Secondary 
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Education has become the sole public examination for secondary pupils. Currently, 
public-funded secondary schools include: government schools, aided schools, DSS 
schools
28
 and caput schools. Table 5.1 shows the numbers and percentages of these 
types of schools and their enrolled pupils in 2013. 
 
Table 5.1. Number and percentage of different types of Hong Kong public-funded 
secondary schools and their enrolled pupils in 2013 
Type of school Number of 
schools 
Percentage of 
schools 
Number of 
pupils 
Percentage of 
pupils  
Government 32 7.0% 24,937 6.7% 
Aided 362 79.0% 297,177 79.7% 
DSS  62 13.5% 49,103 13.2% 
Caput 2 0.5% 1,577 0.4% 
Total 458 100% 372,794 100% 
(EDB, 2014a) 
 
This section examines the nature and degree of autonomy in Hong Kong 
public-funded secondary schools, focusing on aided schools – the major type of 
schools, and also paying attention to DSS schools – the type of schools enjoying 
greater autonomy. Drawing on the analysis of policy documents, literature and 
interview data with regard to aided schools, I give each sub-area of school 
management a grade according to the framework developed in the literature review 
chapter, and create a model of school autonomy in Hong Kong to be compared with 
those of Singapore and Shanghai. 
 
Organisation and governance 
 
The EDB is responsible for the formulation and implementation of education 
policies. A number of large SSBs, such as Catholic Church, Tung Wah Group of 
Hospitals and Po Leung Kuk, play a crucial role in education provision and school 
management. As Principal C explained, “X [the name of the SSB] is my boss. We 
obey the education regulations from the Government… because all our salaries are 
paid by the Government, but the management is by X. I can be fired by X, because 
                                                             
28 DSS schools are examined as ‘quasi-public’ schools in this study as they partly receive public funding. 
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they [the Government] ask X to manage their schools” (sic). According to Principal 
P, Scholar F and Scholar R, the organisational structure of schools is decided by 
SSBs following the EDB’s guidelines. In other words, schools operated by the same 
SSB usually have the same structure (Leung, 2003), usually including school 
management committee, supervisor
29
, principal, vice-principals and heads of 
departments. As mentioned earlier, all aided schools have since 2005 been required 
to establish IMCs. The Education Ordinance defines the functions and powers of 
SSBs and IMCs in this new governance framework, as shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2. Functions and powers of SSBs and IMCs in Hong Kong secondary 
schools 
 Functions and powers 
SSBs 1. setting the vision and mission for the school; 
2. drafting the constitution of the IMC; 
3. giving general directions to the IMC in the formulation of education 
policies of the school; 
4. overseeing the performance of the IMC; 
5. deciding the mode of receiving government aid; 
6. issuing guidelines for raising funds and entering into contracts involving 
funds other than funds received from the Government; 
7. deploying principals and teachers among the sponsored schools under 
certain circumstances 
IMCs 1. managing schools; 
2. formulating education policies of the school in accordance with the 
vision and mission set by the sponsoring body; 
3. accounting to the Permanent Secretary and the sponsoring body for the 
performance of the school; 
4. ensuring that the mission of the school is carried out; 
5. planning and managing financial and human resources of the school; 
6. ensuring that the education of the pupils is promoted in a proper manner; 
7. school planning and self-improvement of the school; 
8. employing such teaching staff and non-teaching staff as it thinks fit and 
determine their terms and conditions of service 
 
In short, SSBs provide guidelines for IMCs and supervise their performance; 
IMCs take charge of the daily operation of schools. Nevertheless, as Principal B 
experienced, in practice, IMCs intend to “give the free hand to principals, unless on 
                                                             
29 According to the EDB, supervisor is appointed by the SSB or elected by the managers of the school in 
accordance with the constitution of the IMC and mainly responsible for reporting personnel changes and 
tenancy of schools. (http://www.edb.gov.hk/en/sch-admin/sbm/corner-imc-sch/delegation-function-sv.html) 
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some important issues, like the Medium of Instruction”. Schools can apply to join 
the DSS once they meet the EDB criteria. According to Principal P, “most DSS 
schools are from Band One… so [they are] famous schools… the Government has 
cut the number that can be DSS schools, the plan is not to have all schools DSS 
schools” (sic). Table 5.3 summarises the nature and degree of school autonomy 
with regard to the ‘organisation and governance’ of Hong Kong secondary aided 
schools. 
 
Table 5.3. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘organisation 
and governance’ of Hong Kong secondary aided schools 
Area Description Degree 
Organisation 
structure and 
functions 
Mainly determined by the EDB and SSBs (e.g. the 
introduction of IMCs) 
1 
Governance 
mechanism 
The EDB executes central control; SSBs provide 
guidelines for IMCs and supervise their performance; 
IMCs take charge of the daily operation of schools 
2 
Types of 
schools 
Schools can voluntarily join the DSS if they meet the 
EDB criteria; but the number is controlled by the EDB 
2 
 
Similar to aided schools, DSS schools are primarily operated by their 
principals and management committees. But as mentioned above, IMCs are not 
compulsory for them; in other words, under the DSS, SSBs have greater power in 
determine the composition of school management committees and then the 
management of schools. 
 
Finance 
 
The Government remains the major source of funding for the majority of 
secondary schools in Hong Kong. More specifically, government and aided schools 
are fully funded according to heads of pupils and provided with land, standard 
school buildings and facilities by the Government (Yung, 2006). Aided schools are 
financially managed under the Code of Aid which specifies the number of classes 
that schools can operate per year group and the number of teachers that they can 
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hire based on pupil intake. In addition, as Principal Z and Principal Q stated, aided 
schools are allowed to collect fees (Tong Fai)
30
 and receive donations that are 
approved by SMCs/IMCs. According to Principal C, Principal H and Journalist K, 
SSBs may offer some extra funding for specific purposes, such as hiring temporary 
teachers and organising school events. 
With regard to financial management, as Principal Q explained, there is a 
“general domain where [aided] schools can use with considerable freedom 
following specifications” and a “special domain where every part has got a 
specified usage”. As stated in the Code of Aid, the subsidy consists of Recurrent 
Grants, Non-recurrent and Capital Grants, and Non-recurrent Grants for Curriculum 
Development. Recurrent Grants can be further divided into Salaries Grant, 
Operating Expenses Block Grant, Composite Furniture and Equipment Grant, Rent 
and Rates Grant, and Passages Grant
31
. From the names of these grants, as Principal 
P explained, it is clear that the EDB “has already created a number of pockets for 
[aided] schools” and principals “cannot move money from one pocket to another”. 
This was echoed by Scholar A and Scholar R. Principal Z and Principal B 
mentioned that schools are requested to provide annual budgets for the EDB audit 
and make them known to the public via schools’ websites. The Government has the 
power to reduce, withdraw, refund and expand subsidies (Hong Kong Government, 
1994). Table 5.4 summarises the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard 
to the ‘finance’ of Hong Kong secondary aided schools. 
 
Table 5.4. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘finance’ of 
Hong Kong aided secondary schools 
Area Description Degree 
Source(s) of 
finance 
Fully funded by the Government; donations and fees 
approved by SMCs/IMCs and additional grants from 
SSBs  
2 
Expenditure Domains and quota are stipulated in the Code of Aid; 
schools manage their expenditure according to that 
2 
Land, buildings Provided by the Government and maintained by schools 1 
                                                             
30 EDB allows aided secondary schools to collect Tong Fai at a rate of not exceeding $290 per annum from 
their senior secondary pupils (EDB, 2008a). 
31 Passages Grant is for schools which require passages for teachers of English on overseas terms and their 
families if applicable (Hong Kong Government, 1994). 
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and facilities 
Financial report 
and its 
availability 
Audit by the EDB and uploaded to school websites 1 
 
As mentioned above, DSS schools have been given the authority to set their 
own tuition fees on top of annual per capita government subsidies. The current 
three- income-banding funding scheme for DSS schools was introduced in 2000. 
Table 5.5 shows the permitted ratio between the government subsidies and school 
tuition fees. 
 
Table 5.5. Three-income-banding funding scheme for Hong Kong DSS schools  
Band  Fees  Subsidy 
I 
0 to 
3
1
X 
X 
II 
3
1
X to 2
3
1
X 
X, but schools are required to set aside 50% 
for scholarships / financial assistance schemes 
III 
2
3
1
X or more 
None 
(EMB, 2000) 
 
Basically, as long as tuition fees are below two and a third (2 1/3) of the 
average unit cost of subsidising an aided school place (X), DSS schools can 
continue to receive full recurrent subsidies (Lai, 2002). According to Principal P, 
“the amount of fees ranges from hundreds to thousands HKD… a few DSS schools 
that transformed from elite schools charge very expensive fees”. Meanwhile, the 
Government provides DSS schools with land, standard buildings, non-recurrent 
capital grants for major repairs and a one-off grant for upgrading facilities to the 
standard of newly constructed aided schools. Anything over and above the standard 
is only available are at their own expense (Tsang, 2002). 
Comparing to aided schools, DSS schools enjoy more freedom in the use of 
their grants for educational purposes as long as that is in compliance with the 
Education Ordinance, agreements signed between the school (SSB and SMC/IMC) 
and the Government, and other relevant regulations (EDB, 2012). According to 
Principal P, DSS schools are also subject to the EDB audit. School reports including 
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a financial summary are required to upload onto schools’ websites for public 
monitoring (EDB, 2012). 
 
Curriculum, teaching and examinations 
 
Aided schools are required to prepare their pupils for the public examinations 
(Chan & Tan, 2008). They adopt the central curriculum prescribed by the 
Curriculum Development Institution of the EDB, which is developed in 
consultation with advisory bodies such as the CDC and Education Commission. 
As Morris and Adamson (2010) note, the Government tightly mandates these 
bodies through determining their agendas and selecting their members. The 
central curriculum includes eight Key Learning Areas with a range of compulsory 
subjects and a list of optional subjects from which schools can choose. For each 
area, there is a curriculum guide for aims, content, time allocation, learning and 
teaching strategies, assessments and resources, and practice exemplars (CDC, 
2002). According to Scholar R, “usually, teachers… take reference to the guide and 
develop their lesson plan”. 
Based on the curriculum guide, various commercial textbook publishers decide 
the depth of coverage and the way that topics are explained and presented (Morris 
& Adamson, 2010). In other words, as Scholar R explained, “the publisher will edit 
textbooks in accordance with the curriculum published by the EDB”. Then, the 
EDB provides a recommended list of textbooks “vetted by the appropriate 
Reviewing Panels of the Bureau’s Textbook Committee” and states that choosing 
textbooks from that list is not “a compulsory requirement” (EDB, 2015b). However, 
as Principal B stated, “you will have a lot of difficulties if you do not follow… you 
have to explain to the EDB… and you have to submit the books you want to use for 
approval”. Principal H considered that “‘not approved’ carries a meaning of not up 
to standard, and not legitimate”. 
Although schools are encouraged to design their own calendar flexibly to meet 
their local needs, the guide offers very detailed suggestions about curriculum time 
allocation for each area. Taking English Language as an example, schools may 
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allocate seven to eight periods per week and 17%-21% periods in total for each key 
age stage. The length of a lesson is freely decided by schools. The EMB (2005a) 
only stipulates that there should be no less than 190 school days and 90-93 holidays 
a year and the proposed list of school holidays should be submitted for approval. In 
addition, a model of learning time (including school time, time before and after 
school, weekends and holidays) and activities arrangement is provided for their 
reference (CDC, 2002). 
Scholar A argued that “[principals] are not legally required to follow the 
[central] curriculum. But they will be foolish if they don’t”, as it is highly 
consistent with the syllabus produced by the sole public examination body – the 
HKEAA. As Principal Z described, day-to-day teaching actually “follows the 
textbook and the textbook follows the curriculum and assessment syllabus”. He also 
admitted that “past exam papers are the key references for teaching” and the 
approaches of the public examination are mirrored by internal assessments in order 
to make their pupils more proficient. Although teachers are said to have been given 
greater power to determine teaching methods, Scholar F argued that “if they have 
found the traditional dictated way works, they will be very reluctant to change it, 
even if they want to”. 
School-based Assessment (SBA) is applied to three core subjects, namely, 
Chinese Language, English Language and Liberal Studies, and a number of 
optional subjects, such as Chemistry and Visual Arts. All pupils from Secondary 
Four to Six are supposed to be assessed by their own teachers in those subjects 
under the HKEAA guidelines. However, as Scholar A observed, SBA has “not 
proved popular at all”, as “parents would challenge subjective assessment by 
teachers” and this “has put teachers in a position they are not comfortable with”, so 
“there is a move now among the teaching associations to actually ask SBA to be 
removed”. According to the latest HKEAA (2015a) announcement, since 2018, the 
marks awarded in SBA will account for 15-20% in most subjects’ results in the 
public examination
32
; and SBA will no longer be implemented in two subjects and 
become optional trail in four subjects. 
                                                             
32 The weighting of SBA will range from 30% to 50% in three optional subjects relating to arts and technology. 
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As mentioned earlier, SBCD has been promoted in Hong Kong since the 1980s. 
Rather than providing an alternative curriculum, Marsh et al. (2014) argue that 
SBCD “has been, and remains, a means to reify the central curriculum reform 
initiatives by making them more relevant to and therefore more feasible in the local 
(school) context” (p. 36). Principal B commented that “unless it is designed for the 
public examination… it dies”. Besides, very little time is actually allocated for 
SBCD by schools. Principal Z elaborated that: “say for example, out of 50 periods, 
it would just account two or three [periods]… most of them are used by schools as a 
kind of propaganda… telling parents that we have so many school-based curricula, 
but if you really take into consideration the hours, the time spend on it, then you 
will find that just… very minimum proposal” (sic). 
Table 5.6 summarises the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to 
the ‘curriculum, teaching and examinations’ of Hong Kong secondary aided 
schools. 
 
Table 5.6. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘curriculum, 
teaching and examinations’ of Hong Kong secondary aided schools 
Area of school 
management 
Description Degree 
Textbooks Most schools choose textbooks from an EDB-approved 
list; deviation need to get permission from the EDB 
2 
Subjects Prescribed compulsory and optional subjects; the 
choices of optional subjects depend on individual 
schools 
1.5 
Content of 
subjects and 
curriculum 
delivery 
Following prescribed curriculum syllabuses; Flexible in 
theory; influenced by the sole public examination in 
reality 
2 
School-based 
curriculum 
development 
Supplementary to central curriculum and preparation for 
the public examination 
2 
Curriculum 
time allocation 
The percentage of curriculum time for each subject is 
provided by the EDB; the arrangement is determined by 
schools 
2.5 
School 
calendar  
Decided by schools following the EDB guidelines; the 
list of school holidays is required to submit for approval 
3.5 
Entrance 
exams 
Prescribed syllabuses for the public examination (about 
80-85%); the SBA is applied to selected subjects 
1.5 
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following the HKEAA guidelines (about 15%-20%) 
 
In contrast, DSS schools have greater flexibility in curriculum design than 
aided schools. For example, as Journalist K mentioned, 11 out of 62 DSS secondary 
schools in 2013 were allowed to offer up to 50% of their pupils alternatives to the 
central curriculum, such as the International Baccalaureate Diploma and General 
Certificate Education A-levels, mainly catering for the international market. 
Nevertheless, the EDB (2015a) emphasises that “DSS schools are still required to 
offer principally a curriculum targeted at local students and prepare them for the 
local examinations”. This was also mentioned by Principal P: for the majority of 
schools, “no matter aided or DSS, you have to teach Hong Kong curriculum, which 
means you have to prepare kids to sit for public examinations conducted by the 
HKEAA” (sic). As Chan and Tan (2008) argue, most DSS schools have only been 
free to develop non-examination subjects; this has limited their autonomy in 
providing alternative curriculum to a certain extent. Scholar X also noticed that 
“even some performance very good schools are very conservative, they are more 
reluctant to make change” (sic). 
 
Teachers 
 
According to the Education Ordinance and Code of Aid, teachers in aided 
schools are required to register as either ‘registered teachers’ or ‘permitted 
teachers’. The former have to possess a recognised teaching certificate (e.g. a local 
Teacher’s Certificate or Post-graduate Diploma/Certificate in Education) in 
addition to a degree qualification. They are given permanent posts and allowed to 
teach all subjects. The latter do not need to have a teaching certificate, but can only 
sign a temporary contract and teach few designated subjects (e.g. music, arts and 
sports) when registered teachers are in shortage (EDB, 2008b). In general, 
permitted teachers get less pay than registered teachers and as stipulated in the 
Code of Aid there is no increments for permitted teachers after reaching certain 
salary bars. They may obtain the ‘registered’ status through the completion of 
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recognised on-the-job training programmes. 
Lai’s (2002) study demonstrates that sub-degree-level and untrained teachers 
served as a “convenient buffer” in Hong Kong to meet the rapidly growing demand 
for teachers from the 1950s to the early 2000s. A great number of teachers gained 
their teaching certificates through in-service teacher training during that time (Lai 
& Grossman, 2008). But standards for entering the teaching profession have 
become more rigorous in recent years; the Government’s long term policy was “to 
require all new teachers to be professionally trained and degree holders” (EMB, 
2005b). According to Principal Z, schools “are allowed to recruit teachers without 
teachers’ training, but that’s not that normal”. Principal H confirmed that trained 
teachers are preferred in most schools. By 2013, the vast majority of secondary 
school teachers are professionally trained university graduates, as shown in Table 
5.7. 
 
Table 5.7. Academic qualification and training status of Hong Kong secondary 
school teachers 
Academic qualification Training status Number  Percentage 
University graduate or equivalent Trained 27968 93.3% 
Untrained 1456 4.9% 
Non-university graduate Trained 488 1.6% 
Untrained 69 0.2% 
Total  29981 100% 
(EDB, 2014a) 
 
There are five universities primarily providing initial teacher education. Those 
who enter teaching later in their careers can receive the recognised professional 
qualification through the Non-Graduate Teacher Qualification Assessment. Schools 
are responsible for checking the eligibility of job applicants. As Principal C 
explained, two interviews are usually held with applicants: “one with principal, the 
second is in the headquater’s office” in SSB and if “we want to employ contract 
[permitted] teachers, before that, we have to ask the permission from them [SSB]” 
(sic). As soon as the appointment is confirmed by SMCs/IMCs, applications for 
teacher registration are submitted to the EDB. Only the employment of principals, 
temporary Native-speaking English Teachers and teachers directly appointed to 
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promotion ranks is required to be firstly approved by the EDB. Dismissal is handled 
by the same authorities (EDB, 2007). 
The number of teachers that a school can recruit depends on the permitted 
number of classes and the permitted teacher-to-class ratios. For example, as 
Principal Z explained: his school was allowed to operate four classes in Secondary 
One and five classes in Secondary Four; the permitted teacher-to-class ratios in the 
2012/13 school year were: 1.7 teachers per junior secondary class and 2.0 teachers 
per senior secondary class, which means he may hire 6.8 teachers for Secondary 
One and 10 teachers for Secondary Four. This is the main indicator for calculating 
the Salary Grant. Another is the status of teachers – all teachers are categorised as 
either Graduate (GMs) or Certificated (CMs) Masters/Mistresses. GMs must hold a 
university degree and are paid more than CMs. Schools are only permitted to use 85% 
of their Salary Grant for GMs. Principal C complained that “nowadays, almost all 
teachers are degree holders, but they [EDB] still keep this kind of ratio”. 
Consequently, many graduates are employed as CMs. 
With regard to continuing professional development, the minimum 
requirement is 150 hours spread over three years. As Principal Z argued, this is a 
“loose indication” because the EDB does not specify “what should be included and 
not included”, so “it’s up to the teacher to decide” the form and content. 
Nevertheless, as Principal H mentioned, schools have to report the hours of 
continuing professional development completed by their teachers in the annual 
school report. The EDB (2015c) also lists a set of recognised training courses on its 
website, including those stated in the Code of Aid and other equivalent ones 
acceptable to IMCs or Permanent Secretary for Education. Teachers are required to 
undertake these courses if they wish to be eligible for promotion (EDB, 2015c). 
The current teacher appraisal framework was introduced in 2001. Following 
the Teacher Performance Management (EMB, 2003), schools can define the 
objectives, set the criteria and methods, and determine the procedures of their own 
appraisal models. Although under this framework, schools are given the authority 
to conduct appraisal and approve promotion, according to Principal P, there is “a 
ratio between senior and junior teachers… if all your senior teacher positions are 
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filled… there is no chance” of promotion. Teachers are not civil servants, but 
follow similar salary scales including annual increments as civil servants, which are 
stipulated in the Code of Aid. Table 5.8 summarises the nature and degree of school 
autonomy with regard to the ‘teachers’ of Hong Kong secondary aided schools. 
 
Table 5.8. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘teachers’ of 
Hong Kong secondary aided schools 
Area of school 
management 
Description Degree 
Qualification 
and training 
The vast majority of teachers are required to be trained 
degree holders 
1.5 
Appointment 
and dismissal  
Hired and fired by schools (SMCs/IMCs); registered in 
the EDB 
3 
Continuing 
professional 
development  
150 hours spread over three years, the form and content 
are decided by teachers and schools; recognised training 
courses are listed on the EDB website and formed as 
promotion condition 
2 
Appraisal  School-based teacher appraisal in compliance with the 
EDB guidance 
2 
Promotion Proposed by schools following the stipulated ratio 2 
Pay (salary 
and bonuses) 
Following stipulated salary scheme stipulated in the 
Code of Aid 
0 
Legal status Not civil servants, but following similar salary scheme 2 
 
Compared to aided schools, DSS schools enjoy more flexibility in the 
management of teachers. As Principal P explained, “the DSS school system, it’s a 
little different, because all teachers are kind of in contracts… but I would have to 
exam the qualifications of the applicants in the same that the EDB exams applicants 
of the aided schools” (sic). In particular, DSS schools are not required to conform 
to the proportion of GMs and CMs. This enables them to hire more junior CMs 
staff with comparatively lower salary costs and more supporting staff (e.g. teaching 
assistants and administrators), whereas the number of such staff is stipulated for 
aided schools (Chan & Tan, 2008). 
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Accountability 
 
The school development and accountability framework was introduced in 
2003 and its latest phase starts from September 2015. This framework requires all 
aided schools to prepare a school development plan, conduct annual school 
self-evaluation and seek validation from an external review team sent by the EDB 
once every four years (Walker & Ko, 2011; EDB, 2015d). Both school development 
plan and school self-evaluation make reference to 23 performance indicators in four 
major domains prescribed by the EDB, namely, management and organisation, 
learning and teaching, student support and school ethos, and student performance 
(EDB, 2015e). In addition, the EDB provides a series of standard school 
self-evaluation tools which are recommended for schools to assess their 
performance, such as Key Performance Measures, Stakeholder Surveys and School 
Value-added Information System (EDB, 2015f). Schools’ self-evaluation annual 
reports should be endorsed by their SMCs/ IMCs and made available on their 
websites before the end of each academic year (Cheng, 2009). 
According to the EDB (2015g), an external review team is comprised of four 
members: three EDB officers and a front-line school personnel. The main purpose 
of the review is to complement school self-evaluation and “give schools the benefit 
of feedback and suggestions for improvement from different perspectives” (p. 3). 
As Principal B, Principal H and Principal Q described, external review teams 
usually visit schools for four days; with reference to the prescriptive performance 
indicators, reviewers check school development plans and self-evaluation reports 
for the latest two years, observe lessons and meet stakeholders (i.e. parents, pupils, 
teachers and school managers). As the EDB (2015g) states, external review reports 
focus on the contexts of the schools and their key strengths and areas for further 
improvement. Principal B said that schools would be expected to “demonstrate that 
they are taking steps to improve” drawing on EDB’s suggestions. External review 
reports are required to be released to schools’ stakeholders but only encouraged to 
be uploaded to their websites for the public information (EDB, 2015g). 
On top of this, aided schools are required to participate in the Territory-wide 
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System Assessment conducted by the HKEAA. It aims to provide schools with 
objective data on pupils’ performances in Chinese language, English language and 
Mathematics at the end of key age stages one to three against specific Basic 
Competencies (HKEAA, 2015b). According to Journalist K, the collected data is 
also used by the Government to review and inform policies. The EDB does not 
officially rank schools. The banding system, revised in 2000, is used to group 
pupils based on their academic abilities, although, as illustrated earlier, it in effect 
labels schools. Schools’ academic performance and other statistics are still 
published in mass media, which puts great pressure on schools. Table 5.9 
summarises the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the 
‘accountability’ of Hong Kong secondary aided schools. 
 
Table 5.9. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘accountability’ 
of Hong Kong secondary aided schools 
Area Description Degree 
Goals and 
standards 
School development plan is made according to a set of 
prescriptive performance indicators  
1 
Evaluation and 
inspection 
School self-evaluation and external review by the EDB 
are conducted with reference to performance indicators 
1 
Annual report Checked by the external review team 1 
Availability of 
information 
School development plan and self-evaluation have to be 
uploaded to schools’ websites; external school review 
reports are required to release to schools’ stakeholders 
1 
 
As EDB (2015h) stipulates, DSS schools, which have service agreement with 
the Government, are subject to external review on their performance and the 
Territory-wide System Assessment. This is one of the criteria for the renewal of 
service agreement. While the timing is set out in service agreement, the procedures 
and requirements are the same as those for aided schools. The arrangements of 
external review for DSS schools without service agreement are those applied to 
aided schools. Principal P felt that DSS schools actually “face more serious and 
stricter scrutiny from the EDB than aided schools”, because “the more freedom a 
school has, the closer the EDB looks at it”. 
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Pupil admission and external relations 
 
Pupil admission in aided schools is determined through the Secondary School 
Places Allocation system designed and managed by the EDB. It is divided into two 
stages: discretionary places and central allocation. The application for discretionary 
places depends on schools; those participating are allowed to reserve up to 30% 
places for their preferred pupils and not subject to restriction on districts (EDB, 
2014b). According to Principal Z, “all secondary schools in Hong Kong… try their 
best to attract more applicants for the discretionary places”. In the central allocation 
stage, 10% are for unrestricted school choices and the remaining 90% are for 
restricted school choices; pupils are centrally allocated to secondary schools 
according to their bands, parental choice and computerised random number (EDB, 
2014b). Contrary to the former allocation system merely depending on academic 
performance, as Chan and Tan (2008) argue, the current system actually reduced 
schools’ control over “the quality and demographic attributes of their student 
intakes” (p. 475). 
According to Principal C, the competition among schools has increased in 
recent years, as the birth rate in Hong Kong has decreased and the Government has 
started to “kill schools”. Principal Z complained that, in this situation, he has to 
spend a great deal of time and money on marketing activities and teachers are also 
distracted from teaching by the work to attract more pupils. While collecting data in 
Hong Kong, I saw prominent advertisements for schools in local newspapers and 
massive banners on the streets. 
The EDB has developed a series of schemes and programmes to encourage 
and help schools to build active partnerships with businesses (EDB, 2015i). Schools 
are fairly free to have ‘sister schools’ in Mainland China or overseas. Parents who 
would like to engage in school activities can either join the Parent-Teacher 
Association following the EDB guideline, or be elected as the IMC parent 
representative to have their voice heard in the matter of school management. 
Principals and teachers are very used to freely expressing their views on and 
complaints about education and schools through the media. This is evident in my 
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data collection, particularly comparing to the other two East Asian societies. Table 
5.10 summarises the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the 
‘pupil admission and external relations’ of Hong Kong secondary aided schools. 
 
Table 5.10. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘pupil 
admission and external relations’ of Hong Kong secondary aided schools 
Area Description Degree 
pupil admission A centralised allocation system; schools can 
reserve up to 30% places 
2 
Relationship with other 
schools and businesses 
The EDB provides schemes to encourage and 
facilitate that 
4 
Level of parents’ 
involvement 
Parents can join the Parent-Teacher 
Association and/or be elected as representatives 
of IMCs; the power and function are stipulated 
by the EDB 
3 
Relationship with mass 
media (or interview 
requests in general) 
People can freely express their opinions 5 
 
For schools under the DSS, whether or not join the allocation system is their 
own choices. For those participating, they can still freely set their own admission 
requirements; those not can recruit pupils go beyond geographic boundaries (EDB, 
2014b). As Law (2007) argues, given nine-year compulsory education is free in 
aided schools, tuition fees can be a “barrier” for pupils from poor families to choose 
fee- charging DSS schools, although not all of them charge high fees (p. 111). 
Moreover, Journalist K pointed out that the freedom of pupil admission enjoyed by 
elite DSS schools has led to a concern on the potential detrimental impact of 
admitting pupils on their academic merit which mainly means pupils’ “English 
language ability and the types of private tutoring and extra-curricular activities that 
parents could arrange for their kids to build their impressive portfolios for 
admissions”. For “some not very famous” DSS schools, as Principal P mentioned, 
they “have to try very hard to attract students”. 
This section has examined the nature and degree of school autonomy in the 
current Hong Kong education system, particularly, with regard to aided and DSS 
secondary schools. Drawing on the historical and current development, this is 
163 
further analysed and discussed from four perspectives in the next section. 
 
5.5. Features of school autonomy 
 
Education in Hong Kong was modelled on a British-style system and 
influenced by Chinese tradition during its colonial history. The post-handover 
period has seen a number of whole-system changes such as the introduction of a 
sole public examination and the New Academic Structure. Through decades of 
efforts, Hong Kong has achieved 12-year free education; developed a sophisticated 
partnership with various non-governmental SSBs; and shifted from relying on 
private funding and resources to receiving public subsidies. Subsequent to the 
expansion of mass education, since the early 1980s, policy-makers started to stress 
quality assurance, effective school governance, parental choice, market forces and 
competition through a series of school-based management initiatives including the 
SMI/SBM schemes, SBCD programmes and the DSS. In this context, school 
autonomy in Hong Kong has been characterised by four features, elaborated below. 
Firstly, major reforms promoting school autonomy have been centrally 
designed and initiated, but implemented voluntarily at first and made compulsory 
after 1997. A good example is the introduction of the SMI and SBM scheme. As 
described above, the former was firstly promoted through lobbying strategies but 
not warmly welcomed by most aided schools, whereas the revised SBM scheme 
was mandatory for all aided schools since 1997. This change has been in 
accordance with the shifting of governance and policy-making in the political 
system before and after the handover (Morris & Scott, 2003). The establishment of 
IMCs, the promotion of Chinese as Medium of Instruction and the regulation of 
class sizes are examples of the centrally initiated and implemented policies in the 
post-1997 period. The SAR Government, compared with its colonial predecessor, 
seems to have relied less on the use of symbolic policies and increasingly tightened 
its control over policy implementation at the school level (Morris & Adamson, 
2010). 
Secondly, the establishment of IMCs has transferred autonomy from SSBs, 
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rather than from the Government, to individual schools. By including 40% external 
representatives, the power previously exclusively enjoyed by SSBs has been 
divided among various stakeholders. The roles and functions of SSBs and 
SMCs/IMCs, and the relationship between them, have been clearly redefined, while 
the central control of the Government has not been significantly changed. In other 
words, the Government still holds the power of determining goals and criteria of 
education through the prescribed curriculum and the public examination, and 
designing the governance and accountability framework. Furthermore, as Pang 
(2008) argues, the Government “is likely to assume increasing control of school 
education”, because: the Board of Education was dissolved in 2003; the Education 
Commission no longer prepares policy documents from 1997; and the role of SSBs 
as “intermediate control structure” has been weakened since the 2000s (p. 30). In 
this sense, central control of education seems to have been reinforced. 
Thirdly, the autonomy that has been devolved to schools is limited and further 
balanced by a set of central control mechanisms. For example, aided schools have 
only been empowered by the SBM scheme to manage 15% of their budget; and 
they are free to admit up to 30% pupils based on their own discretion. Although the 
DSS enables schools to be more autonomous than their aided counterparts in many 
aspects, schools with DSS status are still subject to government inspection and the 
contract can be terminated by the EDB if they cannot meet the stipulated standards. 
Besides, there are only a small proportion of secondary schools (13.5%) granted 
DSS status, which has limited their impact. Despite that the Government has 
developed a school-based evaluation framework, it has to be validated by the EDB 
review and conducted according to prescriptive performance indicators. Even in 
some areas that schools are in theory granted great autonomy (e.g. teaching 
methods and SBCD), in reality, they adopt approaches which guarantee high 
performance in the sole public examination. 
Fourthly, the DSS has been promoted as a key means to achieve marketisation/ 
privatisation of education (Chan & Tan, 2008), which has correspondingly brought 
about the increase of the level of school autonomy. It was formulated and initiated 
in an attempt to expand the private provision of education and strengthen the role of 
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private schools as a good alternative to public schools (Tse, 2005). Moreover, 
market mechanisms are central to the management of DSS schools. For example, 
they are allowed to determine tuition fees according to market price signals, and 
parents and pupils can ‘buy’ education service based on their needs and preferences 
without central restrictions. Thus, a few elite DSS schools are able to set higher 
bars to select rich and/or academically capable pupils. Nevertheless, Law (2007) 
argues that the extent of marketisation/privatisation should not be exaggerated; “the 
DSS school is not a genuine case of privatisation; rather, it subsidises private 
education” (p. 109). 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
The Hong Kong education system has mainly reflected and changed in 
response to broader socio-political shifts. In terms of school autonomy, three 
distinct periods have been identified in this thesis. The strategies adopted by the 
government in the education sector have shifted from ‘laissez-faire’ to centralised 
control and then to decentralisation and diversification. However, the reforms 
promoting school-based management since the 1980s have not necessarily led to 
higher levels of school autonomy in all types of schools and in all management 
areas. Furthermore, the Government has recentralised the education system through 
weakening advisory bodies and SSBs; the accountability framework and quality 
assurance mechanisms have also been used to retain central control. Meanwhile, the 
central curriculum and the sole public examination have determined daily teaching 
and learning to a large extent, although SBCD has been rhetorically encouraged. 
The DSS, as a specific approach to marketisation/privatisation, has only brought 
about more autonomy in a small number of schools. Therefore, it would be 
problematic to make the general claim that secondary schools in Hong Kong enjoy 
high levels of autonomy.
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Chapter 6. School autonomy in Singapore secondary education 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In addition to Hong Kong examined in the previous chapter, Singapore is 
another society selected to answer the second research question. It is a 
commonplace to declare that Singapore is unique – a tiny island, a young state, a 
strong government, a prosperous economy and a multicultural society. Its education 
system, well-acknowledged as high-performing (Stewart, 2011), has been 
developed in this context and been used as a vital means to achieve economic 
growth, political stability and national cohesion. The main purpose of this chapter is 
to investigate the nature and the degree of autonomy in Singapore secondary 
schools. Firstly, it is concerned with how the education system has been painted in 
a broad canvas of economy, politics, society and culture. Secondly, a specific focus 
is given to the evolution of school autonomy over time. Thirdly, a model of 
autonomy enjoyed by secondary schools currently is created, according to the 
analysis of policy documents, literature and interview data. Lastly, five features of 
school autonomy in Singapore are identified and enunciated, based on the analysis 
of historical transitions and current developments. 
 
6.2. Context 
 
The Republic of Singapore (Singapore) is a sovereign city-state, sitting at the 
southern tip of the Malay Peninsula. It is a small island (about 700 km
2
) with a 
population of 5.4 million, ethnically made up of 74% Chinese, 13% Malay, 9% 
Indian and 4% others (Department of Statistic, 2015). Singapore was ‘found’ in 
1819 by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles and officially subject to British colonial rule 
from 1867. It was occupied by Japanese during the Second World War, granted 
limited self-governance by the UK in 1959, incorporated into the Malaysian 
Federation in 1963, and reluctantly and traumatically obtained full independence in 
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1965 (Turnbull, 2009). The paucity of natural resources has stimulated the People’s 
Action Party (PAP) – the sole party that has ruled Singapore since independence – 
to prioritise education and manpower training as the centre of its economic and 
political nation-building strategies (Gopinathan, 2012). These instrumental goals 
have profoundly shaped the development of the Singapore education system. 
 
Economic growth 
 
Singapore had a long history of free entrepôt trade since Raffles landed. The 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 resulted in a dramatic increase in trade between 
Europe and Asia, which made Singapore the capital of the British Straits 
Settlements during the colonial period because of its strategic location (Turnbull, 
2009). Nonetheless, the first generation of the PAP leadership staunchly believed 
that Singapore could only survive by being united with Malaya, generally because 
it was “a Chinese majority in a Malay-dominant area” (Gopinathan, 2012, p.66) and 
specifically, in terms of economy, because its lop-sided trading economy was 
heavily intertwined with Malaysia (Gopinathan, 1974). Therefore, the 
independence came as a “rude shock” (Tong & Lian, 2002, p. 2) and forced this 
new-born country to confront a stark and urgent situation. Considerable efforts 
were made in these circumstances to orient education to the pre-eminent goal of 
economic survival by providing a basic-skilled and disciplined labour force 
(Gopinathan, 1995). 
Singapore ushered its economic turning point in the late 1960s, when the 
outspread of the fever of China’s Cultural Revolution frightened western companies 
and factories out of investing in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and turned to Singapore. 
The following two decades saw great economic strides based on the export-oriented 
and labour-intensive manufacturing industries. Since the 1980s, Singapore sought 
to attract high value-added goods and services (Turnbull, 2009). Correspondingly, 
as Ashton and Sung (1997) observe, its education system moved from providing 
compulsory primary education and upgrading basic literacy, Mathematics and 
science in the 1960s, to promoting technical and vocational training in the 1970s, 
168 
and then to developing skills required for “effective participation in an advanced 
industrial society” (p. 212) and expanding the provision of higher education in the 
1980s. It is noteworthy that Singapore achieved universal primary education in 
1965 and lower secondary education in the early 1970s without making them 
compulsory (Stewart, 2011). 
By the 1980s, a rich and progressive Singapore had become a major global 
economic player, well-known as one of the ‘Tiger Economies’ which provided a 
stable and friendly investment environment with low taxes and pro-employer 
Labour Law; and a successful ‘developmental state’ which has had extensive state 
intervention, regulation and planning in its economic and social developments 
(World Bank, 1993; Johnson, 1995). The mid-1980 recession urged the 
Government to recognise the challenge of knowledge-based economy in the 
globalisation era (Sharpe & Gopinathan, 2002). Singapore has since concentrated 
on enhancing “creativity and productivity in its labour force to compete better in 
the global auction for talent” (Gopinathan & Mardiana, 2013, p. 16). A major 
restructuring of the education system has been launched since the late 1990s and 
continues to be underway (Gopinathan, 2007). Two of the key initiatives were the 
1997 “Thinking Schools, Learning Nation” and 2004 “Teach Less, Learn More”, 
which have put a high premium on flexibility, decentralisation, diversity, 
innovation, entrepreneurship, information technology and lifelong learning in 
education (Pang, 2011). 
 
Politics and governance: a centralised and paternalistic ‘administrative state’ 
 
The halo of British invincibility was inevitably shattered due to its surrender 
during the Second World War. Meanwhile, there was little racial integration and 
social cohesion in Singapore as an immigrant society; the main ethnic groups 
considered themselves as Chinese, Malays and Indians, rather than as Singaporeans 
(Gopinathan, 1995). During the 1960s, independence movements triggered 
intensive ethnic and religious disturbances and tensions (Turnbull, 2009). Therefore, 
it was urgent for the newly-elected PAP Government to build a united nation 
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accommodating ethnic and linguistic pluralism to ensure the continued survival of 
the country (Hill & Lian, 1995). This goal was deemed to be achieved by creating 
and inculcating a sense of national identity and a kind of value that would enable 
Singaporeans to live in harmony (Han, 2009). Education has since served as part of 
this broader strategy to promote national integration and produce loyal and 
committed citizenry, and for this purpose, bilingualism and different versions of 
national education have become the key components of the education system 
(Gopinathan, 2007). 
Since its birth, Singapore has experienced a long socio-political stability 
guaranteed by a powerful government. As Gopinathan and Mardiana (2013) 
describe, its governance system has been maintained by “an astute and 
development-focused political and administrative elite” (p. 22), eschewed 
“ideology in favour of pragmatism and rational policy making” (p. 17), efficient 
resource distribution and detailed policy implementation. Moreover, high salaries 
have been provided for ministers and civil servants to attract and retain elitists and 
eliminate corruption (Hill & Lian, 1995). The highly efficient and clean 
Government has received worldwide reputation and admiration. 
However, Singapore has been often criticised as “one of the most 
outstandingly stubborn cases of authoritarianism” (Sim, 2006, p. 143), ‘soft 
authoritarianism’ (Hwee, 2002), or ‘stable semi-democracy’ at best (Case, 2002). 
Mauzy and Milne (2002) opine that it has a “dominant party system” rather than a 
“one-party system”, because “other parities exist” (p. 38). In spite of the 
‘multi-party’ form of the political system, the PAP is in fact the sole party that has 
ever been in power with few parliamentary seats held by the fragmented opposition 
and no local elected institutions (Jones, 2013). Lee Kuan Yew, who went on to lead 
the country for 31 years as Prime Minister since 1959, once even declared, “I make 
no apologies that the PAP is the Government and the Government is the PAP” 
(Petir, 1982, quoted in Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 25-26). With this 
unchallengeable power, Gopinathan (2007) points out that the Government has 
been able to develop its own forms of human rights and state control and 
interventions. 
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Lee Kuan Yew and other political leaders have firmly supported hierarchy 
within the Government. This, as Mauzy and Milne (2002) argue, means “the 
Minister, not the top civil servant, is in charge” (p. 6). Many academics have 
identified Singapore as an ‘administrative state’. For example, as Chan (1976) 
elaborates, its governance system has been characterised by “depoliticisation”, 
which means political decisions have been “given” by, and “the bureaucracy is a 
close handmaiden of”, the PAP (p. 232). In addition, Khong (1995) points out that 
“the alliance, based on a convergence of interests between an increasingly 
technocratic civil service and the political leadership, has played a vital role in 
conferring legitimacy on the government” (p. 117). In this way, the political power 
concentrated in the hands of cabinet ministers has been diffused into the 
administrative arena. 
Lee Kuan Yew was highly skeptical of ‘western democracy’. Instead, ‘Asian 
Values’ and ‘Neo-Confucianism’ were notably developed by him and have been 
cherished by the Government. This ideological system has rationalised the 
Asian-style authoritarianism and stressed the rule of law and order, collectivism, 
communitarianism and social harmony in sacrifice of certain freedoms (DeBary, 
1998; Hill, 2000). As to its people, the Government has adopted a ‘Father knows 
best’ approach in both public and private sectors (Choy, 1987) on the ground that 
ordinary people are ‘immature’ (Haas, 1999). Examples include a series of 
government- initiated campaigns, such as: against spitting in public and selling 
chewing gum; and advocating flushing public toilets and behaving courteously. 
Caning, introduced in the colonial period, has been retained as punishment for 
convicted criminals and expanded to daily misbehaving. The mass media is 
state-owned and responsible for informing people the Government’s decisions and 
propagating its ideologies (Lee, 2010). Unions have been turned into a key 
institution of implementing policies and maintaining order (Rodan, 2006). 
These political characteristics have been accordingly reflected in Singapore’s 
small, compact, centralised and regulation-making education system. On the behalf 
of the Government, Singapore’s Ministry of Education (SMOE) exercises strict 
control over various types of educational institutions and different levels of 
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schooling in almost all management areas (Tan, 2006). As Dimmock and Tan (2012) 
argue, the “high degree of tight coupling and alignment in policy and leadership” 
have guaranteed “the implementation, sustainability and scalability of policy 
reforms” across the whole country (p. 326). Particularly with regard to curriculum, 
following Lee Kuan Yew’s idea of education – ‘producing a good man and a useful 
citizen’, pupils have been imbued with the values and beliefs promoted by the 
Government in “all subjects where appropriate”, especially Civics and Moral 
Education, Social Studies and Mother Tongue Language (Han, 2009, p. 106). 
This highly centralised and hierarchical one-party Government has tried to 
seek a ‘kinder and gentler’ face since the mid-1980s under the leadership of the 
then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (1990-2004) and his successor, Lee Kuan 
Yew’s son, Lee Hsien Loong (2004-present), in order to hold Singapore’s attraction 
to global investors and cope with a more complex socio-political setting (Lyons & 
Gomez, 2005). The Government has shown its desire for a ‘civic society’, although 
this has been more concerned with the contribution from, rather than the criticism 
made by, elites (Hill & Lian, 1995; Lee, 2002). The reflection of this political 
emphasis in the education arena was the introduction of National Education and 
Character and Citizenship Education as compulsory curriculum since the late 1990s, 
with the purpose of retaining young Singaporean’s loyalty and attachment 
(Gopinathan, 2007). However, the degree of ‘openness’ and ‘liberalisation’ seems 
not high enough to appease the growing discontentment with the existing 
social-political restrictions. The PAP experienced its lowest popular support and 
won a narrow victory over the opposition in the 2011 Election. 
 
A pragmatic and meritocratic society 
 
For centuries, people from various countries have flooded into Singapore 
drawn by the chance to make their fortunes; the tide continues to this day. Most of 
the migrants were Chinese and Indian. The lack of natural resources and the tension 
with potentially hostile neighbours in Malaysia and Indonesia have generated a 
strong sense of urgency and unsafety within Singapore. As Reid (2010) argues, the 
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awareness of crisis has equipped Singaporean with “a pragmatic determination to 
adopt policies that are good for the country rather than reiterating ancient beliefs or 
shibboleths” (p. 15), which has especially worked well for the Chinese. Moreover, 
Tong and Lian (2002) point out that the instrumental, utilitarian, technically- 
oriented and consumption-conscious culture has increasingly dominated the society. 
This may partly explain why education in Singapore has long been regarded and 
utilised as an instrument to an end, more than an end in itself; and why practical 
subjects (such as Mathematics, science and English) and examinations have been 
attached such importance (Gopinathan, 1995; Tan & Ng, 2007). 
The belief in talent has deeply rooted in every facet of Singapore as a state and 
a society. Meritocracy integrated with elitism is included as a component of the 
Government’s ideology (Mauzy & Milne, 2002), and established as a crucial value 
and principle in people’s daily life (Ho, 2003). Originating from Confucianism, it is 
accepted that individuals are born with different capabilities (Kim, 2009); their 
social and occupational positions should be and can be objectively and 
scientifically determined by merit (achievement), rather than political and economic 
background, race, religion, class or parentage. A conspicuous example is the 
short-lived Graduate Mother Scheme announced in 1984, which provided financial 
benefits for university graduate mothers and school enrolment privileges for their 
children (Mauzy & Milne, 2002). The education system is similarly premised on an 
idea that, while everyone has access to education, which equips them with skills 
and knowledge to earn a better living, the best and brightest are identified and 
ensured the best resources to develop to their fullest potential (Gopinathan, 2007). 
Through half a century, Singapore has transformed ‘from third world to first’ 
in the words of Lee Kuan Yew. As Sharpe and Gopinathan (2002) argue, the PAP 
Government has formulated its development strategy in a firm faith in human 
capital. Its education policies and practices have been driven and restructured in 
tune with economic changes and political needs. A set of socio-political features, 
such as centralism, hierarchy, pragmatism and meritocracy, have also shaped the 
governance and management of the education system. The next section specifically 
examines the evolution of school autonomy in Singapore against this broad 
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backdrop. 
 
6.3. Historical development of school autonomy 
 
In this section, I identify four historical segments specifically in terms of 
school autonomy. From 1819 to 1958, education was rarely the Colonial 
Government’s priority; only the post-war period saw the preparatory efforts to 
establish a national education system. From 1959 to 1978, as part of the nation- 
building strategy, a unified and centralised national education system was formed to 
cater for all pupils from different ethnic groups. The period from 1979 to 1996 
witnessed the beginning of education decentralisation and diversification, which 
resulted in high-performing schools granted with more autonomy. Since 1997, 
further decentralisation and diversification were launched in parallel with the 
introduction of various quality assurance mechanisms as a means of retaining 
accountability and central control. 
 
Preparation for a national education system: 1819 – 1958 
 
As Wilson (1978) argues, the Singapore education system during the colonial 
period was predominated by a laissez-faire philosophy that left the major provision 
of schooling to enterprising individuals, missionary bodies and private 
organisations. For a long time, schools were operated in one of four languages: 
English, Malay, Chinese and Tamil, and differentiated in terms of curriculum, 
management and overall goals. Only Malay and English schools were occasionally 
funded by the Colonial Government from 1854; in return, they were subject to 
official inspection (Wong & Gwee, 1980). It was not until the 1920s that the 
Colonial Government began to exert more control over community-run Chinese 
schools due to their subversive political activities (Doraisamy, 1969). A significant 
move was the Registration of Schools Ordinance that required schools, teachers and 
managers to register, regulated the operation of schools and shut down schools that 
“promoted ideas deemed to conflict with the interests of the Government” (Tan, 
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2006, p. 59). Since 1923, the Grants-in-Aid scheme and official inspection were 
extended to Chinese schools. 
The Ten Years Programme for education development was published in 1947, 
which was described by Gopinathan (1974) as the “first effort in Singapore history” 
to design education policy and define overall goals (p. 7). It called for a universal 
education system to prepare for self-governance, which would be able to provide a 
free primary education and a common curriculum for all ethnic groups of pupils 
(Yip, Eng & Yap, 1990). In 1955, an All-Party Committee was commissioned to 
scrutinise Chinese schools which became increasingly politicalised and radicalised, 
influenced by the huge socio-political movements and turbulence in China. The 
1956 White Paper accepted many of the Committee’s recommendations, including 
a common curriculum, a settlement on English as the medium of instruction and the 
principle of ‘equality of treatment’ for all language streams schools (Tan, 2006; 
Gopinathan, 2012). 
The 1957 Education Ordinance and subsequent regulations reaffirmed the 
requirement of school registration, clarified the duty and responsibility of school 
management committees and stipulated that government schools and aided schools 
would be treated equally in respect to finances, teachers’ qualifications and salaries, 
physical facilities, and pupils’ attainment, behaviour and discipline (Colony of 
Singapore, 1957a, 1957b). In addition, the Director of Education was given the 
power to control staff appointment and dismissal in all types of schools (Tan, 2006). 
All these policy initiatives marked the preparation for the construction of a united 
national education system. 
 
Centralisation and integration: 1959-1978 
 
Since 1959, education policies towards centralisation and integration started to 
be intensively implemented to ensure economic survival by association with socio- 
political stability. Two or more language streams schools were accommodated into 
one building and operated under a common principal (State of Singapore, 1959). 
Universal primary education was available for all pupils from 1966, which means 
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pupils from different ethnic groups could receive the same number of years of 
formal schooling. In terms of curriculum, common syllabuses and attainment goals 
were provided for all schools (State of Singapore, 1962), bilingualism became 
compulsory at the primary level in 1960 and the secondary level in 1966 
(Gopinathan, 1980) and the Education Publication Bureau was set up in 1967 to 
produce standard and affordable textbooks. The national examination system was 
introduced to primary and secondary education in 1961 and 1966 respectively 
(Doraisamy, 1969). The Institute of Education was established in 1973 to centrally 
prepare graduates and non-graduates in different approaches for the teaching 
profession (Wong, 1974). 
Moreover, values, norms and attitudes that would lead to a strong sense of 
national identity and civic loyalty, and appreciation of a well-governed society were 
emphasised in schooling. Rituals and ceremonies involving national symbols, such 
as flag-raising and anthem singing, were introduced in 1966 – a year after the full 
independence (Yip et al., 1997). During this period, education provision through 
the public sector was largely expanded and became the majority. For example, the 
percentage of government secondary schools increased from 22.2% in 1955 to 71.5% 
in 1980 (SMOE, 1995). 
With regard to education governance and management, Goh and Gopinathan 
(2006) argue that “the strictly top-down approach in planning, disseminating and 
enforcing educational changes was a clear reflection of the Singapore’s 
Government paternalistic style of rule”, which eventually resulted in a “‘yes-man’ 
syndrome”, a “spoon-feeding culture” and the lack of autonomy within the 
education system. Hargreaves, Shirley and Ng (2012) provide a vivid description of 
this kind of governance and management culture: “if you gave a speech that 
contained an idea that a senior education official liked, the joke was that within 72 
hours, it would be fully implemented with complete fidelity across the entire 
country” (p. 80). 
By the end of the 1970s, a fragmented colonial education system inherited 
from the UK was transformed into a centralised and integrated system characterised 
by a standardised structure, common curriculum, unified examinations, 
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institutionalised values and top-down managerial approach. 
 
Early decentralisation and diversification: 1979-1996 
 
The rapid post-war economic growth supported the expansion of the education 
system. Over the first two decades of the independence, Singapore achieved a basic 
standard of national education. The late 1970s and early 1980s were seen as the 
watershed that the Government’s policy focus shifted from quantity to quality (Ng, 
2008). In 1979, a government-commissioned committee headed by then Deputy 
Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee reported on the issues of high attrition and semi- 
literate school leavers and attributed the cause to ability differentials. Following this 
report, a new education system was implemented aimed to allow pupils to progress 
at a pace more suited to their abilities. This new system created a two-tier 
curriculum and a three tracks system at the primary school level: the normal 
bilingual, the extended bilingual and the monolingual. Similarly, according to their 
results of the Primary School Leaving Examination, secondary pupils would be 
grouped into one of three courses: special, express and normal. In 1994, the normal 
course was further divided into academic and technical courses
33
 (Deng, 
Gopinathan & Lee, 2013). 
In fact, the top layer of the pupil cohort received much more attention and 
support compared to their counterparts in this new system, which entrenched the 
meritocratic ethos long adopted by the PAP (Tan, 1998). For example, in 1980, the 
Special Assistance Plan was introduced to nine leading Chinese-medium schools in 
which pupils were offered with both Chinese and English at the first language level 
and a series of programmes to help them develop a strong understanding of Chinese 
values and culture (Gopinathan, 1995). In addition, a small number of well- 
established schools, at both primary and secondary levels, were selected and funded 
to develop their distinct enrichment programmes, including Niche Programme, 
Languages Elective Programmes, Art Elective Programm, Music Elective 
                                                             
33 Taking the Secondary One enrolment in 2000 for example, there were 50.8% pupils in express course, 22.2% 
in normal (academic) course, 17.5% in normal (technical) course and 9.4% in special course (SMOE, 2014). 
177 
Programme and Gifted Education Programme, in order to cater for the diverse 
needs of top and specialist pupils (Tan, 2007). 
Another two significant decentralisation initiatives targeting the most 
promising and able pupils were the establishment of independent and autonomous 
schools. As the then First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong stated in 1985, 
the centralised control had largely restricted prestigious schools from developing 
their individuality and special characters; more autonomy to principals and teachers 
would stimulate education innovation and enhance the quality of education (Tan, 
2006). He thus argued for freeing those top schools by giving principals the power 
to manage staff, design curriculum and choose textbooks. Goh’s statement was 
echoed by the then Education Minister Tony Tan. At the end of 1986, Tan, 
accompanied by 12 school principals, went on a field trip to study the management 
of 25 ‘acknowledged successful schools’ in the US and the UK. A year later, the 
Towards Excellence in Education report introduced independent schools to ease the 
overly rigid education system. 
Between 1988 and 1993, eight schools deemed to be academically excellent 
and possess “capable principals, experienced teachers, strong alumni network and 
responsible governing boards” were selected to be given independent status (Tan, 
2007, p. 307). These independent schools have since enjoyed greater autonomy in 
hiring and dismissing teachers, managing finances, developing curriculum and 
enrolling pupils, but have been still required to conform to some education policies, 
such as bilingualism and national education. While continuing to receive a great 
deal of financial aid from the SMOE, they have been allowed to charge high tuition 
fees. Therefore, Tan (1998) argues that “independent schools are by no means 
financially independent of the government” (p. 52). 
However, independent schools were widely criticised due to their elitist nature 
and expensive fees (Tan, 2006). Meanwhile, the 1991 Election saw the PAP’s 
victory again but with a reduced number of parliamentary seats. It was believed by 
the Party leaders that the increasing cost of public services resulted in the loss of 
votes (Tan, 1993). The then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong thus announced in 
1992 that the number of independent schools would be maintained at eight for the 
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time being. Instead, 18 academically outstanding government and aided schools 
were selectively converted to ‘autonomous schools’ between 1994 and 1997. These 
autonomous schools could enjoy greater autonomy in terms of curriculum design 
and pupil admission, and charge a certain amount of tuition fees – higher than 
ordinary schools but lower than independent schools (Tan, 1998). Independent and 
autonomous schools have been expected to serve as ‘role models’ of high quality of 
schooling and to diversify the highly centralised education system, although the 
number of them was limited (Tan, 2006). 
In parallel with these decentralised initiatives, the Government also tightened 
its control over schools through creating and implementing a series of regulative 
and accountability frameworks and mechanisms. For example, in 1979, national 
guidelines and standardised formats were provided by the SMOE for principals to 
make the School Rolling Plan, which was aimed to facilitate the conduct of central 
monitoring and reviewing (Ng, 2008). In 1981, the SMOE published the principal 
handbook, to which they were required to reference when making daily operational 
policies and undertaking administrative procedures (Wee & Chong, 1990). In the 
same year, the Curriculum Development Institute was set up within the SMOE in 
order to design and produce standard curriculum and teaching materials used across 
the country (Ng, 2008). 
The annual ranking system was introduced in 1992. The purpose as claimed by 
the Government was to provide sufficient information for parents and pupils, 
encourage diverse choices and enhance inner-school competition through which the 
overall standard of education would be raised (Goh, 1992). All schools were ranked 
according to their pupils’ academic performance. League tables were published in 
local newspapers, which drew massive public attention and correspondingly caused 
huge pressure on schools. This ranking system received critiques from both within 
and outside the Government; the main concern was that it is problematic to judge a 
school’s excellence solely on the basis of examination results (Tan, 2006). 
Moreover, as Ng (2008) notes, negative opinions were also derived from the 
anxiety that the increased stress on individual schools might bring about 
over-conformity. In this scenario, the ranking system was scrutinised in 1997. 
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However, it was retained after several feverous parliamentary debates. 
 
Further decentralisation and diversification: 1997-present 
 
In the mid-1990s, the SMOE continued to recognise over-centralisation and 
bureaucracy as the major obstacles to the effectiveness of education system, which, 
as Tan and Ng (2007) describe, resulted in “schools waiting for edicts to be issued 
from the headquarters” (p. 158). Schools were encouraged to be more creative, 
flexible and responsive to various local needs and pupils’ diverse talents (Teo, 
2000), while headquarters were supposed to provide general guidance and ensure 
overall quality (Ng, 2008). 
In parallel, the accelerating pace of globalisation and a sharp economic 
recession in Asia highlighted the inadequacy of the Singapore education system 
which was “dominated by teachers and syllabuses” (Gopinathan, 2007, p. 60). A 
significant response was the 1997 ‘Thinking Schools, Learning Nation’ initiative, 
which emphasised adopting more flexible pedagogical strategies, developing pupils’ 
critical and creative thinking abilities and encouraging them to actively learn more 
than the formal curriculum. 
This initiative was accompanied and balanced by the Desired Outcomes of 
Education published in the same year, which defined the common values, attitudes 
and capacities that ideal Singaporean pupils should attain at each key stage of their 
education (SMOE, 1997). As Tan (2014) points out, it has functioned as concrete 
guidelines not only for policies and school programmes, but also for the evaluation 
of these policies and school programmes. 
Still in 1997, the school cluster system was introduced in attempt to 
decentralise educational administration, promote greater collaboration among 
schools and ensure effective resource allocation (Teo, 1997). All government and 
aided primary schools, secondary schools and junior colleges were placed into 28 
clusters and later in 2000 into four zones; independent schools were permitted to 
choose whether they would like to join or not (Tan, 2006). Each cluster consisted of 
around 13 different types and levels of schools, facilitated by a superintendent who 
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was given the authority and resources to deal with local needs and problems 
(Sharpe & Gopinathan, 2002). 
The School Excellence Model introduced in 2000 required all schools to carry 
out self-appraisal (SMOE, 2000), which devoted more emphasis to value-addedness, 
leadership, staff management and strategic planning in addition to academic results 
(Tan & Ng, 2007). An external validation led by the School Appraisal Branch 
within the SMOE was undertaken every five years in order to maintain quality 
assurance. Furthermore, this model was associated with various official rewards to 
individual schools, such as Achievement Awards, Outstanding Development 
Awards and Development Awards, which set the national standards for schools and 
impacted on their daily practice (Ng & Chan, 2008). The annual ranking system 
was modified by the SMOE in 2004. Instead of making league tables, schools with 
similar academic performances were banded together and their exact ranking 
positions was kept confidential (Ng, 2008). 
A broader and more flexible curriculum for junior colleges and upper 
secondary schools was endorsed by the SMOE in 2002. Subsequently, 11 prominent 
secondary schools and junior colleges were permitted to provide ‘Integrated 
Programmes’ from 2004 which would let up to 10% top-scoring pupils skip the 
national General Certificate of Education ‘Ordinary’ (GCE ‘O’) level examination 
and consequently a small group pf the most talented pupils would be able to enjoy 
more flexible and innovative curriculum and co-curriculum activities (Gopinathan 
& Deng, 2006). Particularly, an independent school, the Anglo-Chinese School, was 
approved to offer an alternative qualification – the International Baccalaureate 
diploma – from 2005 after several tries (Tan, 2007). It was the first public-funded 
school allowed to do so. 
Curriculum reform was further initiated after the Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong’s speech on the 2004 National Day Rally in which he put forward that “we 
have got to teach less to our students so that they will learn more”. In response, the 
SMOE launched the ‘Teach Less, Learn More’ initiative a year later, seeking to 
further lessen the dependence on rote learning, repetitive tests and inflexible 
instruction, and encourage innovative, differentiated and effective teaching, and 
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active and independent learning (Ng, 2008). In this spirit, 10-20% of curriculum 
time was freed up as ‘white space’ to give teachers the autonomy to “customise 
lessons, using a variety of teaching and assessment methods to better meet the 
needs of their students” (SMOE, 2005). As Leong, Sim and Chua (2011) argue, this 
policy initiative demonstrated the Government’s attempts to shift away from “a 
grades-centric and ‘one-size-fits-all’ paradigm of education” to a “top-down 
support for bottom-up or school-based curriculum initiatives” (p. 52). Nevertheless, 
the high-stake national examination system was not accordingly changed. 
From 2004 to 2008, four specialised independent schools were established, 
including Singapore Sports School in 2004, NUS High School of Math and Science 
in 2005, and in 2008, the School of the Arts and the School of Science and 
Technology. They have been operated with greater autonomy, especially in putting 
more weight on their specialised subjects, whilst retaining membership of the 
existing school clusters and achieving aims set in the Desired Outcomes of 
Education. 
Northlight School and Assumption Pathway School, targeting pupils from the 
bottom layer of academic performance, were set up in 2007 and 2009 respectively. 
Crest Secondary School began to admit for pupils undertaking the normal 
(technical) course in 2013. These three specialised schools have adopted a 
whole-school approach to provide tailored curriculum and learning environment to 
fit their pupils’ academic abilities and possible career paths. 
Three private-funded secondary schools were opened in 2005 to further the 
diversity of the education system. Notwithstanding the private nature, they have to 
strictly follow the SMOE’s guidelines on bilingualism, national education, daily 
flag-raising and national anthem rituals and enrol at least 50% of local pupils 
(Gopinathan, 2007). 
 
Since independence, the Singapore education system experienced a long 
period of high centralisation and standardisation; the SMOE directly and tightly 
controlled and supervised almost all aspects of education and schooling. Since the 
early 1980s, an array of decentralisation and diversification initiatives, such as the 
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establishment of independent and autonomous schools, and the introduction of the 
School Excellent Model and school cluster system, have been introduced to cater 
for specific needs of pupils and particularly to ensure the brightest receive the best 
and customised educational service. As a result, more autonomy has been granted to 
those high-performing schools with the most able pupils. On this basis, the next 
section explores how school autonomy is developed in the current education 
system. 
 
6.4. Current model of school autonomy 
 
According to the Primary School Leaving Examination results, pupils (without 
special needs) in Singapore are admitted to a four-year express (60%), five-year 
normal academic (25%), or four-year normal technical (15%) course in secondary 
schools (Stewart, 2011). The normal academic course prepares pupils for the GCE 
‘N’ (Normal)-level examination in the year of Secondary Four, while pupils from 
the normal technical course take the same examination in the year of Secondary 
Five. In their final year, pupils of the normal academic course may join those in the 
express course sitting for the GCE O-level examination. Only a small proportion of 
top pupils undertaking Integrated Programme can skip those examinations. Pupils 
passing the entry mark can continue their postsecondary education at junior 
colleges, polytechnics, or Institution of Technical Education, and study for the GCE 
‘A’ (Advanced)-level examination to go to universities. 
The vast majority of secondary schools in Singapore are public-funded, which 
can be categorised into ‘government’ and ‘aided’. A small number of them have 
been designated as ‘autonomous’. In addition, there are independent schools, 
specialised independent schools and specialised schools financially supported by 
the Government. Table 6.1 shows the number and percentage of different types of 
public-funded secondary schools and their enrolled pupils in 2013. 
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Table 6.1. Number and percentage of different types of public-funded secondary 
schools and their enrolled pupils in 2013 
Type of school Number 
of 
schools 
Percentage 
of schools 
Number 
of 
students 
Percentage 
of students  
Government / Government 
(autonomous) 
108/15 72.8% 139,542 70.8% 
Aided / Aided (autonomous) 18/13 18.3% 40,456 20.5% 
Independent  8 4.7% 12,759 6.5% 
Specialised independent  4 2.4% 2,693 1.4% 
Specialised 3 1.8% 1,715 0.8% 
Total 169 100% 197,165 100% 
(SMOE, 2014) 
This section examines the nature and degree of autonomy in Singapore 
public-funded secondary schools, focusing on non-autonomous government schools 
– the main type of secondary schools, as well as autonomous and independent 
schools – the types of schools with greater autonomy. According to the framework 
developed in the literature review chapter, I give a grade to each sub-area of school 
management with regard to non-autonomous government schools, drawing on the 
analysis of policy documents, literature and interview data. The model of school 
autonomy in Singapore is developed to be compared with those of Hong Kong and 
Shanghai. 
 
Organisation and governance 
 
In Singapore, all public-funded schools are subject to the policy and 
framework of the SMOE. There are four zonal branches including 28 clusters that 
operate as an intermediate level of governance between the SMOE and schools. 
This cluster system was initially designed in the geographic sense. However, as 
Scholar J argued, it “becomes very strange, because they [SMOE] want diversity 
within a cluster… they want to try and make sure that every cluster has primary 
schools, secondary schools, prestigious, non-prestigious… so now the ‘geography’ 
has gone… you have schools not next to each other being grouped together” (sic). 
In other words, which cluster a school belongs to is mandated by the SMOE. 
As stated by the SMOE (2015a), cluster superintendents are empowered to 
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“develop, guide and supervise the school leadership teams to ensure that schools 
are effectively run”. They are given an annual budget to promote collaboration 
amongst schools, identify teachers’ career development needs and those with 
potential, and offer financial support for the worthwhile school projects. As Scholar 
J and Policy-maker W mentioned, they also supervise and evaluate the performance 
of school leaders. In this way, part of the operational power as to finance, personnel 
and appraisal has been devolved from the central level to the cluster level. 
According to Policy-maker W and Principal L, the SMOE provides general 
guidelines for school organisational structure. Within a school, there are principal, 
vice-principals and heads of departments. Different forms of school management 
bodies are required to be set up in according types of schools: school advisory 
committees in government schools, school management committees in aided 
schools and a board of governors in independent schools. Scholar G explained that 
principals can suggest the person they believe would contribute to the development 
of schools to become members of the management body; but the candidate list has 
to be approved by the SMOE. In respect to day-to-day school operation, as Scholar 
J observed, “across all the schools, the principal pretty much has very free hands to 
run the school… nearly in every school in Singapore the board lets the principal be 
the professional educator”. 
Principal L recalled that “all schools started as government schools”; 
autonomous and independent schools have been selected by the SMOE based on 
their academic merit. In theory, schools can reject to be converted. However, as 
Scholar M and Scholar S argued, the autonomous and independent statuses are 
usually linked with good reputation, more resources and greater autonomy, which 
generate great attractiveness to schools. They further explained that the prerequisite 
of obtaining the special status is meeting the pre-set criteria and the final say is held 
by the SMOE. The rationale, as Principal L understood, is “since you are proving 
yourself to be up to a certain standard, I will give you more autonomy in your 
running”. Moreover, high-flying schools are selectively permitted to offer various 
enrichment programmes catering for the talented and most able pupils. Specialised 
independent schools and specialised schools have been set up by the SMOE to 
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provide customised courses.  
Table 6.2 summarises the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to 
the ‘organisation and governance’ of Singapore non-autonomous government 
secondary schools. 
 
Table 6.2. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘organisation 
and governance’ of Singapore non-autonomous government secondary schools 
Area Descriptions Degree 
Organisation 
structure and 
functions 
Mainly determined by the SMOE (e.g. the introduction 
of cluster system) 
1 
Governance 
mechanism 
The SMOE executes central control; the cluster system 
works as an intermediate administrative level; principals 
are responsible for daily operation 
2 
Types of 
schools 
Schools can apply for special status if they meet the 
SMOE criteria and reject to be converted by the SMOE; 
the SMOE has the final say 
2 
 
Membership of a cluster is not compulsory for independent schools. Scholar J 
explained that whether or not independent schools join the cluster “depends on how 
willing a principal is to have the school involved”. As Principal L observed, with 
regard to organisation structure and school management, “independent schools 
[have] a bit more flexibility” comparing to government schools. Nevertheless, 
Scholar J emphasised that this does not mean that the SMOE gives up its control 
over independent schools. He provided an example of the SMOE’s ‘powerfulness’: 
“in the 1990s, the Ministry of Education intervened in an independent school when 
its governing board members were having a big fight with each other, like a power 
struggle… the Ministry of Education stepped in and dissolved the board” (sic.).  
 
Finance 
 
All government schools are fully funded by the Government. Autonomous 
schools are able to charge a small amount of fees and apply for extra funding from 
the SMOE for their enrichment programmes. On the top of that, all public-funded 
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schools are members of the Education Fund
34
, which enables them to receive 
donations and issue tax deductible receipts, conforming to the SMOE’s internal 
guidelines (SMOE, 2015b). Various branches of the Finance and Development 
Division within the SMOE are responsible for managing school funds; formulating 
financial and procure policies, budget allocation framework and reporting standards; 
and setting contract requirements and daily budget operations (SMOE, 2015c). As 
Principal L and Policy-maker W stated, the SMOE provides all public-funded 
schools with the land, infrastructure and facilities, while schools are responsible for 
daily maintenance. 
Detailed guidelines with regard to school expenditure are made by the SMOE. 
As Principal L experienced, “how we use our money, it’s very tightly controlled… 
for example, there is a quota that you can use for furniture, you may decide to buy 
how many chairs or desks, but you cannot spend it on school activities”. 
Furthermore, Policy-maker W pointed out that government schools only receive 
money “virtually”, as bills are paid directly by the SMOE. Schools’ annual financial 
reports are required to be submitted for the SMOE audit and uploaded to the 
websites of schools and the SMOE for public information. Table 6.3 summarises 
the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘finance’ of Singapore 
non-autonomous government secondary schools. 
 
Table 6.3. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘finance’ of 
Singapore non-autonomous government secondary schools 
Area Descriptions Degree 
Source(s) of 
finance 
Fully funded by the Government; receiving 
donations subject to the SMOE’s guidelines 
1 
Expenditure Strictly following the SMOE’s guidelines; bills are 
paid directly by the SMOE  
1 
Land, buildings 
and facilities 
Provided by the Government and maintained by 
schools 
1 
Financial report 
and its availability 
Audited by the SMOE and uploaded to the websites 
of schools and the SMOE 
2 
 
Aided schools can receive the identical per head amount from the Government, 
                                                             
34 The Education Fund is an exempt charity which receives donations from public and funds projects to 
advance education in Singapore. Members of the Board are appointed by their designations within the SMOE. 
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which can be up to 90% of their total revenue. Independent schools are given an 
annual per capita grant equivalent to the recurrent cost in government and aided 
schools. Independent schools are given an annual per capita grant equivalent to the 
recurrent cost in government and aided schools. The Government also subsidises up 
to 80% and 90% of the building fund for independent schools and aided schools 
respectively (Chan & Tan, 2008). According to Policy-maker W, the remaining is 
usually raised by schools through “appealing to parents, old boys, old girls, alumni 
members and the community”. Scholarships, both from the SMOE and independent 
schools, are available to pupils who have done well. In terms of expenditure, 
independent schools have greater financial autonomy than their government 
counterparts, mainly because they can be in charge of their own bills. 
 
Curriculum, teaching and examinations 
 
In Singapore, the Curriculum Planning and Development Division within the 
SMOE is responsible for designing syllabuses, assessment modes and special 
curriculum programmes, monitoring their implementation, and promoting 
pedagogical approaches that support learning outcomes and achieve national 
education goals. It also provides school personnel training in order to facilitate the 
understanding and implementation of the national syllabuses and programmes 
(SMOE, 2015d). The syllabus for each subject prescribes the curriculum aim, 
content, time allocation and desirable outcomes, and provides a guideline for 
teaching, learning and assessment. 
The vast majority of secondary schools adopt the national curriculum, which is 
subject-centric and composed of three circles. The inner circle seeks to equip pupils 
with sound values and inculcate responsible citizenry, which includes Co-Curricular 
Activities, Character and Citizenship Education, National Education, Physical 
Education and Values in Action. The middle circle, Project Work, centres on pupils’ 
thinking, process and communication abilities. The outermost circle consists of a 
set of compulsory and optional content-based subjects which can be divided into 
Languages, Humanities and the Arts, and Mathematics and Sciences. As prescribed 
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by the SMOE, pupils from different course streams are offered different subjects or 
different levels of complexity in subject coverage (Tan, 2014). National Education, 
English and Mother Tongue Language, Science and Mathematics are compulsory 
for all course streams (SMOE, 2015e, 2015f).  
The SMOE reviews private-published textbooks and displays those approved 
on the ‘Approved Textbooks List’ website. As Policy-maker W explained, the 
SMOE provides guidelines for publishers in terms of textbooks; and “when they 
ready to publish books, they do send to us, and then we look through, and if we 
think that they follow our guidelines, we will allow them to put something like 
‘[S]MOE approved textbooks’”. According to Principal L, the SMOE also invites 
experts to write textbooks for subjects such as History and Civics and Moral 
Education. Both SMOE produced and approved textbooks, in the view of Principal 
L and Policy-maker W, are “prescribed” and “standard”, as they are all based on the 
national syllabuses and reflect the national examinations. 
As the SMOE (2015g) stated, schools are “encouraged” to select the textbooks 
from the ‘Approved Textbooks List’ according to their pupils’ specific needs. 
According to Policy-maker W, in reality, “schools prefer to choose approved books, 
because of ‘security’ and ‘safety’… there are some schools choose textbooks out of 
that list because their students need more challenging textbooks” (sic). Scholar S 
added that “if they [schools] wish to deviate, they will seek [S]MOE approval 
first”. 
The SMOE schedules school terms and holidays. With regard to curriculum 
time, it stipulates 40 periods of 35-40 minutes per week for secondary schools, 
which equals six hours a day including recess time (Straughan, 2011). Both 
Principal L and Policy-maker W emphasised that the SMOE stipulates the 
minimum curriculum time for each subject, which is specified in the syllabuses. 
Taking Secondary Three normal academic courses for example, there are 20 periods 
per week for core examination subjects, six periods for compulsory non- 
examination subjects and three to eight periods for optional subjects. More 
specifically, for instance, eight periods are allocated to English per week, six 
periods to Maths and two periods to Civics and Moral Education (International 
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Review of Curriculum and Assessment Frameworks Internet Archive, 2010). 
According to Principal L, these are “recommended hours… it is up to the school’s 
discretion on how many periods they want to devote to [different subjects]… 
probably can go up to more, but not less” (sic). In this case, although the SMOE 
encourages schools to determine their own operational hours, the room left is 
limited. 
Although SBCD has been promoted in Singapore since the 1980s, from 
Gopinathan and Deng’s (2006) point of view, this does not mean that schools have 
been changed to “places responsible for creating their own curriculum materials” 
(p.106). Rather, according to Deng et al. (2013), SBCD in Singapore has referred to 
the adaption, modification and translation of the national curriculum in specific 
school contexts. This is understandable given that, as Lam, Alviar-Martin, Adler & 
Sim (2013) note, getting good exam results remains the key priority in Singapore. 
These arguments are echoed by the interview data collected in this study. For 
example, Scholar S argued that SBCD “is not independent of national curriculum”, 
but rather “essentially an effort to tweak the curriculum to fit the particular needs of 
the school’s cohort of students”. In respect to the time allocated to SBCD, Principal 
L explained that, “national curriculum should be fulfilled first… then it is up to the 
schools to design and implement their school-based curriculum… the reality is 
whether you still have time to do that, after fulfilling the national curriculum”. 
Perhaps what schools can decide, as mentioned by many interviewees, is how 
to deliver curriculum and what teaching resources can be used. Nonetheless, the 
national curriculum is singly assessed by the Singapore Examination and 
Assessment Board within the SMOE, which has become the de facto guideline on 
day-to-day teaching and learning. Academics argue that traditional classroom 
pedagogies and especially factual classroom talk have remained overwhelmingly in 
Singapore schools (e.g. Curdt-Christiansen & Silver, 2012; Hogan et al., 2013). 
Similarly, Scholar S points out that although the SMOE “encourages a diversified 
pedagogy… the examinations are high-stakes selection examinations, so much 
cramming takes place”. This is also echoed by Gopinathan and Mardiana (2013); 
according to them, the use of the results of national examinations “as a sorting 
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mechanism continues to result in a strong focus on grades and content acquisition 
rather than learning and holistic development” (p. 25). 
Table 6.4 summarises the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to 
the ‘curriculum, teaching and examinations’ of Singapore non-autonomous 
government secondary schools. 
 
Table 6.4. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘curriculum, 
teaching and examinations’ of Singapore non-autonomous government secondary 
schools 
Area of school 
management 
Description Degree 
Textbooks A list of the SMOE produced and approved textbooks, 
written according to the prescribed syllabuses; most 
schools choose from that list; those do not, need the 
permission from the SMOE 
2 
Subjects Prescribed compulsory and optional subjects stipulated 
for different course streams; top pupils may go beyond 
the national curriculum 
1 
Content of 
subjects and 
curriculum 
delivery 
The content primarily follows prescribed syllabuses; 
teaching methods are flexible in theory, but influenced 
by national examinations in practice 
2 
School-based 
curriculum 
development 
Complementary to the national curriculum and after 
finishing the national curriculum  
2 
Curriculum 
time allocation 
The number of periods is prescribed by the SMOE; the 
arrangement depends on schools 
1 
School 
calendar  
Terms – scheduled by the SMOE; days – little room is 
left for schools to make decisions 
2 
Entrance 
exams 
Prescribed syllabuses; national examinations 0 
 
In theory, autonomous and independent schools are given greater autonomy in 
terms of curriculum design; but they have to conform to two specific national 
education policies, namely, bilingualism and the teaching of civics/moral education. 
Moreover, both literature (e.g. Tan, 1998; Chan & Tan, 2008) and interview data 
demonstrate that only a few of them actually stray from the national curriculum. As 
Scholar B and Principal L elaborated, staying in the mainstream can ensure that 
pupils will not be disadvantaged in the national examination (only one independent 
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school can provide alternative certificate). Policy-maker W emphasised that “there 
is also an understanding that schools should mollify the curriculum to suit their own 
local needs… customise it… students from the top 10% are given special 
programmes”. In other words, the ‘customisation’ of the curriculum is not to create 
a new curriculum; rather, opportunities and support are provided for the brightest to 
go beyond the national curriculum. Scholar J argued that “it’s [SMOE] still 
adopting a very cautious attitude towards allowing schools to really diverse, for 
example, an independent school’s application to switch to IB [International 
Baccalaureat] was rejected by the [S]MOE… Because I think the Ministry of 
Education still feels… that schools are very important institutions for socialising 
young people, so they don’t want to just let everything be totally non-government 
run” (sic). Similarly, as Scholar D maintained, “Singapore are still stuck in the 
common curriculum… principals have a margin of control over the non-mainstream 
curriculum but none over the mainstream curriculum”. 
 
Teachers 
 
In Singapore, the majority of teachers are ‘appointed teachers’; as Scholar G 
explained, “they are centrally selected, employed, trained, assigned and dismissed 
by the SMOE”. More specifically, to qualify for the interview to become teacher 
trainees, applicants are expected to be from the top 30% of their cohort and have 
relevant higher education degrees and/or certificates. Qualified applicants are 
interviewed by the SMOE and required to pass the Entrance Proficiency Test 
(SMOE, 2015h). All the selected candidates sign contracts with the SMOE and then 
become civil servants. Those without teaching qualification have to be trained at 
the National Institute of Education which was formed in 1991 and has since 
become the sole provider of teacher education and training programmes in 
Singapore, working “in close unison” with the SMOE (Dimmock & Tan, 2012, p. 
328). 
According to Policy-maker W, as soon as the selected candidates are admitted 
to the teacher training programmes, they are “employed on the government salary 
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scales” and the SMOE “pays for all the tuition fees”. As Scholar M explained, once 
teacher trainees finish their programmes and meet the criteria to become teachers, 
the SMOE would appoint them to different schools based on central needs and 
teachers’ preferences. In other words, as Scholar J stated, “principals can only hire 
teachers from the pool of teachers that they have”. Although teachers can request a 
different posting after two years, the request needs to be approved by the SMOE.  
Another type of teacher is the ‘contract teacher’ – they are not necessarily 
trained, mainly employed short-term to fill temporary gaps and sign/cease the 
contract with individual schools. As Policy-maker W stressed, in reality, the SMOE 
“would not allow schools to have too many such vacancies”; in other words, the 
number of contract teachers is very limited. 
With regard to continuing professional development, according to Principal L 
and Policy-maker W, the SMOE: (1) organises a set of training programmes and 
associates them with promotion; and (2) stipulates 100 minimum hours per year and 
provides a range of scholarships for teachers, while the time, form and content of 
training courses can be decided by teachers and schools. The ‘Education Service 
Professional Development and Career Plan’ was designed in 2006 by the SMOE. It 
comprises three career paths – teaching, leadership and specialist, an evaluation 
system – the Enhanced Performance Management System and recognition through 
monetary rewards. Through the process of the plan, teachers are encouraged to 
select a career path, develop their goals for teaching based on self-evaluation, and 
discuss goals and performance benchmarks with their reporting officers (usually the 
heads of the departments or vice-principals) to ensure that they are aligned with the 
goals set by schools and the SMOE (SMOE, 2005; Lee & Tan, 2010). 
Reporting offices are supposed to supervise teachers throughout the year and 
mark their performance at the end of the year. As Policy-maker W experienced, in 
fact, “anybody, any senior person, who works with a junior teacher, is in the 
position to supervise the teacher… teachers always feel that they are being 
observed… they are being watched all the time”. This sophisticated and ubiquitous 
monitoring mechanism can produce detailed career profiles of every teacher and 
guarantee the ‘right’ selection and promotion. According to Principal L, “teacher 
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promotion is civil service promotion, so it’s by the [S]MOE, principle do 
recommend, but not on the running”. 
With regard to teachers’ salary, Scholar G explained that it is “from the 
government funding and it’s regulated by the Ministry of Education according to 
how many years they have been working and also teachers’ positions in the ‘career 
paths of teachers’”. In other words, as Principal L stated, it “sticks to the standard 
salary scales”. On the top of that, principals can decide teachers’ annual 
performance bonuses according to their performance grades, which can amount to 
one to three months’ salary for average to outstanding performers (Sclafani & Lim, 
2008). Policy-maker W emphasised that both salary and annual performance bonus 
are “directly transferred to teachers’ accounts by the [S]MOE”. 
The then Minister of Education Tharman Shanmugaratnam (2006) claimed 
that school leadership has been the key to school governance and management in 
Singapore. As Scholar G enunciated, the rationale is to “select and train principals 
carefully and then let them do their jobs”. For the majority of public-funded schools, 
according to Scholar J, school leaders are from “the same group”, “only three local 
private schools that really appoint their own people”, and others are carefully 
selected, employed and trained by the SMOE. As Policy-maker W elaborated, “we 
[SMOE] choose the right principals [to guarantee the quality of education]… we 
actually look at principal candidates very carefully before we sort of put them to 
head a school… and we prepare them, we actually put them to courses” provided 
by the SMOE. By referencing to teachers’ profiles, those who are identified to have 
leadership potential would be strongly encouraged to take the leadership track of 
the career paths. Although teachers’ willingness would be taken into account, in 
Dimmock and Tan’s view (2012), the leadership track “is a system, rather than 
individual-initiated process of selection” (p. 327). 
According to Scholar D, school leaders are usually rotated between schools 
and re-assigned by the SMOE every five to seven years. Furthermore, they may be 
rotated to the SMOE headquarters serving as cluster superintendents or assistant/ 
deputy directors in specific branches, or to the National Institute of Education to 
share the insights from the frontline with teacher trainees (SMOE, 2011). As 
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Dimmock and Tan (2012) argue, “rotation is thus seen as a means of securing a 
tightly coupled leadership both vertically and laterally, as well as professionally and 
inter-institutionally” (p.329). In brief, it seems that who can become teachers, who 
should be promoted to be school leaders, where they should go and how long they 
can work there, are under the tight control of the Government. Table 6.5 
summarises the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘teachers’ 
of Singapore non-autonomous government secondary schools. 
 
Table 6.5. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘teachers’ of 
Singapore non-autonomous government secondary schools 
Area of school 
management 
Description Degree 
Qualification 
and training 
The requirements are stipulated by the SMOE; the 
majority of teachers are centrally selected, employed, 
trained and appointed by the SMOE 
0.5 
Appointment 
and dismissal  
Determined by the SMOE; schools and teachers’ 
preferences are taken into consideration 
0.5 
Continuing 
professional 
development  
100 hours minimum per year and forms and content are 
decided by teachers and schools; the SMOE provides 
some courses as the requirements for promotion 
1.5 
Appraisal  Centrally designed framework; conducted by schools 2 
Promotion Teachers choose the career paths; promotion is proposed 
by schools; the SMOE has the final say 
1 
Pay (salary 
and bonuses) 
Stipulated salary scales; schools can determine bonuses 
according to teachers’ performance grades 
2 
Legal status The majority of teachers are civil servants 0.5 
 
The qualification requirements for ‘appointed’ and ‘contact’ teachers are also 
applied to those working in independent schools. Comparatively, independent 
schools have more freedom in determining the number of teachers that they would 
like to hire and setting salary scales at their own budgets. As Scholar J stated, the 
principle is “you want more teachers; you use your own money”. With regard to 
teachers’ salary, as Policy-maker W explained, “in the independent schools, they 
don’t have to follow this system [the government salary scales]... for convenience, 
the independent schools by and large follow us [SMOE]… but they might give the 
teachers a little bit more or less... it’s easier for them” (sic) . Notwithstanding, there 
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are some regulative restrictions for ‘appointed teachers’ working in independent 
schools. For example, according to Scholar J and Scholar S, after teaching for six 
years, they have to make a choice – either return to government schools, or give up 
their government employment and sign a contract with an independent school. 
Scholar D also argued that although in theory “independent schools have the 
most autonomy to nominate somebody”, in almost all the cases, it is the SMOE that 
has the final say; however “the principals of the top independent schools… are 
appointed with heavy government influence and approval”. 
 
Accountability 
 
The current school accountability framework comprises the School Excellence 
Model and Recognition System, under the management and supervision of the 
School Appraisal Branch within the SMOE. Since 2000, all public-funded schools 
are required to conduct annual self-evaluation which is validated by an external 
review team dispatched by the SMOE once every five years (Ng, 2003). The 
framework is composed of two categories: (1) ‘Enables’ – how results are achieved; 
and (2) ‘Results’ – what the schools has achieved. There are nine prescriptive 
quality criteria against which schools are assessed internally and externally, namely, 
leadership, strategic planning, resources, staff management student-focused 
processes, administrative and operational results, staff results, partnership and 
society results, and key performance results (Ng & Chan, 2008). 
Principal L described his experience of the evaluation and review procedure: 
“the criteria are given by headquarters… [for each of the criteria] you consider how 
you describe your work… and you score yourself… after that, the external team 
comes and checks whether you target it or not, they provide suggestions for 
improvement” (sic). As the SMOE (2000) emphasises, schools have to provide 
explicit evidence to justify self-scoring. The school self-evaluation and external 
review reports are confidential to the SMOE (Ng, 2010). The School Appraisal 
Branch is to “provide information for continuous school improvement and enable 
schools to be well organised and managed to provide quality education” (SMOE, 
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2015a). 
According to the SMOE (2000), the School Excellence Model is meant to help 
schools appraise their own performance in various aspects of school processes and 
pupils’ outcomes. Mok (2002) argues that this model provides “a common language 
and frame of reference within the school sector” which enables schools to 
benchmark them against other similar schools (p. 357). Similarly, Ng (2008) opines 
that it attempts to empower schools to determine development plans, identify and 
measure strengths and weaknesses, recognise progress and achievements. In 
addition, as the SMOE (2000) stated, the model is a “systematic framework for 
helping schools become excellence organisations as they drive towards the 
achievement of the Desired Outcomes of Education”. In other words, although 
individual schools are allowed to determine their own targets and approaches via 
the School Excellence Model, they are expected to conform to the overall goals and 
standards defined by the SMOE. 
The Recognition System was introduced in 2014 in order to bring about a 
more holistic awarding system. Additionally, the number of other school awards 
has been reduced and the secondary school banding system based on academic 
results was removed (SMOE, 2012). Instead, emphasis is placed on recognising 
best practices of schools in five key aspects: teaching and learning, student 
all-round development, staff development and well-being, character and citizenship 
education, and partnership. 
Notwithstanding the efforts to promote the school-based appraisal model and 
develop the holistic recognition system, the accountability framework facilitates the 
maintenance of the Government’s central control. As Ng (2008) argues, even a top 
school that “had the ‘strength’ to break away from the mainstream system” may 
find itself “‘pulled’ back into the system”, as the winners of school awards are 
published, which provides a kind of tangible evidence of schools’ merit (p. 121). 
Further, since all teachers and school leaders are employed as civil servants, 
according to Scholar D, S and Principal L, they are not report to school boards or 
management committees, but directly to the Government through the SMOE. Ng 
(2010) thus argues that, in a political and administrative sense, “the government is 
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the most important stakeholder of the school” (p. 283). 
The competition for attracting the most able pupils exists among all types of 
schools. According to Scholar D, “schools are encouraged to be distinctive, to 
create niches for themselves and to compete to attract good students”. As Scholar S 
mentioned, achievements and profiles are highlighted in schools’ websites; 
principals have to get engaged in marketing activities, such as branding and 
publicising to “compete for good students”. Principal L pointed out that “the 
ranking model has changed over time and now is banded”; however, “parents want 
league tables, so newspapers all try to do their own league tables”. Table 6.6 
summarises the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the 
‘accountability’ of Singapore non-autonomous government secondary schools. 
 
Table 6.6. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘accountability’ 
of Singapore non-autonomous government secondary schools 
Area Descriptions Degree 
Goals and standards Set by individual schools via the School 
Excellence Model in line with the Desired 
Outcomes of Education stipulated by the SMOE  
2 
Evaluation  Annual self-evaluation and external review by 
the SMOE once every five years 
1 
Annual report Submitted to the SMOE 1 
Availability of 
information 
Confidential to the SMOE 0 
 
Autonomous and independent schools are also subject to this accountability 
framework, which is not essentially different from non-autonomous government 
schools. The central accountability framework is employed as a tool to concretise 
the Government’s requirements and expectation. 
 
Pupil admission and external relations 
 
Admission to secondary schools is currently through a central allocation 
system, based on the Primary School Leaving Examination results. According to 
Principal C, Scholar D and Policy-maker W, there is little leeway for the majority of 
government and aided schools. Only those with specialisations have some 
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discretion over admission. More specifically, as Gopinathan and Mardiana (2013) 
explain, principals in schools running Niche Programmes have up to 5% control of 
admission to talented pupils through the Direct School Admission scheme
35
 and 
there will be 85 such secondary schools, accounting for 50%, in 2016 (SMOE, 
2015i). 
According to Scholar S, “schools are encouraged to be part of their 
communities and to establish links with appropriate institutions… as with most 
things, broad guidelines exist, schools seldom seek to deviate from these guidelines 
and established practices”. Moreover, the SMOE approval is needed for setting up 
partnerships with other schools and businesses. In fact, principals are well 
self-censored as to what they should not do. As Policy-maker W illustrated, “they 
[principals] know that we [the SMOE] do not encourage very sensitive effects 
towards religious and racial elements”. This also demonstrates the rationale that, as 
argued by Scholar G, autonomy can be given to the ‘right’ person to do the ‘right’ 
job.  
Parents are welcome to make contribution to school activities and events, but 
they rarely participate in school management or decision-making process. As 
Scholar S stressed, “the need for school-level autonomy however… is not for 
stakeholders who may wish to invest in schools or parent groups wanting to start 
schools”. As civil servants, principals and teachers are supposed to cautiously deal 
with the relations with the media, or generally, interview requests; who they can 
talk to and what kind of topics they can talk about are required to be scrutinised and 
approved by the SMOE. My data collection experience for this study is a good 
example, which has been elaborated in the methodology chapter. Table 6.7 
summarises the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘pupil 
admission and external relations’ of Singapore non-autonomous government 
secondary schools. 
 
 
 
                                                             
35 Pupils can choose to participate in Direct School Admission scheme which allows them to take school-based 
tests and be admitted by their preferred schools before the Primary School Leaving Examination and central 
allocation. 
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Table 6.7. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘pupil 
admission and external relations’ of Singapore non-autonomous government 
secondary schools 
Area Descriptions Degree 
Pupil admission Primarily through the centralised school 
allocation system according to the Primary 
School Leaving Examination results  
2 
Relationship with other 
schools and business 
Encouraged but need to be approved 4 
Level of parents’ 
involvement 
Parents are welcomed to support school 
activities and events 
2 
Relationship with mass 
media (or interview 
request in general) 
Strictly scrutinised and approved by the SMOE 1 
With regard to pupil admission, autonomous schools and independent schools 
enjoy a relatively greater freedom: those with Niche Programmes are allowed to 
determine their own admission figures and exercise discretion on the whole annual 
enrolment; those without Niche Programmes may reserve up to 20% direct 
enrolment; and those providing the Integration Programme can entirely determine 
their intake (Gopinathan & Mardiana, 2013). There are no essential differences 
between government schools, autonomous schools and independent schools in 
respect to external relations with other schools, businesses, parents and media. 
 
This section provides a detailed description of school autonomy in the current 
Singapore education system and accordingly develops a model. Five features in this 
respect are identified drawing on the understanding of the historical and current 
development of school autonomy in Singapore, which are discussed in the 
following section. 
 
6.5. Features of school autonomy 
 
As Ng (2008) notes, the Singapore education system “moved through the short 
history of nationhood of just over four decades from one which was rudimentary” 
to one whose excellent international surveys results “have showcased its ‘maturity’” 
(p. 113). What has been intertwined with the provisional expansion and quality 
200 
improvement are the reforms of decentralisation and the maintenance of central 
control. The education system was highly centralised in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
reforms enhancing decentralisation and diversity began in the early 1980s, which 
have granted more autonomy to schools throughout the following three decades. 
Tan and Ng (2007) thus argue that the education system has transformed from “a 
direct interventionist control model” to “a more remote supervisory steering model” 
(p. 158). Nevertheless, the Government has never ceased its control in the 
education sector. Five features of school autonomy in Singapore are identified and 
elaborated below. 
Firstly, almost all decentralisation reforms in Singapore have been centrally 
initiated, directed, mandated and funded, rather than having a “grassroots base” 
(Karlsen, 2000, p. 530). The ‘top-down’ approach adopted in education reforms 
suggests considerable influence from the centre. In other words, issues as to how 
much autonomy, in which school management areas, to which level of authorities 
(i.e. cluster or school) and for what types of schools (e.g. autonomous schools, 
independent schools, non-autonomous government schools, or schools with 
enrichment programmes), are primarily decided by the SMOE. This is also a 
reflection of the paternalistic, hierarchical and authoritarian managerial style in the 
political system adopted by the PAP Government (Dimmock & Tan, 2012). Central 
control and intervention have rarely encountered local resistance in practice 
(Gopinathan & Sharpe, 2004). In Tan and Ng’s (2007) opinion, this is not surprising 
“in a country which promotes ‘responsible, rule-following citizenship’ with an 
accent on obligations” (p. 161). 
Secondly, education decentralisation in Singapore has been balanced by 
central control through accountability system and quality assurance measures. All 
schools are required to conform to some key national policies, such as national 
education and bilingualism. For example, notwithstanding the introduction of the 
School Excellent Model and Recognition System, the powerful but invisible control 
over schooling has always been the high-stake national examination which is still 
the sole choice for the vast majority of pupils. Schools that are not able to provide 
alternative certificates cannot take the risk of “being genuinely distinctive from one 
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another” (Tan, 2005, p. 69). Besides, Ng (2008) argues that the quality assurance is 
more like a “paradoxical journey”: although central supervision and external review 
have been increasingly shifted to local accountability and internal appraisal, the 
Government has still held its rein over education through centrally-designed and 
compulsorily-introduced accountability mechanisms, such as the Desired Outcomes 
of Education and the reporting officer system. 
Thirdly, Singapore has established a sophisticated personnel management 
system in the education sector which is characterised by a hybrid of centralised 
control and decentralised measures. By recognising the importance of teachers and 
school leadership, the SMOE has carefully selected teacher trainees, centrally 
trained them in the National Institute of Education, recruited and managed qualified 
teachers as civil servants, tightly monitored and appraised them via the Education 
Service Professional Development and Career Plan, promote the ‘right’ person to 
the leadership path, and kept them working closely with the SMOE. Moreover, 
from Tan’s (2006) point of view, the purpose of granting greater autonomy to 
school leaders is to “better achieve government-dictated macro-policy objects and 
goals” (p. 68). Similarly, as Ng (2008) argues, school leaders are expected to 
understand centralised strategies and aims, and determine what tactics would be the 
best to achieve these aims for their pupils as well as the society. 
Fourthly, autonomy in the Singapore education system has been specifically 
given to different levels of authorities and different types of schools in different 
areas of school management. For example, some operational power with regard to 
finance, personnel and evaluation has been decentralised to clusters and 
superintendents, rather than schools and principals. A small number of independent 
schools and autonomous schools, as the ‘products’ of decentralisation reforms, have 
been selectively given much more autonomy by the SMOE than other ordinary 
schools to enrol top and/or specialist pupils and enable them to go beyond the 
national curriculum. Furthermore, even within these two types of schools, 
autonomy has been granted to different areas of school management and in 
different degrees. For example, independent schools can use their budgets to hire 
contract teachers, while autonomous schools run by the Government can only find 
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their teachers from the ‘pool’ provided by the SMOE. 
Lastly, autonomy in Singapore has only been granted to, either ‘high-flying’ 
schools that are good enough to manage themselves or top pupils who have the 
academic ability to pursue a deeper and broader curriculum. As mentioned earlier, 
the existing independent schools and autonomous schools are academically selected. 
Moreover, enrichment programmes, in particular, the Integration Programme and 
Niche Programme, have only been allowed to be operated in high-performing 
schools and provided to talented pupils. Therefore, school autonomy in Singapore, 
like the whole education and governance system, is highly meritocratic and 
pragmatically serves the purpose of securing economic competitiveness and social 
cohesion. In a word, once schools and their pupils are qualified, they can have more 
autonomy by receiving the approval from the SMOE. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
The national education system in Singapore, rooted in a multi-ethnic and 
small-size society and characterised by instrumentalism and meritocracy, has served 
to build political legitimacy, foster economic growth, and strengthen social 
cohesion and allegiance of identities since its inception. Intensive central control 
was long used as a strategy to bring about standard and efficiency to the 
management of schools at the early national-building stage. Since the 1980s, 
education reforms, aiming to increase decentralisation and diversity, have been 
initiated and promoted by the Government. Superintendents have replaced the 
SMOE to take charge of some operational duties within their clusters. A small 
number of academically strong schools have been selected to become ‘independent’ 
or ‘autonomous’ and ‘awarded’ more autonomy in some specific management areas. 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of schools are still required to conform to national 
curriculum and central guidelines, fully or mainly funded by the Government, and 
mainly appraised by their performance in the national examinations. Therefore, it is 
not wholly accurate to claim that the current Singapore education system has 
overall enjoyed a high level of school autonomy.
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Chapter 7. School autonomy in Shanghai secondary education 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters have investigated school autonomy in Hong Kong 
and Singapore. Shanghai is the third East Asian society studied to address the 
second research question. As a distinct region of China, over the last century and a 
half, Shanghai has undergone an intensive form of forced internationalisation 
(1840s-1940s), decades of socialist transformation (1950s-1980s) and 
re-globalisation from the early 1990s (Wasserstrom, 2007). These historical 
transitions have brought about significant changes in the education arena. This 
chapter examines the nature and degree of autonomy in Shanghai secondary 
schools. It begins by reviewing the economic, social-political and cultural context 
in order to understand the transformation of the education system (section 7.2). 
Then, the historical development of school autonomy is examined (section 7.3). 
Following these two reviews, a model of school autonomy in the current system is 
created, based on the analysis of policies and practices adopted and perceived by 
policymakers, scholars and school leaders within Shanghai (section 7.4). On this 
basis, five features of school autonomy in Shanghai are identified and discussed 
(section 7.5). 
 
7.2. Context 
 
Shanghai sits at the mouth of the Yangtze River in East China. It is one of the 
largest cities by population in China, as well as in the world (Chan, 2007). For 
centuries a major and prosperous local trading port, Shanghai started to draw 
external attention in the 19
th
 century owning to its advantageous location and 
economic potential. It was one of the first five ports opened to international trade 
after the first Opium War (1839-1842). By the 1930s, the city was flourishing as a 
commercial and financial hub of the Asia Pacific (Wasserstrom, 2007). Since the 
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establishment of the PRC in 1949, Shanghai has been selected as one of the four 
provincial level municipalities under the direct leadership of the Central 
Government, with a relatively high degree of autonomy in policy formulation and 
implementation within its 17 county-level
36
 and 210 town-level divisions. 
 
Economic centre 
 
As Cheng (2011) puts it, “if Beijing is China’s political centre, Shanghai is all 
business” (p. 25). In 1952, the newly-established PRC adopted a Stalinist model of 
economic development blended with Mao Zedong’s own socialist egalitarianism 
ideals, which was primarily characterised by highly centralised control, five-year 
plans, top-down directives and absence of capital and labour markets (Leung, 1995). 
Under this new regime, although Shanghai remained as a key economic centre, it 
was forced to abandon its traditional advantages in commerce and finance, and 
concentrate on heavy industry, as with other major cities in China (Arkaraprasertkul, 
2010). Its coastal location became a problem during the Cold War period. As Pan 
(1991) notes, there were 156 Soviet-supporting programmes in the 1950s, but none 
of them was allocated to Shanghai due to the fear of war. Nevertheless, Shanghai 
remained one of the main sources of fiscal revenue for the centre. 
The ‘Cultural Revolution’ (1966-1976) brought the economy of the whole 
country to “the edge of collapse” (Leung, 1995, p. 207). The post-1978 China, led 
by Deng Xiaoping, initiated ‘Reform and Opening’ (gaige kaifang) which signalled 
the transformation from ‘planned economy’ to ‘socialist market economy’ and 
assigned certain cities and provinces flagship status to achieve rejuvenation and 
progress. Nonetheless, Shanghai’s economic renaissance is said only to have begun 
from1992, after Deng’s comments that “in the areas of talented personnel, 
technology and administration, Shanghai has obvious superiority” (Jacobs, 1997, p. 
170). A set of preferential policies have enabled Shanghai to set up China’s largest 
free-trade zone in Pudong District, make decisions regarding foreign investment, 
                                                             
36 There are currently 16 districts and one county in Shanghai. For the rest of the thesis, I shall use the term 
‘district’ to include both ‘district’ and ‘county’, unless otherwise stated. 
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trading and stocks approvals, and lower tax rates for enterprises (Arkaraprasertkul, 
2010). Shanghai has become one of the world’s fastest developing cities in the past 
three decades. By 2013, Shanghai’s GDP per capita grew to US $ 14,574 more than 
twice that of China as a whole (Shanghai Statistics Bureau, 2014a). 
Despite its constant economic growth since the early 1980s, China’s 
educational investment has remained relatively low by world standards. Leung 
(1995) demonstrated that the spread of basic literacy and numeracy in China with a 
large illiterate population was achieved with investment ranging between 2.2-3.1% 
of GDP. The goal of 4% of GDP by 2000 was delayed to 2012 (Zhong, 2013). In 
this circumstance, education has still been expected to provide a sufficiently 
qualified labour force to support economic development. Reflecting its economic 
strength, Shanghai became the first city in China that achieved nine-year 
compulsory education in 1993, and 4% of GDP for education investment in 2002. 
The current enrolment rate for compulsory education in Shanghai stands over 99%; 
and about 84% of Shanghai secondary school graduates go to college, in contrast to 
24% nationally (Shanghai Statistics Bureau, 2014b). 
 
Political quiescence 
 
The insecure Cold War environment for the new-born Communist PRC 
reinforced the CCP resolve to consolidate its political control. As Leung (1995) 
notes, in this highly centralised and one-party dominated system, Mao, the ‘Great 
Leader and Teacher’, launched a series of mass political campaigns, such as 
anti-Rightist struggle and the ‘Great Leap Forward’, to eliminate the enemy of the 
proletariat, promote ideological indoctrination and eventually build a socialist 
society. The pre-1949 Shanghai was seen as ‘the birthplace’ of the CCP but also a 
‘sink of iniquity’ (Jacobs, 1997). Its western-influenced modern culture and 
capitalist heritage did not fit well with Mao’s socialism and ‘pro-ruralism’ (Kirkby, 
1985). The post-1949 Shanghai was thus particularly heavily supervised and 
controlled by the centre. For example, Jacobs (1997) argues that the centrally- 
organised out-migration from Shanghai in the Maoist era was used to fragment 
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potential political opposition as well as to contribute to industrial development in 
other regions. 
The turning point of China’s politics was the end of the Cultural Revolution. 
Since then, ‘politics in command’ has given way to economic construction to 
safeguard the PRC and CCP’s existence (Xing, 2003). However, serious social 
problems appeared alongside market-oriented reforms, such as the infiltration of 
western bourgeois liberalism leading to a collapse of public faith in socialism, and a 
popular resentment at corruption and the ever-increasing gap between rich and poor. 
Combined with growing unemployment and inflation, these resulted in massive 
anti-government demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Zhao, 2004). As 
Vickers (2009) notes, the CCP subsequently “deployed patriotism rather than 
socialism as the key plank of the Party’s new ideological platform” and rested Party 
legitimacy on economic success (p. 61). 
Staggering economic progress has not brought about a similar scale of 
improvement in political democratisation. Yang (2006) argues that in recent years 
“the foremost concern for China’s leaders has been the maintenance of political 
order and the promotion of effective governance” (p. 144). The ‘Harmonious 
Society’ and ‘China Dream’ have been espoused respectively by the former 
President Hu Jintao (2003-2013) and the present President Xi Jinping, advocating 
the overriding need for socio-political stability to guarantee individuals and the 
nation’s economic success. According to Jacobs (1997), Shanghai was relatively 
quiescent during unrest in the 1980s. Although it has benefitted from preferential 
economic policies since the early 1990s and regained the nation’s economic 
leadership, it has not competed politically with Beijing. Shanghainese are known in 
China for “lacking enthusiasm for politics” (Yu, 1992, p. 143). 
During the early decades of the PRC, education served as an ideological and 
political instrument (Law, 2009). The superiority of a socialist society and 
Party-state was central to the Government’s curriculum and schooling agenda, 
especially in History, Chinese Language and moral and political subjects (e.g. 
Thought and Values, and Thought and Politics) from primary to tertiary education 
(Jones, 2002). Besides this, Vickers (2009) argues that the promotion of Mandarin 
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(Putonghua) as the national language and the adoption of a simplified version of 
the traditional script were the key strategies for breaking from “the old order” and 
constructing a new China (p. 56). The structure and practices of the education 
system also represented political needs. For example, Party secretaries rather than 
principals had the power over school management; and the Young Pioneer 
(shaoxiandui) and Young League (gongqingtuan) were established to bring up 
young generation in the spirit of Communism. 
After the Tiananmen demonstrations, the CCP intensified efforts to 
indoctrinate youth. Thus, ‘patriotic education’ (aiguozhuyi jiaoyu), in combination 
with ‘national situation education’ (guoqing jiaoyu), was initiated in the early 1990s, 
and continues to this day across all levels of schooling (Vickers, 2009). It promotes 
moral and ideological values, such as a sense of pride in one’s Chinese identity, 
commitment to society and loyalty to the Party and nation, through emphasising the 
country’s so-called ‘One Hundred Years of Humiliation’ and in particular the 
“Against Japanese Aggression” (kangri zhanzheng) (Mitter, 2007). Moreover, as 
Vickers (2009) argues, the promotion of ‘quality education’ (suzhi jiaoyu) since the 
late 1990s has complemented patriotic education in seeking to cultivate capable 
individuals who are willing to make a commitment to building and defending a 
strong, modern and united China. Education in Shanghai has also been affected by 
these changes. 
 
A central-provincial governing system 
 
According to Dong (2007), the division of power between the centre and the 
provincial has followed a principle of ‘unified leadership and level by level 
management’ since 1954. In maintaining its leadership, the CCP has established 
numerous committees and branches at all levels of governance and across all public 
sectors. Moreover, all governing institutions have been structured in a dual 
Party-government system in which the Party secretary outranks the governor 
(Lawrence & Martin, 2013). Only since the mid-1980s, has central control become 
more indirect, and the provincial level has hence been granted greater autonomy 
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(Goodman, 1997). Nevertheless, as Yang (2006) notes, the Central Government has 
retained the power to appoint top provincial officials and reconfigure 
central-provincial fiscal relations. Shanghai has since become responsible for its 
own governance in almost all areas, including education, as long as it conforms to 
national policies and guidance. 
In fact, the functions and responsibilities of the central and provincial 
authorities have never been clearly demarcated. As Vickers and Yang (2013) note, 
even when a license for education decision-making has been transferred to a 
province, “the precise extent of that license has remained vague and uncertain” (p. 
29). Dong (2007) compares the central- provincial relationship to a ‘barrel’– they 
are all similar in terms of scope and scale but only different in that the centre 
maintains the final say. Moreover, the centre and the province are both 
characterised by bureaucracy and a system of ‘polyarchy’. The education system is 
centrally administered and governed by the Ministry of Education (CMOE) and 
education departments of other national ministries. Similarly, the Shanghai 
Municipal Education Commission (SMEC) and district education bureaus (DEBs) 
cooperate with other provincial/district authorities (e.g. human resources, finance, 
organisation and planning) in relevant areas. Any decision thus has to be approved 
multiple times. 
 
The cultural heritage and pride of local identity 
 
Although there have been a variety of dogmas and philosophies in China’s 
long history, Confucianism has undoubtedly dominated almost all facets of the life 
of individuals and of society
37
. Kim (2009) argues that East Asia, including China, 
has kept a “strong Confucian pedagogic culture” (p. 857) characterised by a 
number of unchanging patterns, particularly exam-driven schooling and patriarchal 
authority and hierarchy. Cheng (2011) argues that, in this cultural context, 
education has been reduced to “examination preparation” and is seen as the major 
“path for upward social mobility” (pp. 23-24). Although Shanghai has reached a 
                                                             
37 Confucianism was attacked in China during the Cultural Revolution and has been recently promoted by the 
Chinese Government to develop China’s ‘soft power’. The establishment of Confucius Institutes is an example 
(Kim, 2009). 
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relatively high enrolment rate in tertiary education, the pressure of examinations 
has not been reduced. The high spending on private tutoring is a conspicuous 
example
38
 (Loveless, 2013, October 9). Law (2009) studies the influence of 
‘Confucian authority’ on the culture of school management in China and argues that, 
for principals: 
 
“It is important to cultivate and keep good relationships with government 
officers, to faithfully implement the government’s education policy, and to 
listen carefully to and carry out what government officials specifically instruct 
the school to do.” (p. 316) 
 
Shanghainese proudly see themselves, and are seen by the rest of China, as 
‘Domestic Overseas Chinese’. As Jacobs (1997) argues, Shanghai’s immigrant 
culture, relative wealth, concern with the economy rather than politics, and 
enthusiastic engagement with the outside world, have validated this metaphor. 
Shanghai’s pride in its own distinctiveness has been reflected in its attempts to 
reaffirm its local identity, particularly as the most important ‘gateway’ to Chinese 
modernity (Bergère, 2009). For example, although pre-1949 Shanghai was 
ambiguous in the CCP’s official discourse, the cultural and economic vigour of the 
cosmopolitan ‘Old Shanghai’ has been unabashedly recalled and celebrated in 
museums and commercial areas (Vickers & Yang, 2013). With regard to education 
developments, since the 1980s, the Shanghai Municipal Government has pioneered 
on almost all fronts, and projected Shanghai as a ‘first-class city with first-class 
education’ within China and internationally (Ngok & Chan, 2003). 
 
After three decades of a centralised and relative closed socialist era, since the 
early 1990s, Shanghai has re-connected to the world and achieved remarkable 
growth in its economy and education provision. Meanwhile, political control, the 
central-local governing relationship and Confucian culture have profoundly shaped 
its schooling and school management. The next section examines the historical 
changes to the nature and degree of school autonomy against this broader 
                                                             
38 According to Loveless (2013, October 9), Shanghai parents would annually spend on average of 30,000 yuan 
($ 4800) on maths and English tutoring when their children in secondary schools. 
210 
background.  
 
7.3. Historical development of school autonomy 
 
In this section, I divide the development of school autonomy in Shanghai in 
particular and in China in general into four periods since the establishment of the 
PRC. From 1949 to 1965, China constructed a highly unified and centralised 
education system by imitating that of the Soviet Union. From 1966 to 1984, much 
of the system was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, and the post-Mao era 
witnessed a renaissance of education and schooling in order to meet the escalating 
demand for economic development. Shanghai was tightly controlled by the Central 
Government during these two periods. A significant education decentralisation 
reform was initiated in 1985, which marked the beginning of the third period. For 
the subsequent 25 years, China experienced a series of reforms, devolving power to 
lower level authorities and encouraging diversity of education provision. Shanghai 
has since been a pioneer in almost all education experiments. The fourth period 
started from 2010 when the latest national and local education development plans 
were released. Shanghai as well as China as whole both seem to be characterised by 
a hybrid of decentralisation and recentralisation in some areas of school 
management. 
 
Construction of a Soviet-inspired education system: 1949-1965 
 
After the founding of the PRC, the Central Government emphasised 
industrialisation and political consolidation as priorities in the building of a socialist 
nation (Zhao, 2007). Following Mao’s dictum “education must serve proletariat 
politics and be integrated with productive labour” (Gu, 2001), education was used 
as an instrument to inculcate the official ideology of Communism, foster 
unquestioning loyalty to the CCP, and produce a labour force with basic literacy 
and numeracy (Cleverley, 1991). To achieve this, the CCP sought to learn from the 
Soviet ‘elder brother’, as it believed “the best of Western science and technology 
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had already been absorbed by the Russians” (Pepper, 1987, p. 197). In the 1950s, as 
Pepper (1987) argues, China’s education system was “reshaped in the Soviet mould” 
(p. 197). 
More specifically, nationalist schools were brought under the new 
Government’s control (Sun, 2004), private schools were nationalised (Zhao, 2007), 
and numerous schools were set up by people’s communes (Pepper, 2000). 
Consequently, almost all schools became public, administered and monitored by 
provincial education commissions and conforming to central stipulations on 
admission policies, school calendars, graduate placement, budget formats, teachers’ 
appointment and salaries (Hawkins, 2006). The CMOE provided unified teaching 
plans which articulated aims, requirements and arrangement of each subject, and 
prescribed the content and allocated curriculum time in syllabuses (Pepper, 1990). 
The People’s Education Press, placed under the leadership of the CMOE, was the 
sole authorised publisher of textbooks and teaching materials (i.e. teaching 
references and pupils’ learning materials including workbooks, supplementary texts, 
experiment sheets and atlases) for the whole country (Ye, 2014). 
A national teaching-research system was established in the 1950s and has 
continued to have an impact on day-to-day teaching to the present day. At the time, 
subject-specific ‘teaching-research officers’ from all levels of education authorities 
were empowered to direct, supervise and monitor teaching activities. Within 
schools, all teachers were organised into teaching-research groups to collectively 
prepare lessons, practice teaching and supervise each other (Pepper, 1990). The 
rationale was elaborated in the CCP’s official newspaper, the People’s Daily 
(Renmin ribao), 
 
“Since all teaching work is carried out under a unified aim and plan, each 
subject taught by each teacher is, both qualitatively and quantitatively, essential 
for the realisation of the general aim and plan. If teaching work is not carried 
out through the guided, organised, and collective activity of the 
teaching-research office, it will be difficult to achieve the desired result”. (24th 
April 1954, quoted in Pepper, 1990, p. 42) 
 
The national college entrance examination (gaokao) was introduced in 1952 
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for all secondary graduates, which as Pepper (1990) argues, reinforced the 
Soviet-style centralisation. The ‘key school’ (zhongdian xuexiao) system was set up 
in the 1950s aiming to identify and prepare the most academically capable pupils 
for higher levels of education with limited resources. As a result, the Central 
Government monopolised the provision, governance, resource allocation, 
curriculum and pedagogy across the county. 
 
Destruction and reconstruction: 1966-1984 
 
During the Cultural Revolution, education was regarded as a tool of ‘class 
struggle’ and the ‘newly-established national education system was destroyed (Gu, 
2001; Zhao, 2007). Teachers were branded as intellectuals, sent to factories and 
villages to be ‘re-educated’, suffering severe persecution. Conventional schools 
were replaced with schools led by peasants, workers and soldiers. Schooling was 
shortened, whereas physical labour and military-associated projects were increased; 
the curriculum was dominated by studying the thoughts of Mao (Cleverley, 1991). 
After the end of the 1960s, classes were suspended; a huge number of urban pupils 
were sent to the countryside for years to learn from the peasantry (Jones, 2002). 
The college entrance examination was abolished; instead, political 
recommendations and class background determined college admission (Pepper, 
2000). As Reed (1988) estimates, a total of 160 million young people did not 
receive sufficient education. 
The end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 saw the beginning of the 
reconstruction of the education system. A milestone was the reinstatement of the 
college entrance examination in 1977. Deng stressed that “science and technology 
were the keys to modernisation, and education was the means to developing science 
and technology” (Gu, 2001, p. 112), which signalled the Government’s 
determination to prioritise education in national policy agendas (Hao, 1998). 
Recognising the limitations of centralised administration and the paucity of 
resources, local governments and governance institutions were encouraged to play a 
greater role in education provision and management (Ngok & Chan, 2003). From 
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the early 1980s, non-governmental forces (e.g. state-owned enterprises, social 
organisations and individuals) were allowed to finance schools. These initiatives 
paved the way for the reforms promoting education decentralisation since the 
mid-1980s. 
 
Decentralisation and diversification: 1985- 2009 
 
China’s decentralisation reforms started in the public sector in the mid-1980s, 
which redefined the relationship among the central and local governments as well 
as their relationship to education (Pang, 2011). Significant changes occurred in 
governance, finance, and curriculum and examinations. Shanghai, as the sole 
‘education experimental zone’ (Su, 2011), spearheaded almost all reforms within 
the purview of the national frameworks and policies. 
 
Governance 
 
The first and foremost moves to decentralise the education system followed 
the Decision of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on the Reform of 
the Education System in 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1985 Decision’). 
Critical problems identified in this document were the over-centralisation of the 
national system and the neglect of regional disparities. It proposed that more 
responsibility and power be granted to provincial governments, including school 
administration, formulation and implementation of specific policies, teachers’ 
appointment, inspection over education institutions and the division of 
administrative power at the sub-provincial level. Meanwhile, the Central 
Government would continue to play a monitoring role and provide overall 
principles, guidelines and plans (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee & 
State Council, CCPCCC & SC, 1985). 
These changes were further articulated in the Programme for Education 
Reform and Development in China promulgated in 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 
the ‘1993 Programme’): 
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“The Central Government stipulates the basic length of schooling, curricula 
design and standards, budgeted teaching posts, teaching qualifications and 
basic standards of teachers’ salaries; provincial, autonomous regional and 
Municipal Governments are given the authority to formulate the specific length 
of schooling and annual pupil admission, make teaching plans, choose 
textbooks and scrutinise local textbooks, and specify the ratio of teachers’ 
professional titles and specific standards of teachers’ salaries for their own 
systems.” (CCPCCC & SC, 1993) 
 
In Shanghai, a governance framework of ‘local responsibility and bi-level 
management’ was established in the mid-1980s (Ngok & Chan, 2003). District 
governments became the direct ‘manager’ of individual schools, while a tight rein 
was kept by the Municipal Government.  
The 1985 Decision also introduced the ‘principal responsibility system’ to 
schools, which set up a tripartite management structure: 
 
“Under the guidance of the higher Party organisations and education 
department, principals take the full responsibility of teaching and 
administrative management of schools; schools’ Party organisations play the 
role as the political core; and congresses of teaching and administrative staff 
ensure schools’ democratic management and supervision”. (CCPCC & SC, 
1985) 
 
A range of educational laws were launched during this period, regarding 
compulsory education, vocational and technical education, higher education, 
teachers’ qualifications and educational finance (Hawkins, 2006). In parallel to 
these legislative developments was the establishment of the national inspection 
system aimed to ensure the implementation of laws and policies and consequently 
improve education quality (Wang, 2008). The National Education Supervision 
Agency was set up within the State Education Commission
39
 in 1986, followed by 
the establishment of inspection offices at all local levels (Ma, 2005). The Municipal 
Government promulgated its own Regulation of Education Supervision in 1999, 
which specified that supervisors are responsible for supervising, examining and 
evaluating the educational functions of municipal and district governments and the 
                                                             
39 The Ministry of Education was renamed the State Education Commission from 1985 to 1998. 
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performance of schools and teachers. 
The huge gap in resource allocation between key schools and the rest received 
wide criticism. To promote greater educational equality, the CMOE decided that 
key schools can only exist at the end of compulsory education (Walker & Qian, 
2012). In 1999, the SMEC abolished the ‘key school’ system at the primary and 
junior secondary levels, but replaced it with an ‘exemplary school’ system at the 
senior secondary level (SMEC, 1999, 2004a). According to Walker and Qian (2012), 
former key senior schools were in fact retitled as exemplary schools. 
 
Finance 
 
The 1985 Decision particularly emphasised that with the under-developed 
economy the Central Government could not afford to entirely fund such a vast 
education system. It therefore redistributed the fiscal responsibility for education 
between the centre and the province, stipulating that provincial governments should 
bear the majority of education expenditures and encouraging multiple methods of 
financing (CCPCCC & SC, 1985). The Central Government was still supposed to 
pay teachers’ salaries on the public payroll. However, as Cheng (1997) notes, that 
money was actually collected by local governments; it was merely rerouted to and 
reallocated by the centre. He describes this situation as “the centre hosts the 
banquet and the local foots the bill” (p. 395). 
At the sub-provincial level, fiscal responsibility was further decentralised to 
county and township governments and even village committees in some rural areas 
(Zeng & Zhang, 2009). To increase education funding, local governments were 
allowed to levy taxes and an educational surcharge on industry, production and 
business, and to offer taxation discounts to school-run enterprises (Hawkins, 2006). 
Non-governmental actors were welcomed to open people-run (minban) schools
40
 
and make to donations to public-funded schools under government guidance, which 
well entrenched the ideology of ‘socialist market economy’ (CCPCCC & SC, 1985). 
                                                             
40 The nature of the people-run school is contested. Mok (1997) argues that it is hard to differentiate between 
‘people-run’ and ‘private’. But Ding (2012) demonstrates that governments have never been excluded from 
sponsoring people-run schools. More details will be provided later in the chapter.  
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This was reaffirmed in the 1993 Programme: “while the focus remains on state 
schools, encouragement will be given to the gradual establishment of people-run 
schools” (CCPCCC & SC, 1993). In what is known as a policy of ‘fishing’, local 
governments may top-up a small amount of subsidy as ‘bait’ to match larger 
donations from society (Cheng, 1997; Ye, 2014). 
In fact, as Ding (2012) demonstrates, the majority of people-run schools 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘bureau-sponsored people-run schools’) have been 
sponsored by DEBs through their affiliated commercial companies and public 
schools, whereas only a small proportion (hereinafter referred to ‘independent 
people-run schools’) have received funding from non-governmental forces. DEBs’ 
leadership and sponsorship of people-run schools were legislated by the 2002 Law 
on Promoting People-run Education (hereinafter refer to as the ‘2002 People-run 
Education Law’). Besides, public schools were permitted to make extra money 
through collecting sponsorship fees from parents
41
 and running enterprises (Cheng, 
2011). These ‘non-budgeted’ incomes enabled schools to pay for non-recurrent 
spending and reward teachers (Wong, 2006). Many scholars (e.g. Sun, 2004; and 
Hawkins, 2006) argue that, rather than a devolution of power, the decentralisation 
reforms in China were largely a transfer of fiscal burdens from the centre to the 
local. 
In Shanghai, district governments became the main source of funding for 
public schools. The first five primary and secondary ‘people-run’ schools42 were 
established in 1992 and then spread over the country (Ngok & Chan, 2003). 
‘Converted schools’ (zhuanzhi xuexiao) were created four years later and 
subsequently emulated by other provinces (Ding, 2012). There were two forms of 
‘converted schools’, namely, ‘people-sponsor-and-government- subsidise’ (minban 
gongzhu) and ‘government-sponsor-and-people-subsidise’ (gongban minzhu). Ding 
(2012) points out that these schools were operated in the same way as people-run 
schools. 
                                                             
41 Pupils, who were unregistered residents, cannot meet academic entrance requirements, or gave up free 
school places that they were allocated, can buy their places at a high price. 
42 There were a small number of people-run schools in Shanghai during the 1950s, ranging from 2.9% to 7.8% 
of all schools (Ding, 2012). 
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Curriculum and examinations 
 
The 1985 Decision officially recognised regional distinctiveness and 
disparities within China and thus a uniform national set of textbooks was 
inappropriate. Since 1986, the Central Government has adopted the ‘One 
Guide-Multiple Textbooks’ policy, encouraging diverse local production of 
textbooks under central guidance (Hao, 1998). This marked the initiation of the first 
round of national curriculum reform. In 1988, Shanghai became the first that was 
given the power to design the curriculum. The Curriculum and Teaching Material 
Reform Commission was set up to take specific reform actions (Xu, 2012). 
Following Shanghai, other economically advanced areas and then later the 
remaining regions were successively allowed to determine their local curricula 
(Ngok & Chan, 2003). However, as Sun (2004) argues, this was essentially another 
form of centralisation – local governments replaced the Central Government in 
controlling the curriculum. 
Almost a decade later, a new set of local textbooks were issued to all pupils in 
Shanghai. A major change was the introduction of optional and extracurricular 
subjects, which accounted for about 10% of curriculum time and were designed by 
the Municipal Government (Tan, 2012; Ye, 2014). Nonetheless, the Central 
Government maintained its control through prescribing compulsory subjects, 
limiting optional subjects to aesthetic education areas such as arts, sports and 
technological skills, and providing a national curriculum framework (implemented 
in 1993) on how new subjects should be developed. Hawkins (2006) thus argues 
that “while there is some tolerance for diversity, it is quite limited” (p. 35). 
The second round of nationwide curriculum reform started in 2001 with the 
publication of the Outline of Reform on Curriculum in Basic Education (Trial) by 
the CMOE. The main goals during this phase were transforming pupils from 
passive receivers of knowledge to active participants in learning, shifting the 
pedagogic focus from ‘exam-oriented’ to ‘quality- oriented’ and, in particular, 
furthering curriculum decentralisation through the promotion of national, local and 
school-based curricula (CMOE, 2001). As a pioneer, Shanghai initiated its own 
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reform from 1998. As Ye (2014) argues, SBCD enabled schools to gain some 
control over their own curricula for the first time. Nevertheless, the Guide of 
School-based Curriculum Management published in 2002 clearly stated that SBCD 
should be guided by national and local curricula, concentrating on the areas not 
covered by them, and closely supervised by all levels of education authorities. It 
also specified how to design and assess SBCD at the school level and how to 
monitor and evaluate it at the local authority level (CMOE, 2002). 
Teaching and learning, particularly in secondary schools, was long dominated 
by academic subjects, and overwhelmingly determined by examination syllabuses 
(Pepper, 2000; Tan, 2012). There was a popular Chinese saying portraying the 
college entrance examination as ‘millions of troops walking through a single-log 
bridge’. Concomitant with the curriculum reforms was an effort to move the 
education system away from exam-orientation (Ngok & Chan, 2003). Shanghai was 
again a leader in this reform. Since 1985, Shanghai was permitted to design its own 
college entrance examination, which as Cheng (2011) argues was the key to a 
localised curriculum. In 1994, the junior secondary schools entrance examination 
was replaced by the ‘neighbourhood attendance’ policy. In theory, all primary 
pupils were admitted to secondary schools according to their catchments areas 
divided by the SMEC. In reality, pupils can still choose better schools in other 
neighbourhoods by paying sponsoring fees. Notwithstanding these changes, 
entrance examinations for senior secondary schools and colleges were retained and 
highly centralised at the municipal level, focusing on national compulsory subjects. 
 
A hybrid of decentralisation and recentralisation: 2010-present 
 
The National Outline for Medium and Long Term Education Reform and 
Development (2010-2020) was put forward in 2010, and set out the latest national 
goals and strategies for education development. Both standardisation and 
decentralisation initiatives were proposed in this document. With regard to 
curriculum, teaching and examinations, it emphasised the adoption of compulsory 
subjects following national curriculum standards and ability-oriented evaluation 
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system for pupils, the promotion of Putonghua as medium of instruction and the 
implementation of exercise for one-hour per day. In relation to teachers, it 
stipulated that their appointment should conform to national qualification standards, 
standardised teachers’ professional titles (zhicheng). It authorised provincial and 
sub-provincial governments to select, appoint and appraise teachers. It also 
reaffirmed the promotion of central-local-school governance and finance structure, 
principal responsibility system, multi-level inspection system and people-run 
schools. All these highlighted aspects are supposed to be achieved by local 
governments (CCPCCC & SC, 2010). 
Referencing to the national version, the SMEC (2010) developed Shanghai’s 
Outline for Medium and Long Term Education Reform and Development 
(2010-2020) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2010 Shanghai Outline’). On the one 
hand, schools were given more autonomy to select their preferred pupils and 
implement self- management and development, although no specific actions were 
proposed. On the other hand, it designed a series of recentralisation and 
standardisation initiatives. For example, the SMEC aimed to standardise schools’ 
funding, arrangements of buildings and facilities, and teachers’ allocation and their 
salaries in order to reduce the gaps between districts. The municipal inspection 
commission, teaching certificate validation system, and people-run education 
development funding were set up in an attempt to reinforce municipal guidance and 
monitoring. In particular, the power of personnel management was withdrawn from 
schools to districts – DEBs would be able to rotate teachers within their territory. 
 
For a long time, the Shanghai education system was strictly controlled by the 
Central Government in almost all aspects as other Chinese regions. From the 
mid-1980s to the late 2000s, Shanghai spearheaded a set of education 
decentralisation reforms which have shifted some powers and responsibilities from 
the centre to the municipal level. Various types of people-run schools have also 
been established to diversify the system. Nevertheless, the Central Government has 
never excluded itself from controlling, supervising and guiding local education 
governance and management. More recently, with the purpose of improving 
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education equality, Shanghai as well as China as a whole seems to be framed in a 
hybrid of decentralisation and recentralisation at the municipal and district levels. 
 
7.4. Current model of school autonomy  
 
In contrast to most other Chinese regions with a ‘6-3-3’ schooling structure, 
Shanghai has adopted a ‘5-4-3’ structure since the late 1980s, which means 
five-years of primary education followed by four-years of junior secondary 
education, and after sitting for the Senior Secondary School Entrance Examination 
(zhongkao), pupils may proceed to three-year senior secondary education and 
prepare for the college entrance examination. Local secondary schools (excluding 
vocational schools and schools for special needs and migrant workers’ children) can 
be generally divided into ‘public’ and ‘people-run’ schools. Table 7.1 shows the 
number and percentage of these two types of secondary schools as well as their 
enrolled pupils in 2013. 
 
Table 7.1. Number and percentage of public and people-run secondary schools and 
their enrolled pupils in 2013 
Type of 
schools 
Number of 
schools 
Percentage of 
schools 
Number of 
pupils 
Percentage of 
pupils 
Public 762 88% 593,500 89% 
People-run 103 12% 75,179 11% 
Total 865 100% 668,679 100% 
(Shanghai Statistics Bureau, 2014b) 
 
This section examines the degree and nature of school autonomy in Shanghai 
secondary schools, concentrating on public schools – the major type of schools, and 
also giving some consideration to bureau-sponsored people-run schools – the type 
of schools enjoying greater autonomy. Drawing on the analysis of policy documents, 
literature, and interview data with regard to public schools, I grade each sub-area of 
school management according to the framework developed in the literature review 
chapter. On this basis, a model of school autonomy in the current education system 
is generated, which can be compared with that in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
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Organisation and governance 
 
Under the guidance of the CMOE, education governance in Shanghai is 
carried out through a so-called “Two Tier Government, Two Tier Management” 
system (Shen, 2007). The SMEC directly runs five senior public secondary schools; 
and 17 DEBs operate the remaining senior and all junior public secondary schools, 
and the majority of people-run secondary schools. Further, the SMEC is responsible 
for: (1) implementing laws, regulations and policies of education made at the 
central level; (2) formulating municipal laws, regulations and policies of education 
in accordance with the central framework and according to the overall goals of 
economic and social development of Shanghai; and (3) monitoring and evaluating 
schools’ performance (SMEC, 2009). 
DEBs are given the power to: (1) formulate and implement specific policies 
within the municipal framework and according to districts’ specific social and 
economic development; (2) approve the establishment, annulment and modification 
of public and people-run schools; (3) conduct annual inspection and appraisal of 
individual schools; and (4) supervise non-degree education programmes operated 
by private agencies (SMEC, 2010). The Principal Responsibility System, 
introduced in 1985, continues to provide a framework for intra-school management. 
As Principal U and Principal N explained, the principal is in charge of daily 
operation; the school-Party secretary works on moral, ideological and political 
activities; and the congress of teaching and administrative staff ensures democratic 
engagement and supervision. 
The SMEC (2010) stipulates that important issues should be decided by the 
principal after discussion with the vice-principal, the school-Party secretary and 
vice-secretary, and the chairman of the union at the ‘school administrative meeting’. 
As Scholar Y mentioned, with regard to key decisions, such as the appointment of 
school leaders and large procurements, “permission from higher authorities is 
required”. The introduction of the Principal Responsibility System was intended to 
empower principals in school management (Delany & Paine, 1991). However, Law 
(2009) argues that this is a division of labour rather than of power. The Central 
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Government clearly stated: “school principals’ first fundamental duty is to 
persistently implement the directives, policies and regulations of the CCP and the 
state” (State Education Commission, 1991). This is still the case. As Principal I 
experienced, principals “administratively manage schools under the close guidance 
and supervision of the Party organisations”. 
Table 7.2 summarises the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to 
the ‘organisation and governance’ of Shanghai public secondary schools. 
 
Table 7.2. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘organisation 
and governance’ of Shanghai public secondary schools 
Area Description Degree 
Organisation 
structure and 
functions 
Mainly determined by the SMEC and DEBs according to 
the guidance of the CMOE (e.g. the introduction of 
principal responsibility system) 
1 
Governance 
mechanism 
Within the central framework, the SMEC and DEBs 
formulate specific municipal and district education 
policies and schools take charge of implementing policies 
2 
Types of 
schools 
Approved by DEBs 1 
 
The 2002 People-run Education Law requires every people-run school to set 
up a decision-making body (e.g. school boards or school councils) and specifies its 
structure, functions and power. Nevertheless, Chan and Wang (2009) note that key 
persons in the decision-making bodies of bureau-sponsored people-run schools are 
usually from or assigned by DEBs. Ding (2012) thus argues that decision-making 
bodies “do not really function” (p. 63). With the approval of DEBs, new people-run 
schools can be established and the junior sectors of public secondary schools can be 
turned into people-run schools. 
 
Finance 
 
Public schools in Shanghai are primarily funded by district governments; 
districts with a fiscal deficit can receive extra funding from the Municipal 
Government. Grants from the Central Government only account for a very small 
proportion (Xu, 2012). Compulsory education is free for pupils and tuition fees for 
223 
senior secondary pupils are stipulated and standardised at the municipal level. 
Principal O emphasised that “sponsorship fees are not permitted in Shanghai any 
more”. The finance department within the SMEC is responsible for making budget 
plans and managing donations. It also provides public schools with land, buildings 
and facilities, while schools take daily care of these state-owned properties. Besides, 
as Principal O and Principal U said, the SMEC lists how much incidental fees that 
schools can collect from pupils. For example, schools can only charge every pupil 
no more than 100 yuan for extracurricular activities and no more than 300 yuan for 
school uniform (SMEC, 2013a). 
With regard to school expenditure, Principal N noted that “there is a very 
detailed stipulation informing you how many percentages of funding can be used on 
which items…but how to use this amount of money depends on schools”. Principal 
O added that “if the spending is less than 20,000 yuan, the head of the [school] 
finance department only needs to report that at the school administrative meeting; 
between 20,000 and 30,000 yuan, the spending has to be approved by the meeting; 
between 30,000 and 50,000 yuan, there should be a discussion during the meeting; 
over 50,000 yuan, the government would look into the procurement applications 
and pay the bills”. Financial reports are annually audited by DEBs, but not 
available to the public. Scholar V argued that “school autonomy is very limited in 
terms of finance… basically all the expenditures have to be made clear…there is 
little money can be used by schools freely”. 
Table 7.3 summarise the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to 
the ‘finance’ of Shanghai public secondary schools. 
 
Table 7.3. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘finance’ of 
Shanghai public secondary schools 
Area Descriptions Degree 
Source(s) of 
funding 
All levels of government, mainly from DEBs; donations 
are managed by the SMEC 
1 
Expenditure Domains and quota are stipulated by the SMEC and 
DEBs; how to use them depends on schools; over a 
certain amount, the bills are paid by DEBs 
1.5 
Land, buildings 
and facilities 
Provided by local governments and maintained by 
schools 
1 
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Financial report 
and its 
availability 
Audited by DEBs, but not made available for the public 1 
 
As mentioned above, DEBs are the main sponsors for the majority of 
people-run schools: most of them receive funding from the DEB-affiliated 
enterprises; some are funded by public schools; and a few are financially supported 
by state-owned enterprises as requested by district governments (Hu, Dong & Fang, 
2011). The 2002 People-run Education Law empowers people-run schools to 
handle all their funds and properties, and make budgeting and expenditure policies. 
Nevertheless, the Municipal Government stipulates upper limits on their tuition fees. 
With regard to bureau-funded people-run schools, DEBs exercise a stronger control 
over their expenditure. An example is provided by Ding (2012); according to her, 
those schools have to deposit all their funds in designated bank accounts opened by 
DEBs and apply for specific spending. 
 
Curriculum, teaching and examinations 
 
The current Shanghai curriculum scheme (kecheng fangan) was released in 
2004 by the SMEC, in compliance with national standards. It specifies curriculum 
rationale, goals, structure (i.e. subjects permitted and curriculum time allocated), 
delivery, evaluation, management, quality assurance and textbook planning (SMEC, 
2004b). According to the CMOE’s requirements, the SMEC categorises the 
curriculum into three components. As Principals interviewed in this study 
elaborated: (1) the basic (national) course (75-80%), which is subject-centric, 
standardised by the CMOE, compulsory for all public schools and centrally 
examined; (2) the enriched course (10-15%), which includes social activities (e.g. 
community service and social practice) and aesthetic learning domains; and (3) the 
inquiry-based course (5%), which comprises two types – one focuses on specific 
topics according to pupils’ interests and the other is associated with compulsory 
subjects and disciplinary knowledge. The latter two courses are school-based and 
non-examined, but developed conforming to the SMEC guidelines. 
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Based on the curriculum scheme, the SMEC (2004c) produces curriculum 
standards for subjects of the basic course and curriculum guides for the enriched 
and inquiry-based courses. Principals interviewed all confirmed that textbooks for 
all compulsory and optional subjects are unified by the Shanghai Primary and 
Secondary Curriculum Reform Office within the SMEC. As Principal I described, 
“textbooks are blueprints and teachers are designers, how to carry out lessons based 
on blueprints is very important… teachers only implement textbooks, topics are 
clarified in textbooks” (sic). Principal U added that “in order to complete national 
curriculum, you could use some supplementary textbooks decided by schools”, but 
those provided by the SMEC are the basis. Following the municipal guides, schools 
are free to develop materials for the enriched and inquiry-based courses (SMEC, 
2002). 
The SMEC is in theory authorised to be in charge of Shanghai’s curriculum 
and textbooks with little consultation to the CMOE. However, Vickers and Yang’s 
(2013) study demonstrates that central control of what should be taught in 
classrooms has never been absent. According to them, the short-lived series of 
Shanghai senior secondary history textbooks, published in 2004, made a bold 
attempt to neither “feature laboured condemnations of Japan’s invasion of China” 
nor “reference to the war and attendant atrocities” (p. 34). When the CMOE found 
this out, it stepped in and required the SMEC to replace the ‘unpatriotic’ textbooks 
with a CMOE-verified version in 2007. They thus argue that “autonomy has meant 
mandating textbook editors to present the standard, approved narrative of the 
national and global past in a manner suited to local educational conditions” (p. 37). 
As specified in the curriculum scheme, there are 40 weeks including 34 
teaching weeks, two social practice weeks, and four weeks for examinations and 
special events per academic year. More specifically, taking junior secondary as an 
example, there are 34 periods per teaching week; each period lasts 40 minutes. 
According to Principal I, school days are also “united and regulated by the 
municipal… usually from 8 am to 4 or 4:30 pm… How many lessons [for each day], 
this can be decided by yourself, but you cannot beyond a regulated total amount of 
lessons” (sic). A typical school day is also required to have 15 to 20 minutes 
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morning/noon meeting and 35 to 40 minutes physical exercises (SMEC, 2004c). 
Principal N complained about the fixed schedule: “I think it’s not that reasonable, 
but it’s difficult to make a change”. For each subject, the allocation of curriculum 
time is also stipulated. For example, Table 7.4 shows the arrangement of subjects 
and curriculum time for junior secondary education. 
 
Table 7.4. Arrangement of subjects and curriculum time for junior secondary 
schools in Shanghai per academic year 
                 Grade 
    Periods 
Subjects 
6 7 8 9 
Basic 
course 
Language 
and  
literature 
Chinese 
Language 
136 136 136 136 
Foreign 
Language 
136 136 136 136 
Mathematics Mathematics 136 136 136 170 
 
Social 
science 
 
Thought and 
values 
34 34 68 68 
History 136  
Society  68 
Geography 136  
Nature 
science 
Science 170  
Physics  136 
Chemistry  68 
Biology  102 
Technology 
Labour and 
technical skills 
170 
Information 
technology 
68 
Sports and 
fitness 
Sports and 
fitness 
102 102 102 102 
Arts 
Music 68  
Painting 68  
Arts  136 
Expanded 
course 
All learning 
fields 
Subject-based; 
Activity-based 
170- 
136 
170- 
136 
136- 
102 
136- 
102 
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Theme 
education; 
Communist 
Youth League 
activities 
34-68 34-68 34-68 34-68 
Community 
service; 
Social practice 
2 weeks per academic year 
Inquiry-based course 68 68 68 68 
(SMEC, 2004c) 
 
On completion of all these requirements, in theory, schools are allowed to 
make their own timetable within the fixed school terms. However, as Principal N 
complained, in reality, “we have too much curriculum… too many subjects, and the 
curriculum time is so long… we don’t really have much spare time”. 
Shanghai is currently involved in the second round of a curriculum reform 
which started in 1998 aiming to further ‘quality education’ through promoting 
SBCD (SMEC, 2002; Tan, 2012). The interview data shows that there seem to have 
been various forms of SBCD conducted in practice. For example, Principal U from 
a school that takes X (a kind of Arts) as its specialism (tese), which is accordingly 
developed as its SBCD focus. According to Principal O, the adoption of the 
‘neighbourhood attendance’ policy in 1994 has resulted in “a huge diversity of 
academic ability within classes”, SBCD in his school is thus “making lessons meet 
needs of individual pupils”. As to Principal D’s school, there are two kinds of 
SBCD, “one is designed to deepen the basic course; the other is based on pupils’ 
interests”. 
Despite these different forms of SBCD, Tan (2013) notes that all schools are 
obliged to “take orders, receive training and carry out specific school-based 
initiatives from the district authorities” (p. 94). More specifically, according to Xia 
(2011), there are three models of designing specific courses: (1) the ‘top-down 
design’, meaning the whole course is determined at the district level; (2) the 
‘bottom-up, semi-open design’, meaning the goal and the characteristics of courses 
are regulated by the DEBs, but schools can decide how to implement the courses; 
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and (3) the ‘bottom-up design’, meaning schools are able to create new courses, but 
have to be approved by DEBs. In addition, DEBs often develop a mandatory order 
clarifying the content, format and time allocation of SBCD and identify some 
common research foci in accordance with the ‘five-year plan’ of the Central 
Government (Tan, 2013). 
The ‘teaching-research system’ continues to direct how curriculum should be 
delivered in classroom. In Shanghai, this system comprises three levels: municipal, 
district and school, and covers all subjects in the basic course. As Scholar Y and 
Principal T explained, district teaching-research officers frequently visit schools 
and classrooms, and directly supervise and evaluate teachers’ teaching activities; 
the teaching methods and models recognised and praised by them are promoted 
across schools. According to Principal U and Principal O, teaching-research groups 
in each school usually meet once a week for about one to two hours to make 
collective lesson plans, share teaching experiences, discuss exam questions and 
problems encountered in teaching, and conduct research related to teaching.  
Shanghai has recently adopted various forms of assessment, such as the 
‘Growth Record Booklet’ focusing on pupils’ developmental process (Shen, 2007) 
and ‘Teaching Quality Test’ emphasising pupils’ holistic development (Tan, 2013). 
Nonetheless, according to Walker and Qian (2012) and confirmed by principals 
interviewed, the high-stake entrance examinations for senior secondary schools and 
colleges, standardised at the municipal level and consistent with national standards, 
are still the most important measurements both officially and unofficially. In 
addition, district-level and school-based tests are conducted at the end of each 
semester. According to Principal U and Principal N, DEBs often organise unified 
semester tests on one or two selected subject(s) and for one or two selected grade(s), 
in order to collect information about pupils’ attainment, which is taken as one of the 
key indicators of school performance. 
Table 7.5 summarises the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to 
the ‘curriculum, teaching and examinations’ of Shanghai public secondary schools. 
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Table 7.5. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘curriculum, 
teaching and examinations’ of Shanghai public secondary schools 
Area of school 
management 
Description Degree 
Textbooks Determined by the SMEC 0 
Subjects Compulsory subjects are determined by the SMEC 0.5 
Content of 
subjects and 
curriculum 
delivery 
Prescribed by the SMEC; influenced by the 
‘teaching-research’ system 
2 
School-based 
curriculum 
development 
Guided by the DEBs; depending on pupils’ interests or 
schools’ specialists, or complementary to national 
curriculum 
2.5 
Curriculum 
time allocation 
The total number of periods for each subject every 
academic year is stipulated by the SMEC 
2 
School 
calendar  
School terms and days are determined by the SMEC; the 
specific arrangement is made by schools 
2 
Entrance 
exams 
Standardised and organised at the municipal level 0 
 
As stipulated by the Shanghai Municipal Government (1994), syllabuses and 
compulsory subjects adopted by people-run schools should be the same as public 
schools’. This is confirmed by E, the Head of the Teaching Department of a 
bureau-sponsored people-run school whose pupils are expected to sit for public 
entrance examinations. According to E, the textbooks used in her school are 
provided by the SMEC; and the curricula are designed, delivered and evaluated in 
tandem with the SMEC curriculum standards and examination syllabuses. As Chan 
and Wang (2009) point out, DEBs have also been known to intervene in matters of 
curriculum and teaching in people-run schools. 
 
Teachers 
 
Based on the Teacher Law and the Teacher Qualification Ordinance issued in 
1993, Shanghai has developed its own Teacher Qualification System in 2001 to 
select competent degree holders (not necessarily trained) to enter the teaching 
profession (Shen, 2007). Within this system, as Principal I and Principal U 
explained, interviews and examinations for the teaching certificate are designed by 
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the CMOE and carried out by the SMEC and DEBs (SMEC, 2013). District human 
resource bureaus and DEBs approve the plan for budgeted teaching posts of every 
school. People who possess the teaching certificate are qualified to apply for the 
posts. Principal O pointed out that principals’ power of teacher appointment has 
been reduced since 2006, as “schools have been put under the category of public 
institution, which means that the Government stipulates the size of budgeted posts 
and allocates salary grant according to that… principals cannot decide how many 
teachers they would like to have”. 
As explained by Principal I, Principal U and Principal D, schools are 
responsible for checking applicants’ qualifications and organising trial teaching 
sessions; then, the Educational Human Resource Exchange and Service Centre in 
every district interview and examine school-selected candidates; and, on this basis, 
DEBs authorise schools to hire those they deem qualified. Principal O and Principal 
U added that, talented teachers without a teaching certificate may be given one-year 
probation” in public schools and “they can be transferred to more permanent terms 
only if they obtain a teaching certificate within that year. According to Zhao (2009), 
by 1996, approximately 95% of all Shanghai public school teachers have gained 
teaching certificates. Teachers are not civil servants, but their personnel profiles are 
kept and managed by district human resource bureaus (Wang, 2006). Principal U 
explained that, for the first three years, the contract needs to be renewed by schools 
every year; in the fourth year, a permanent contract is guaranteed as stipulated by 
the 1995 Labour Law. Since then, dismissal is not only a decision made by schools. 
Scholar V stressed that “all the changes in terms of manpower have to be approved 
by the education bureau”. 
With regard to continuing professional development, as the CMOE (1999) 
stipulated, teachers in their probation year should have no less than 120 hours 
training; junior teachers need to complete minimum 240 hours spread over five 
years; and for senior teachers the requirement is 540 hours. This would affect 
“teachers’ continual employment, increase in salary and promotion prospect” (Tan, 
2013, p. 136). As required by the SMEC, schools are responsible for making 
continuing professional development plans for individual teachers and at least half 
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of the training hours should be provided within schools. According to Principal I 
and Principal U, teachers have since 2012 spent increasing time in teacher 
development colleges (jiaoshi jinxiu xuexiao) which are established and run by 
DEBs. Nevertheless, Scholar V pointed out that what can be accounted for as 
continuing professional development is not specified. This, as Tan (2013) argues, 
provides the flexibility for teachers in choosing training time, form and content. 
Teacher appraisal is primarily school-based; according to guidelines provided 
by DEBs, schools may design their own appraisal criteria and instruments (Zhang, 
2008). Principal N illustrated that, by referring to self-appraisal, peer appraisal and 
appraisal by school leaders, every teacher is given a performance grade. According 
to Principal U and Scholar Y, the external appraisal is largely determined by 
teaching-research officers from the SMEC and DEBs
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, and linked with promotion 
within a hierarchical system of professional titles for teachers, namely, junior-grade 
(Level 3 and Level 2), intermediate-grade (Level 1) and senior-grade. In addition, 
there are two honorary professional titles given to extraordinary teachers: backbone 
(gugan) teachers and special-grade (teji) teachers. The ratio of professional titles is 
strictly set by the SMEC. Almost all principals interviewed found this problematic. 
For example, Principal I complained that “in our school, there are so many 
excellent teachers who cannot be promoted due to the limited quota”. 
The implementation of the ‘merit pay’ (jixiao gongzi) system since 2009 in 
China has significantly affected the salaries of public primary and junior secondary 
teachers. In Shanghai, a teacher’s pay is composed of 70% basic pay and 30% merit 
pay (comprising 70% basic merit pay and 30% reward merit pay). The basic pay 
and basic merit pay are standardised across all schools and determined at the 
municipal level, according to teacher’s professional titles, responsibilities and 
workloads; and the reward merit pay is decided by schools depending on teacher 
appraisal (SMEC, 2009). In other words, as almost all principals interviewed 
complained, under the new system, they only have the power to determine 30% of 
the bonus which amounts to about 9% of total pay. Besides, this reform did not 
                                                             
43 As Scholar Y explained, teaching-research officers can award excellent teachers with honorary titles and 
select teachers for competitions of demonstration lessons and important professional training; all these are 
crucial for promotion. 
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include senior secondary teachers. Therefore, senior secondary teachers may be 
paid less than their junior secondary colleagues. Principals can do little with that, 
even the income gap “disturbed the harmonious atmosphere” in their schools 
(Walker & Qian, 2012). 
Table 7.6 summarise the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to 
the ‘teacher’ of Shanghai public secondary schools. 
 
Table 7.6. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘teacher’ of 
Shanghai public secondary schools 
Area of school 
management 
Description Degree 
Qualification 
and training 
Teaching certificate is compulsory, but training before 
entering teaching profession is not necessary 
2 
Appointment 
and dismissal  
Selected by schools and district authorities, DEBs 
authorise schools to sign contract with those they deem 
qualified 
2.5 
Continuing 
professional 
development  
The minimum hours are required by the CMOE; training 
programmes are school-based and DEB-organised, but 
form and content are not stipulated 
2 
Appraisal  Primarily school-based; external appraisal by 
teaching-research officers from the SMEC and DEBs 
2 
Promotion Determined by schools but strictly follow the stipulated 
ratio 
1 
Pay (salary 
and bonuses) 
Mainly following salary scale; principals can determine 
9% of the total salary 
1 
Legal status Not civil servants, but their profiles are kept and 
managed by district authorities 
2 
 
Bureau-funded people-run schools enjoy more freedom in the appointment and 
dismissal of teachers, but the requirement of teaching certificate is the same as 
public schools (SMEC, 2011). Both Chan and Wang (2009) and Ding (2012) point 
out that DEBs put a large proportion of their teachers on the government payroll. 
This, on the one hand, attracts more people to work in those schools; on the other 
hand, enables DEBs to have a vital say in teacher management. All principals in 
bureau-funded people-run schools are assigned by DEBs. In fact, the majority of 
them are retired principals from the same districts, who are familiar with, and opt to 
obey, stipulations and regulations. Thus, as Ding (2012) argues, they are seen by 
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DEBs as “people on our own side” (p. 64). 
 
Accountability 
 
The main tasks of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government Education 
Inspection Office include: (1) supervising the municipal and district governments 
and relevant bureaus over their educational functions; (2) formulating the municipal 
inspection standard; and (3) supervising public-funded educational institutions 
according to this standard. Under the guidance of the municipal inspection office, 
district education inspection offices are responsible for designing and implementing 
specific inspection plans (SMEC, 2005). According to Scholar Y, the education 
inspection system is not independent; all levels of education inspection offices are 
placed within corresponding levels of governments. As Principal U explained, the 
head of the district education inspection office is usually the vice district-head who 
is responsible for education. This intertwined structure further ensures the 
governments’ control over education practices. 
Shanghai developed its own School Developmental and Inspecting Appraisal 
(jiaoyu fazhanxing dudao pingjia) framework in 1999, which aimed to facilitate the 
development and comprehensive implementation of “quality-oriented education” 
through “self-restraint, self-perfection, self-development, and other internal 
mechanisms” (SMEC, 2003). More specifically, the basic targets of school 
appraisal include school conditions, school development and school quality. 
Additionally, there are nine development domains, namely, school development 
target, school curriculum construction, teaching reform and student learning, 
school’s moral education, school’s cultural construction, educational subject 
research, teaching force construction, Student development and joint construction 
by school and community (SMEC, 2005). 
As described by Principal U and Principal I, the process of appraisal comprises 
three phrases. Firstly, according to the appraisal, schools are required to conduct 
self-evaluation in terms of their three-year self-development plans and annual 
implementation plans; the self-evaluation reports are supposed to be released online. 
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Secondly, every two or three years, external inspector teams are dispatched by 
DEBs to schools (usually three days for each) to scrutinise the implementation of 
school development plans by checking self-evaluation documents, observing 
lessons, meeting teachers and conducting surveys with staff and pupils. Thirdly, 
school inspection reports are submitted to the inspection office and the feedback on 
school development is sent back to individual schools, but not made open to the 
public. Schools need to sort out the problems identified within a specified time. 
The SMEC (2003) stated that this appraisal framework would enable 
principals to “autonomously manage the school”. However, Tan (2013) argues that 
it is still “used as a tool to ensure quality control and policy alignment”, as 
prescribed targets and criteria demonstrate the government’s expectations and 
specifically determine school management in the area of curriculum, pupil 
admission, finance and personnel (p. 105). 
In addition, as Scholar V and Scholar Y mentioned, a variety of ‘model school’ 
competitions are organised by the SMEC and DEBs, such as ‘Ruling by Law Model 
Schools’ and ‘Construction of Cultural Environment Model Schools’. As principals 
interviewed in this study admitted, among all these honorary titles, the most 
attractive and important one is the ‘Experimental and Model Senior Secondary 
School’. As mentioned earlier, most of them are former key schools with high 
academic performance. The SMEC has attempted to rectify the examination system, 
which overemphasises exam results through awarding ‘model schools’ for their 
various merits. However, as Tan (2013) observes, the reality is that schools are 
expected to continue to ensure good academic outcomes while working hard to 
meet additional criteria.  
There is no official ranking of schools in Shanghai. According to Principal U’s 
experience, “the result is not ranked publicly… they [DEBs] offer you [principals] 
a piece of paper, which does not show you the rank, but only some data, and then 
you can see where you are.” Principal N mentioned that DEBs “discuss all schools’ 
problems reflected through examination at the district teaching conference”. The 
SMEC merely provides the average score of each subject across the municipality 
for schools’ information; but this is not available to the public (Zhang, 2008). When 
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I talked to academics, principals, teachers, parents and pupils during the data 
collection, there seems exist an unofficial but well-acknowledged league table of 
pupils’ attainment. Tan (2013) shares a similar experience with me. She notes that 
various websites rank schools and list the ‘key/exemplar’ schools at the municipal 
and district levels. Parents are keen to send their kids to the better public schools or 
well-established people-run schools in their catchment areas. 
Table 7.7 summarises the nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to 
the ‘accountability’ of Shanghai public secondary schools. 
 
Table 7.7. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘accountability’ 
of Shanghai public secondary schools 
Area Descriptions Degree 
Goals and standards Set in individual schools’ development plans 
and in accordance with the School 
Developmental and Inspecting Appraisal 
1 
Evaluation and inspection Annual self-evaluation and external 
inspection by the official inspectors every two 
or three years 
1 
Annual report Scrutinised by the official inspectors 1 
Availability of information Not available to the public 0 
 
School Developmental and Inspecting Appraisal is not applied to people-run 
schools. According to the 2002 People-run Education Law, people-run schools are 
subject to official inspections conducted by education, labour and social security 
administrative authorities in order to facilitate their development and guarantee the 
quality of their education service. Nevertheless, the timing, frequency and form of 
inspection are not clearly specified and largely dependent on higher authorities’ 
decisions. Inspection reports are filed by DEBs and should be made accessible to 
the public. 
 
Pupil admission and external relations 
 
The ‘neighbourhood attendance’ policy has since 1994 been applicable to all 
public junior secondary schools. The catchment area for every school is determined 
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by DEBs. Only schools specialised in sports or arts, which are recoganised by 
DEBs, can recruit up to 5% specialist pupils (SMEC, 2013b). As Principal I 
mentioned, “the number of pupils in each class is regulated as 35-40”. The 
enrolment plan is formulated by individual schools with the DEB approval (SMEC, 
2013b).According to Principal O, “if the number of pupils qualified for admission 
exceeds what we can afford, then we select them at random”. 
As Principal D mentioned, schools are encouraged to establish partnerships 
with other schools and business domestically and overseas receiving approval from 
DEBs. Parents who would like to get involved in school activities may join the 
parent committee. The establishment of parent committee is compulsory for all 
schools, although its power/duties/role is not officially specified. As Principal N 
explained, the goal of parent committees in his school is to strengthen the 
school-family relationship and develop “mutual understanding through inviting 
parents to visit schools, get to know how things work within schools and provide 
some suggestions”; he further clarified, however, this is “not decision-making”, but 
rather “participation”. 
In theory, principals are free to talk to the media and researchers. However, the 
principal usually doubles as the vice school-Party secretary carrying political 
responsibilities. They are fully aware of what they should say and should not say 
during interviews. I experienced this during my data collection, which I have 
elaborated in the methodology chapter. Table 7.8 summarises the nature and degree 
of school autonomy with regard to the ‘pupil admission and external relations’ of 
Shanghai public secondary schools. 
 
Table 7.8. Nature and degree of school autonomy with regard to the ‘pupil 
admission and external relations’ of Shanghai public secondary schools 
Area Descriptions Degree 
Pupil admission ‘Neighbourhood attendance’ policy; 
only 5% places for specialist pupils in 
specialist schools 
2 
Relationship with other schools 
and business 
Encouraged, but need to be approved by 
DEBs 
4 
Level of parents’ involvement Invited to take part in school activities 2 
Relationship with mass media Determined by principals but they are 4 
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(or interview requests in 
general) 
cautious about sensitive issues 
 
The CMOE has since 2004 granted people-run schools the autonomy to have 
their own discretion on pupil admission. Nonetheless, as Ding (2012) argues, the 
SMEC and DEBs still keep tight control over the division of catchment areas, 
admission requirements, methods of selection and timetable, and fees charging. For 
example, as the Xinhua News (n.d., 2014, May 10) reported, the SMEC stipulated 
that pupils can only apply for two people-run schools and sets the dates for online 
applications and admission interviews for all people-run schools. 
 
This section has developed a model of the nature and degree of school 
autonomy in Shanghai secondary schools, which is characterised by five features 
that are discussed in the next section. 
 
7.5. Features of school autonomy 
 
Centralisation and unification, based on the Soviet model, were applied to all 
sectors including education in Shanghai during the 1950s and 1960s. After the 
Cultural Revolution, Shanghai has reclaimed its pioneering role in the realm of 
education. Since the mid-1980s, the Shanghai education system as a whole has been 
given increasing autonomy by the centre. Devolved fiscal responsibility has been 
further shifted to districts and a range of non-governmental agencies and 
individuals have become involved in education provision. Since 2010 there seems 
to have emerged a hybrid of decentralisation and recentralisation, especially in 
regard to resources allocation. The current model of school autonomy in the main 
types of secondary schools also shows that the centralised control has not been 
reduced. Based on the understanding of the historical review and current model, 
five features of school autonomy in Shanghai are identified and elaborated below. 
Firstly, the tension between decentralisation and centralisation has existed 
among all levels of authorities, namely, the centre, municipality, district and school. 
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In other words, autonomy has been given to lower levels of authority, while the 
control of higher levels has been maintained. For example, since the 
decentralisation reform starting from the mid-1980s, the Central Government has 
allowed Shanghai to design its own curriculum with minimal consultation. 
However, this has been on the premise of the implementation of the national 
curriculum or of the compliance with national standards and guidelines in the case 
of local and school-based curriculum. When there are inappropriate deviations (e.g. 
a resulting political embarrassment as Vickers and Yang (2013) demonstrate in 
their study), the Central Government would intervene. In addition, although schools 
are empowered to identify qualified teacher candidates, these candidates have to be 
interviewed and examined by district authorities, and the final say is strictly held by 
DEBs. Thus, as Wong (2006) argues, “there is still little evidence that an expansion 
of the decision-making power of schools will result from delegating power from the 
top’’ (p. 44). 
Secondly, the transfer of autonomy has been primarily from the Central 
Government to the local (municipal and district) governments; limited autonomy 
has virtually reached the school level. For example, the SMEC, replacing the 
CMOE, has enjoyed the power to design and organise the entrance examinations 
for senior secondary schools and colleges, and determine textbooks and the 
enriched and inquiry-based courses. In other words, curriculum and examinations in 
Shanghai are still highly centralised. DEBs have been authorised by the SMEC to 
collaborate with other relevant district bureaus to, for example, determine school 
funding (with finance bureaus), manage teachers’ profiles (with human resource 
bureaus), appoint school leaders (with organisation bureaus), and make annual 
plans for budgeted teaching posts (with human resource and finance bureaus). 
Scholar Y used a metaphor to describe the relationship between schools and higher 
authorities – “a school is like a needle and education departments and other relevant 
authorities at higher levels are thousands of threads; as long as one of the threads is 
lifted, the needle is moving”. 
Thirdly, decentralisation reforms initiated by the Central Government have 
been mainly used as strategies to reduce the fiscal burden for education provision, 
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which was stated clearly in the key official documents (e.g. the ‘1985 Decision’ and 
the ‘1993 Programme’). However, centralisation has been revisited when 
inequalities and regional disparities have arisen. In Shanghai, the uneven economic 
development among districts has led to inequality in terms of education investment. 
It is in this context that the Shanghai 2010 Outline has proposed recentralising and 
standardising education expenditure, resource allocation and teacher appointment. 
The same pattern is evident in China in general (Hawkins, 2006). Karlsen (2000) 
rejects the claim that “the model of decentralisation and centralisation [is] as waves 
following and replacing each other” by referring to Norway and British Columbia 
(p. 534), however this seems not inaccurate in the case of China. 
Fourthly, the power of sponsoring and governing the vast majority of 
people-run schools has been highly concentrated in the hands of DEBs, which is not 
essentially different from their public counterparts. According to the 2002 
People-run Education Law, all people-run schools are given a high level of 
autonomy in curriculum, appointment and dismissal of teachers, school fees and 
expenditure, power and functions of school decision-making bodies, and pupil 
admission. However, only independent people-run schools, accounting for 10% of 
all people-run schools, are arguably ‘private’ and obtain great autonomy in these 
management areas. The remaining 90% of people-run schools still keep a close 
relationship with DEBs financially and managerially. These bureau-sponsored 
people-run schools are mainly distinguished from public schools in their capacity to 
select pupils and charge them higher tuition fees, although autonomy in these areas 
is enjoyed under the frameworks and guidelines set by the SMEC and DEBs. 
Therefore, the relationship between people-run schools and the government is 
described by Chan and Wong (2009) as ‘controlled decentralisation’. 
Lastly, the governing relationship between schools and higher authorities has 
been characterised by a Confucian authority culture strongly intertwined with 
political control. According to Law (2009), the obedience to and respect of people 
in authority originating from a Confucian heritage culture has extended into the 
contemporary Chinese culture of school management. A typical interaction between 
principals and government officials can be described as: the former grasp every 
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opportunity to report schools’ achievement, and bring needs and problems to the 
latter in order to gain understanding, support and approval. Moreover, as 
demonstrated earlier, the central authority maintained in all areas of school 
management has been partly for political reasons (Ngok & Chan, 2003). Political 
intention has been embodied in the central frameworks and policies of schooling 
and curriculum, and also reflected in the structure of the education system. These 
characteristics have facilitated the inter-penetration of administration and 
political-work and ensured that the will of the CCP-led Government would be 
faithfully implemented at the local level. 
 
7.6. Conclusion 
 
The development of the Chinese education system has paralleled economic 
and political reforms, shifting from the highly centralised and standardised Soviet 
model to the decentralised and diversified socialist-market model since the mid- 
1980s. The fiscal burden of the massive national system has been the main driven 
force. In consequence, more autonomy with regard to education governance, 
finance, curriculum and examination has been devolved to the municipal level and 
further to the district level in Shanghai, whereas schools have been merely given 
limited autonomy. However, when there have emerged district disparities in recent 
years, Shanghai has re-adopted the strategy of recentralisation and standardisation 
of resource allocation (including funding and personnel). In spite of all these 
changes, the central control has remained by providing a variety of national 
guidelines, frameworks and standards, and through a dual Party-government system 
which has been reinforced by the Confucian authority culture. Additionally, the 
emphasis on academic performance has resulted in exam-oriented education system, 
which has directed day-to-day teaching and learning in Shanghai to follow 
prescribed curriculum and examination syllabuses. Therefore, individual schools in 
reality have obtained very limited de facto autonomy. 
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In the next chapter, the English representation of school autonomy in East 
Asia is compared to the ‘reality’ of that perceived within domestic contexts. The 
models of school autonomy in three East Asian societies studied are also compared 
and discussed. 
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Chapter 8. Comparison and discussion: the representation, ‘reality’ 
and policy referencing 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
In the last five chapters, I have:  
(1) examined how school autonomy in East Asia has been represented by 
policy-makers in England since 2010, which has addressed the first 
research question; and 
(2) investigated and developed models describing the nature and degree of 
school autonomy in three high-performing East Asian societies, namely, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai, which has provided the answer to 
the second research question. 
This chapter focuses on the third research question. In doing so, three 
comparisons are conducted: 
(1) the English representation of school autonomy in East Asia and the ‘reality’ 
as perceived domestically; 
(2) the policies and practices pertaining to school autonomy amongst the three 
East Asian societies studied; and  
(3) the reforms initiated to increase school autonomy in these four societies. 
Drawing on the literature review chapter, this chapter then extracts the main 
arguments of this study from these comparisons. It discusses the nature of EPB as a 
specific form of ‘externalisation’, whether transnational EPB results in a global 
convergence of national education systems and the distinction of policy borrowing 
and referencing. In addition, this chapter seeks to further the understanding of the 
‘East-to-West’ borrowing, which attempts to flag up the possibilities for 
contemplating how postcolonial theoretical resources might be further developed to 
inform research on EPB. Lastly, the conclusion to this chapter and this study 
overall is made. 
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8.2. School autonomy in different management areas 
 
The promotion of Academies and Free Schools in England has been primarily 
justified on the assertion that high levels of school autonomy have contributed to 
the high performance of East Asian education systems. With reference to various 
areas of school management, this section firstly examines whether school autonomy 
in East Asia projected by policy-makers accords with that perceived domestically. 
Secondly, it investigates the similarities and differences of school autonomy 
amongst the three East Asian societies studied. 
 
Comparison between England and East Asia 
 
In Chapter Four, I have identified six areas of school management to which the 
UK Government has made changes so as to grant greater school autonomy, namely, 
governance and management, curriculum and school calendar, and teachers’ 
qualifications and salaries. Table 8.1 summarises autonomy in the main types of 
secondary schools in England and East Asia in these six areas. From it, it can be 
seen that there is little congruence between the English representation and the 
‘reality’ with regard to the nature and degree of school autonomy. In other words, 
the policy initiatives promoted in England do not replicate their East Asian models. 
More specifically, in England, there are no restrictions on who can apply to 
establish public-funded schools. Individuals (e.g. teachers and parents), education 
institutions (e.g. universities and independent schools), organisations (e.g. charities, 
community and faith groups) and businesses are all encouraged to open and run 
Academies and Free Schools. In Hong Kong, SSBs (e.g. faith groups, alumni 
associations and organisations) are permitted to establish aided and DSS schools by 
using public funding, but no school has been set up by teachers and parents. In 
Singapore and Shanghai, governments (national/municipal/district) are the sole 
providers of public education. 
Additionally, both Academies and Free Schools in England are not under the 
control of local authorities, while all public schools and 90% people-run schools in 
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Shanghai are directly or indirectly sponsored and governed by DEBs. As a 
city-state, Singapore also has a comparable intermediate level of governance and 
administration – cluster superintendents. 
With regard to curriculum, Academies and Free Schools in England are free to 
opt out of the National Curriculum and pursue their own missions and ‘ethos’. 
Whilst the system of school inspection and public examination tends to encourage 
convergence, schools can still promote their own belief systems (e.g. religious 
beliefs), choose textbooks and select which examination boards they use. In 
contrast, the vast majority of schools in all three East Asian societies are required to 
adopt the national/central curriculum. Even those with greater autonomy in 
designing curriculum, such as DSS schools in Hong Kong and autonomous schools 
in Singapore, have limited de facto deviations. The powerful role of the national/ 
central curriculum in East Asia is reinforced by the states’ control over the 
textbooks used, teacher education and the existence of a single national/central 
examination body. In essence, the national/central examination, widely seen as a 
key path towards social mobility, is based wholly on the national/central curriculum 
which is codified in the approved textbooks. For a school to stray away from that 
curriculum would be akin to institutional suicide. 
Head teachers in England are given the power to set school terms and hours. 
The EDB in Hong Kong provides general guidelines as to the minimum school 
days per academic year and requires schools to submit the list of holidays for 
approval. In theory, schools in Singapore and Shanghai are encouraged to flexibly 
design their own calendars within fixed school terms. However, in reality, there is 
limited space left for them to do so, as the SMOE and SMEC prescribe curriculum 
time which accounts for the major proportion of school hours. 
For English teachers, the total amount of their salaries can be set by head 
teachers, whereas there are mandated salary scales stipulated by education 
departments in the three East Asian societies. What can be decided by schools are 
the annual performance bonus in Singapore and the reward merit pay in Shanghai 
which represent 9% of total salary. Only a small number of schools such as 
independent schools in Singapore and DSS schools in Hong Kong are free to  
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Table 8.1. Autonomy in the main types of secondary schools in England and East Asia 
Autonomy in the main types of secondary schools England 
(Academies and  
Free Schools) 
East Asia 
Hong Kong 
(Aided schools) 
Singapore 
(Government schools) 
Shanghai 
(Government schools) 
Areas of 
school 
autonomy  
Governance 
and 
management 
Who can set up public- 
funded schools?  
No restrictions Government and SSBs Government Government 
Who runs and manages 
public-funded schools? 
Free from the control of 
local education 
authorities 
EDB and SSBs SMOE and cluster 
superintendents 
CMOE, SMEC and 
DEBs  
Curriculum 
and school 
calendar 
Are schools required to 
follow the 
national/mainstream 
curriculum? 
No  Yes Yes, except for three 
independent schools which 
can provide alternative 
certificates 
Yes, all public schools, 
even most people-run 
schools 
Can schools set school 
terms and hours? 
Yes No, the EDB stipulates 
less than 190 days and 
90-93 holidays a year 
No, terms and curriculum 
time are stipulated by the 
SMOE 
No, terms and hours are 
strictly stipulated by the 
SMEC 
Teachers Can schools hire 
untrained/unqualified 
teachers? 
Yes A teaching certificate is a 
requirement for 
permanent appointments 
Teachers are centrally 
selected, trained, and 
appointed by the SMOE 
A teaching certificate is 
required by law 
Can schools set 
teachers’ gross salaries 
Yes No, salary scales and 
allowances regulated in 
the Code of Aid 
Yes, but only annual 
performance bonus 
Yes, but only the reward 
merit pay  
Greater autonomy is given to whom? 
(%) of all public secondary schools 
Academies and Free 
Schools (57%). All 
schools are encouraged to 
convert to Academy 
status and 500 new Free 
Schools launched 
DSS schools (13%), 
many elite aided schools 
joined the DSS from 
2000 which enables them 
to charge fees and select 
pupils 
Autonomous schools and 
independent schools 
(21%), mainly high 
performing schools which 
recruit the most able pupils 
Local authorities and 
independent people-run 
schools (1%), rather 
than the vast majority of 
schools 
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determine the entire salary within their own budgets. In particular, the merit pay 
system in Shanghai has been specifically cited to legitimate English head teachers’ 
power to reward the best (Gove, 2013). However, what is not made explicit is that 
only 9% of Shanghai teachers’ pay, the merit-based component, is determined by 
principals according to their performance. 
A teaching certificate is not compulsory in England to enter the teaching 
profession. As The Guardian (Adams, 2014, December 29) reported, the number of 
unqualified/untrained teachers in Academies and Free Schools rose by 2,600 in 2012 
to nearly 8,000 in November 2013, meaning by then teachers without qualified 
teaching status represented nearly 6% of the 141,000 full-time teaching staff. There 
are also a small number of unqualified/untrained teachers in East Asia. However, this 
group of teachers are restricted to teaching some non-examination subjects in Hong 
Kong, temporarily employed to fill gaps in Singapore and required to obtain a 
teaching certificate within their one-year probation period in Shanghai. Without 
exception, a teaching certificate is required for those who plan to stay in the 
profession in all three education systems. Furthermore, in Hong Kong, the EDB has 
since 2005 stipulated that all new teachers should be graduates and professionally 
trained; in total, 96.4% of secondary school teachers are trained university graduates 
(EDB, 2015j). In Shanghai, schools can only hire those who have teaching certificate 
and are deemed qualified by DEBs. Teachers in Singapore are selected and employed 
by the SMOE and then trained at the National Institute of Education – the sole 
teacher education institution which works closely with the SMOE. 
 
Comparison amongst three East Asian education systems 
 
The comparison above has also demonstrated the similarities and differences 
amongst the three East Asian education systems in those six areas. Drawing on the 
models developed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, I compare and contrast them in 
other areas. The Figures below respectively show the variations in terms of 
organisation and governance (Figure 8.1), finance (Figure 8.2), curriculum, teaching 
and examination (Figure 8.3), teachers (Figure 8.4), accountability (Figure 8.5) and 
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pupil admission and external relations (Figure 8.6). From them, it can be seen that 
the three systems share some common features. 
 
 
Figure 8.1. Degree of school autonomy in East Asia with regard to ‘governance and 
organisation’ 
 
 
Figure 8.2. Degree of school autonomy in East Asia with regard to ‘finance’ 
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Figure 8.3. Degree of school autonomy in East Asia with regard to ‘curriculum, 
teaching and examination’ 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4. Degree of school autonomy in East Asia with regard to ‘teachers’
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Figure 8.5. Degree of school autonomy in East Asia with regard to ‘accountability’ 
 
 
Figure 8.6. Degree of school autonomy in East Asia with regard to ‘pupil admission 
and external relations’ 
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education departments. More specifically, all aided schools in Hong Kong are 
required to establish IMCs which undertake daily operations. Membership of 
clusters in Singapore is compulsory for all government and aided schools 
(including autonomous schools) and, as the SMOE stipulates, different types of 
schools should accordingly establish different kinds of school management bodies. 
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In Shanghai, all public schools are managed under the principal responsibility 
system. 
Although official school ranking systems (and their publication) do not exist 
or have been abandoned in the three systems, the media is still enthusiastic about 
producing unofficial rankings acknowledged and valued by educators, parents and 
the general public, which put schools under great pressure and drive them to 
concentrate on academic performance. Therefore, in theory teachers are encouraged 
to develop diverse teaching methods in favour of critical and creative thinking; 
however, in practice, the most effective methods which are perceived to help pupils 
obtain good exam results dominate day-to-day teaching. 
With regard to continuing professional development, all these systems 
stipulate minimum hours, provide lists of recognised courses and relate these to 
promotion prospects. In addition, what can be counted as continuing professional 
development is not specified, which generates flexibility and freedom for schools 
and teachers to choose the form and content of continuing professional 
development programmes. Teacher appraisal is centrally designed and initiated, and 
carried out at the school level. Promotion is determined by schools but conforms to 
strictly-stipulated ratios of professional titles, such as CMs and GMs in Hong Kong 
and junior-, intermediate- and senior- grade in Shanghai. 
Schools in these systems are required to prepare development plans and 
conduct self-evaluations which are validated by external review teams sent by their 
education departments. Development plans are drawn up in compliance with 
national/overall goals; and self-evaluation and external reviews are based on a set 
of prescriptive criteria / standards / performance indicators. Governments in all 
these societies are the providers of land, buildings and facilities, while individual 
schools are responsible for their daily maintenance. Schools are encouraged to build 
relationships or partnerships with other schools and businesses under central 
guidelines. 
In Hong Kong, parents enjoy comparatively more power than their 
counterparts in the other two societies in terms of the levels of involvement in 
school management. They can be nominated as office-bearers of Parent-Teacher 
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Associations and/or be elected as members of IMCs to participate in decision- 
making with other members as stipulated in the Education Ordinance. In contrast, 
parents in Singapore and Shanghai are welcome to engage in school events and 
activities, but not managing schools. 
In all three societies, the government constitutes the major source of school 
funding, even for schools with independent or private status, such as DSS schools 
in Hong Kong, independent schools in Singapore and the majority of people-run 
schools in Shanghai. In addition to public funding, aided schools in Hong Kong are 
able to receive extra grants from SSBs, obtain donations with the approval of IMCs 
and charge a certain amount of fees as stipulated in the COA. Although donations 
are permitted in the other two societies, they are centrally received and managed by 
the SMOE-dominated Education Fund in Singapore and the SMEC and DEBs in 
Shanghai. 
With regard to expenditure management, the domains (the areas in which 
schools can spend money) and quota (how much money schools can spend in each 
area) are specified by the education departments in all three systems. Consequently, 
schools are only able to decide how to use funding according to central stipulations. 
Notwithstanding these commonalities, in Shanghai, the approval from DEBs is 
required when schools’ expenditure exceeds a certain amount; in Singapore, 
government and aided schools’ bills are paid directly by the SMOE. Schools are all 
required to prepare annual financial reports for official audit; however, only those 
in Hong Kong and Singapore have to make their reports available to the public. 
As described above, the three societies adopt similar accountability 
frameworks, but the public availability of the information varies. Schools in Hong 
Kong are required to upload development plans and self-evaluation reports to their 
websites; external review reports are only reported to schools’ stakeholders (i.e. 
teachers, parents, pupils and school managers). In contrast, these reports in 
Shanghai and Singapore are kept confidential. 
Within each system, different types of schools are selectively granted 
autonomy to different extents; but the criteria and process of selection vary. In 
Singapore, the SMOE formulates the criteria of independent schools and invites 
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existing high-performing schools to submit their applications for conversion. It also 
runs a vetting body to scrutinise applications against the criteria. At first, 
autonomous status was only given by the SMOE to schools with academic merit 
and schools had no say on whether they would like to turn into autonomous schools 
or not (Chan and Tan, 2008). This has been changed since 2000. Applications for 
autonomous status can now be initiated by schools and schools may reject 
conversion if it is recommended by the SMOE. But the key criterion for becoming 
an autonomous school has remained academic success. In Hong Kong, the DSS is 
implemented on a voluntary basis; the EDB holds the power of making criteria and 
granting approval. This is similar to public schools which would like to convert to 
people-run schools in Shanghai. 
 
Based on these comparisons, ironically, schools in England enjoy higher levels 
of autonomy than their counterparts in the three East Asian societies which have 
been used as sources of evidence to increase school autonomy in England. 
Moreover, drawing on the distinction between ‘operational power’ and ‘policy and 
operational power’ in the conceptual framework of this study, whilst some 
‘operational power’ is given to East Asian schools, English schools are granted 
‘policy and operational power’. The English representation seems to have been 
based on a set of selected, ambiguous, or even sometimes inaccurate portrayals of 
school autonomy in East Asia, which largely distorts its ‘reality’. Within East Asia, 
education systems are characterised by the varied nature and degrees of school 
autonomy in different areas of school management. Therefore, it is problematic to 
essentialise and homogenise them as a ‘reference group’. 
 
8.3. Reforms of school autonomy  
 
While reforms designed to increase school autonomy have been introduced in 
East Asia, their rationale, scope, form and nature differ considerably from those 
promoted in England. 
Firstly and most significantly, in England, the models of schools provided with 
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high levels of autonomy, notably Academies and Free Schools, are neither given 
the formal power to select pupils on academic merit nor to charge parents extra fees, 
and are targeted at all schools and pupils. Those without Academy status are 
encouraged to convert. This was made explicit in the 2010 SWP – “it is our 
ambition… to help every school which wishes to enjoy greater freedom to achieve 
Academy status” (DfE, 2010, p. 12). Many academics (e.g. Whitty, Power & 
Halpin, 1998; Ball, 2007; Glatter, 2012) attribute this ‘whole system’ reform 
approach to a predominant tradition of the English education system relying on 
various voluntary forces since the 19
th
 Century and a consistent commitment to the 
‘free/quasi market’ underpinned by neo-liberalism and neo-conservativism over the 
past three decades. As Hatcher (2010) argues, the expansion of Academies and Free 
Schools has also been justified by the rhetoric of achieving social inclusion through 
‘equality of opportunity’ and raising standards of attainment in all schools, although 
he argues it has in fact protected middle class advantage. 
In contrast, greater autonomy in Singapore and Hong Kong has mainly been 
transferred by their governments to a small and selected number of schools. In 
Hong Kong, although the DSS was not originally designed for elite schools, the 
EDB revised the scheme in 2000 to allow DSS schools to select pupils and charge 
fees, which has attracted prestigious Band One aided schools to convert to DSS 
status. Providing these schools with admission and finance privileges has 
introduced a degree of elitism into the education system; and this shift has aligned it 
more closely with a political and economic system which has, throughout colonial 
times and currently, been dominated by an elite comprising the government and 
business leaders (Goodstadt, 2014). Hong Kong’s Chief Executive revealed his own 
elitist views recently when he rejected demands that his post be elected through 
more ‘open voting’. He explained that such an arrangement would mean “you 
would be talking to half of the people in Hong Kong who earn less than $1,800 a 
month. Then you would end up with that kind of politics and policies”. As 
Krugman (2014, October 23) opines, his concern was that the bottom 50% of Hong 
Kong’s population would vote for policies that might aid the poor and harm the 
rich. 
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A central message in Singapore’s national narrative is that the society 
generally and the education system specifically are underpinned by meritocracy and 
consequently people’s life chances depend solely on their ability and hard work 
(Mauzy & Milne, 2002). Following meritocratic principles, the most academically 
able pupils go to the best schools which possess the most resources and capable 
teachers. This education system is premised on the belief that the brightest rise to 
the top and eventually contribute to national development. In this context, greater 
autonomy has been selectively granted to academically ‘high-flying’ schools 
(including 28 autonomous schools and eight independent schools out of 170 
public-funded secondary schools) in order to better cater for the need of the future 
leadership of the country. Therefore, in both Hong Kong and Singapore, ‘better’ 
schools have been allowed to exercise greater autonomy. Both cases differ 
markedly from the situation in England and are contrary to the claims in the SWP 
and OECD reports that by being granted more autonomy, schools can better 
improve themselves. 
Since the late 1970s, China has struggled with the tension between the need to 
foster socio-economic development through empowering local authorities, 
particularly in terms of financial management, and the Central Government’s 
imperative to control them politically (Landry, 2008). Hawkins (2006) argues that 
the decentralisation reforms generally and decentralisation of education specifically 
have not involved the redistribution of political power, but been primarily driven by 
fiscal considerations – the Central Government could not afford to wholly fund 
such a vast education system. This has in effect resulted in more autonomy being 
transferred from the centre to the local, along with the responsibility for providing 
individual schools with funding. Therefore, decentralisation in the case of Shanghai 
has mainly taken place at the municipal level rather than the school level. 
Meanwhile, although enterprises, non-governmental organisations and individuals 
have been encouraged to set up and/or fund people-run schools, in fact, the vast 
majority of such schools are financially and managerially controlled by DEBs. 
Overall, education policies and practices in Shanghai are still highly centralised and 
standardised across all schools within the municipality in almost all the areas 
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examined earlier. 
As discussed in the literature review chapter, the reforms of school autonomy 
have often been rhetorically interwoven with the trend of marketisation. This is 
evident in both England and East Asia, but with different meanings. In England, 
increasing school autonomy has been interpreted as a specific means to develop a 
‘free market’ and redefine the role of the state in the education sector (Whitty et al., 
1998). According to Wolfe (2011), Academies and Free Schools, although publicly 
funded, are categorised as independent schools in law and do not conform to 
statutory provisions applying to state (maintained) schools. Glatter (2012) argues 
that, 
 
“…there is a distinctive element – the gradual defenestration of the 
intermediate tier of government with an apparent goal of having just two 
significant layers of governance: the individual school operating in a 
competitive local market and a distant central government and its agencies as 
the sole political authority.” (p. 570) 
 
The purpose of DSS schools in Hong Kong and people-run schools in 
Shanghai is to reinforce private education provision in order to supplement public 
provision. Nonetheless, the Hong Kong Government emphasises its beliefs in 
market values and managerialism (Chan & Tan, 2008), while non-government 
organisations and individuals in Shanghai are only encouraged to make financial 
contributions (Ding, 2012). The introduction of independent schools in Singapore 
aims to pursue excellence through promoting autonomy to the best schools. 
Policy-makers stress that this policy is an attempt to diversify the education system 
through providing some public-funded schools with greater autonomy in finance 
rather than through enlarging the private education sector that principally admits 
those who are able to pay (SMOE, 2004; Tharman, 2004). 
With regard to the future, Singapore seems to have no plans to expand 
independent and autonomous schools. The number of independent schools has been 
maintained at eight since 1992; 18 autonomous schools were set up between 1994 
and 1997, only 10 more have since been granted ‘autonomous status’ (Tan, 2007). 
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In Hong Kong, DSS schools have been subject to growing critical scrutiny as a 
result of financial malfeasance in some schools (Legislative Council, 2014). 
Meanwhile, the public increasingly concern that DSS schools’ priorities, such as 
high fees some schools charge, admission policies and more extensive financial 
resources, are likely to result in education inequality (Tse, 2002). It seems unlikely 
the scheme will be further expanded in the near future.  
Shanghai’s latest development plan proposed to re-standardise schools’ 
funding and facilities, and teachers’ allocation and salaries at the municipal level, in 
an attempt to reduce the growing disparities across districts (SMEC, 2010).The case 
in England is different. Subsequent to the SWP, the number of Academies and Free 
Schools was dramatically increased by the Coalition Government. In 2015, the 
Conservative Government passed the new Education and Adoption Bill a few 
weeks after taking office, which has provided legislative support for the expansion 
of Academies and Free Schools. 
In terms of function, the literature review has argued that complete 
decentralisation seems not to exist; East Asia is no exception. As many academics 
argue, education systems in this area have experienced ‘recentralisation’, 
‘decentralised centralisation’, or ‘centralised decentralisation’. For example, Pang 
(2008) argues that the introduction of IMCs in Hong Kong has resulted in the 
decrease of the intermediate control power of SSBs and accordingly the tightening 
of the government’s central control power. In Singapore, Ng (2008) notes that “the 
government still carries a great responsibility for achieving national outcomes” and 
what has been decentralised is actually the tactical power of management (p. 122). 
In China’s education system, as Ngok and Chan (2003) point out, the Central 
Government has never eased its rein; Shanghai as a local government unit can only 
govern and manage schools within the purview of national stipulations, guidelines 
and frameworks. 
Furthermore, all three East Asian societies are primarily composed of ethnic 
Chinese and have been profoundly influenced by Confucianism. This cultural 
heritage has deeply influenced the tradition of exam-oriented schooling. Moreover, 
as noted earlier, individual autonomy has not been as significant and applauded in 
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East Asian societies to the same degree as in the ‘West’, which frames the context 
within which school leaders and stakeholders perceive and exercise their autonomy 
when making decisions and implementing policy initiatives. By emphasising the 
importance of respect for and obedience to seniority/authority/order, this cultural 
element has shaped the internal operation of schools and the relationship between 
higher authorities and schools (Kim, 2009; Law, 2009).  
Additionally, as Kasahara (2013) notes, they all can be described as 
‘developmental states’ (although to varied extents) which have strong and 
interventionist governments with power and organisation to achieve their 
development goals. In this scenario, almost all the reforms of school autonomy in 
these societies have adopted a ‘top-down’ approach, been implemented in an 
authoritarian and hierarchical manner, and have been recentralised by 
national/central frameworks, standards and guidelines. The variation is that, in 
Singapore and Shanghai, acknowledged as ‘authoritarian states’, reforms have been 
compulsorily introduced with little resistance from the ‘bottom’. In contrast, 
education policies in the colonial Hong Kong were formulated symbolically and 
adopted voluntarily. After the handover, the non-transparent and undemocratic 
political system has increasingly disaffected the public; and education policy has 
been compulsorily implemented which has caused some tensions between major 
SSBs and the SAR Government. 
By contrast, in England, greater autonomy for all schools, associated with a 
number of reforms aimed at promoting school competition, the diversity of 
education provision and parental choice, has been and continues to be advocated by 
politicians of all persuasions (Higham & Earley, 2013). Significant policy 
initiatives include the 1988 Education Reform Act under the Conservative 
leadership; the introduction of Academies during the New Labour years; and, the 
expansion of Academies and Free Schools by the Coalition Government. Over the 
last three decades, successive Governments have consistently accumulated the 
power of the state, ‘liberated’ schools from local authorities in the name of 
removing bureaucracy and promoted new types of highly autonomous schools. 
Moreover, as Glatter (2012) observes, each of these Governments seems to have 
258 
gone further down the route of school autonomy, or more general ‘free market 
(neo-liberal) thinking’, than its predecessor (also see Hatcher, 2010). It is in the 
context of this wholesale belief in the self-evident benefits of school autonomy that 
English policy-makers have sought external justification for their reforms. East 
Asia has provided a convenient, if not wholly accurate, source of external 
referencing. 
As elaborated in the literature review chapter, the promotion of school 
autonomy has globally operated in parallel with the promotion of school 
accountability. Comprehensive accountability systems introduced in all four 
societies have ensured that decision-making at the school level is in conformity 
with national/central frameworks and policies. However, their rationales and forms 
differ significantly from each other. In England, school accountability is designed 
to make information and data about schools publicly available, assist parents to 
make choices and encourage competition between schools (DfE, 2010). As Ehren et 
al. (2015) observe, England’s accountability system has moved away from “relying 
on schools’ self-evaluations to inform inspection assessments” to “relying on 
student achievement data” (p. 377). Meanwhile, external inspection is undertaken 
to grade, rank, categorise and label schools
44
 in order to close or sanction poor 
performers (Morris & Han, 2015, July 10). As announced by the current Secretary 
of Education, Vicky Morgan, schools categorised as ‘coasting’ or ‘inadequate’ 
schools in Ofsted inspection would be forced to turn into Academies (DfE, 2015, 
June 30). 
In contrast to England, in Singapore, the information about school 
self-evaluation and external review is not made open to the public and formal 
ranking was abandoned. Schools in Shanghai are required to upload their 
self-evaluation reports onto schools’ webpages, whereas DEBs would not release 
schools’ external review reports. There is no official ranking of schools in Shanghai 
and the title of ‘key school’ was abolished in 1997 at the junior secondary school 
stage. In Hong Kong, schools are required to make their self-evaluation reports 
                                                             
44 Since 2015, schools can be judged as ‘outstanding’, ‘good’, ‘requires improvement’, ‘inadequate’ and 
‘coasting’. 
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online but only encouraged to make external review reports accessible to the public. 
Schools in Hong Kong with a majority of Band One pupils (i.e. the most academic 
able pupils) are publicly regarded as Band One schools; however, schools are not 
officially banded. 
Rather than closing, sanctioning or converting schools, school accountability 
frameworks adopted by East Asian systems emphasise self-management and 
improvement, and the delivery of centrally-determined education goals and values. 
In particular, the accountability mechanisms in Hong Kong, such as the Basic 
Competency and Territory-wide System Assessments, are meant to inform policy. 
In all three systems, self-evaluation has been recentralised and standardised by 
education departments through prescribing the targets, domains, standards / criteria 
/ performance indicators (Tan, 2013; Ng, 2008; Law, 2007). It is noteworthy that no 
schools in all three East Asian societies have been given more autonomy because of 
their poor performance. In this sense, the policy that converts ‘coasting’ and 
‘inadequate’ schools to academies in England is observably contradicted to that of 
autonomous and independent schools in Singapore. 
Overall, the reforms of school autonomy in England and the three East Asian 
societies have involved different proportions of schools, adopted different 
approaches and served different functions. These variations have been strengthened 
by the promotion of marketisation and school accountability. The concept of 
‘school autonomy’ has been reconstructed, incorporated or re-contextualised, and 
reconceptualised to both reflect and advance the prevailing values/ideology, or as 
Schriewer and Martinez (2004) term it, the ‘socio-logic’, which has driven policy in 
each of the domestic contexts. In addition, drawing on the distinction between ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ governance in terms of school accountability proposed by Ehren et al. 
(2015), England and East Asia seem to have adopted completely different 
approaches to evaluate schools and guarantee education quality. 
 
8.4. Externalisation, convergence and policy referencing 
 
Thus far, I have compared the nature and degree of school autonomy and the 
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reforms of school autonomy in the four societies. In the light of the literature 
review, this section particularly focuses on references to East Asia in England and 
the implications of this ‘externalisation’. 
As reviewed in Chapter Four, school autonomy has been promoted in England 
since the 1980s, which has led to significant changes in the way that schools have 
been funded, governed and managed. Nevertheless, the reforms designed to 
promote school autonomy have remained intensely controversial, mainly on the 
issues of pupil attainment, social equality, democracy and privatisation (Eurydice, 
2007a; Glatter, 2012). During the 2000s, such reforms were legitimated by both 
national (e.g. City Technology Colleges and Academies) and foreign (e.g. Charter 
Schools in the US and Free Schools in Sweden) exemplars. However, negative 
results of external evaluations, in particular PISA, seemed to discredit the New 
Labour Government’s education policies and accordingly England’s old references 
mentioned above. The 2008 economic crisis verified and heightened this discourse 
of failure in terms of education quality (Forestier & Crossley, 2014). When the 
Coalition Government took power, the policy agenda of further promoting school 
autonomy called for new role models. East Asia has stood out where England has 
ended up in failure, and thus been reconstituted as a source of solutions to 
England’s education ‘crisis’. 
As discussed in the literature review, ‘world-class’ models / international 
standards have become the key ‘external point of reference’. As Waldow (2012) 
comments, “Finland would hardly have achieved the status of an educational 
utopia… if not for the OECD PISA study and the league tables generated from it” 
(p. 415). This seems also apply to East Asia. As Sellar and Lingard (2013a) argue, 
PISA has strengthened the global trend of ‘looking East’ as a form of 
‘externalisation’ of national reform agendas. OECD (2013) self-portrays its role as 
“identifying the characteristics of high performing education systems” and allowing 
“governments and educators to identify effective policies that they can then adapt to 
their local contexts” (p. 12). It seems to be disinterested and de-contextualised, and 
therefore universal and objective. However, Auld and Morris (2014) argue that “the 
‘what works’ rhetoric, far from being non-ideological, channels research into a 
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narrow vortex of ‘what matters’ on policy-makers’ terms” (p. 155). This can also be 
seen in this study: the global policy network of knowledge brokers, including the 
OECD, Policy Exchange and McKinsey, has served as a vehicle of policy in the 
management of evidence. 
Many studies, as noted in the literature review (e.g. Schriewer, 2000; Phillips 
& Ochs, 2003; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004), have identified the gap between policy 
rhetoric and policy practice in the process of EPB, and the transformation of the 
‘borrowed’ policy because of re-contextualisation. As demonstrated in this study, 
the gap and process of transformation are also evident in the construction and 
interpretation of ‘reference societies’. Through the filtration and selection of 
external evidence, an imagined East Asia has been developed and whether its 
images actually reflect anything ‘real’ is beside the point. As Waldow (2012) 
argues, “the model is in the eye of the beholder” (p. 417). What matters is that the 
symbolic power associated with this ‘social imaginary’ of high-performing 
education systems has legitimated England’s long perceived policy agendas. In this 
case, it would be more accurate to say that ‘borrowing’ from East Asia does not 
take place in England; East Asia has only been referenced discursively and 
superficially. Therefore, ‘policy referencing’ does not necessarily result from 
‘policy learning’ and result in ‘policy borrowing’. 
In the literature review, I noted that world culture theorists have recently 
employed the concept ‘loose coupling’ to explain the undeniable and profound 
differences across nations of education systems and refine the assumption of 
worldwide convergence through emphasising a specific set of education reform 
perspectives. Green and his colleagues investigated education development and 
globalisation in a group of eastern and western countries from the 1980s to 2000s 
(Green, 1999; Janmaat, Duru-Bellat, Green & Méhaut, 2013). They illustrate that 
whilst policy rhetoric and general policy objectives have tended to converge, very 
limited evidence of de facto convergence can be identified at the level of structures 
and processes. This is similar to what has been found in this study. As demonstrated 
above, although substantive reforms have been pursued under the common mantra 
of enhancing school autonomy (or education decentralisation), the rationale, scope, 
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form and nature of the formulation and implementation of policies in England and 
different East Asian societies have both varied markedly, and been specifically 
defined by their socio-political contexts. 
Furthermore, these variations are not merely a function of implementation 
issues or local variants on a common theme; as shown above, the nature, purpose 
and conceptualisations of ‘school autonomy’ are also fundamentally different in 
each of the contexts that have been studied. This has brought about a significant 
gap between the English representation and the ‘reality’ of East Asian education 
systems, which will neither result in England’s following a direction of reform 
similar to that adopted by ‘world-class’ models, nor lead to education convergence 
between England and East Asia towards international standards. However, this may 
not be a major concern, as ‘world-class’ models and international standards are, as 
has been demonstrated above, diverse in their own practices. Besides, as 
Steiner-Khamsi (2014) argues, there is no agreement what they actually mean. In 
sum, the UK Government seems to have created a ‘myth’ to mobilise the public’s 
belief and obtain their support for reforms; that is, by ‘borrowing’ selected and 
distorted features of imagined ‘world-class’ models, England can improve its 
education system to ‘world-class’. 
 
8.5. East Asia as a source of policy referencing in the West 
 
Four societies involved in this study are often seen as paradigmatically ‘East’ 
and ‘West’. Chapter Four has investigated the response to East Asia’s educational 
success in different western countries. Primarily drawing on the works of Said and 
Bhabha reviewed in the literature review, this section discusses the ‘utopian’ and 
‘dystopian’ images of East Asian education and the power/knowledge relationship 
embedded, which further explores the essence of ‘East-to-West’ EPB. It is 
noteworthy here that, the following discussion specifically focuses on the 
‘East/West’ dichotomisation which has emerged in the global discourse of EPB. As 
was shown earlier, English policy-makers often reference to East Asia as their 
inspiration for reform. In addition, in comparison with Said’s Orientalism, the 
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portrayal of the ‘East’ seems to have developed new and generally more positive 
features in recent years. Therefore, the terms ‘East’ and ‘West’, albeit problematic, 
are retained. However, as argued above, there are significant variations among East 
Asian societies and the ‘East’ cannot be simply homogenised as an identical 
referencing unit. 
 
‘Utopia’/‘dystopia’; competitor and threat 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Four, contrary to Said’s ‘Orientalism’, there has 
emerged a reverse description of the ‘East’ as an advanced, developed and desirable 
model – a ‘utopia’ of education – in England, the US and Australia, which has 
provided ‘what is wanted’ and justified reform initiatives to improve their own 
education systems. In contrast, the stereotypical images of ‘dystopian’ East Asian 
education systems have been retained in Germany and accordingly used to 
demonstrate ‘what is not wanted’. Notwithstanding different ‘social imaginaries’, 
western countries studied have shared the dichotomisation of ‘East/West’ or, more 
precisely, the tradition of ‘Orientalising’ the ‘East’ as the ‘other’ (Said, 2003). 
Meanwhile, as examined earlier, these western countries commonly see East 
Asia as the main competitor in the global economic race. The associated anxiety 
and fear can be partly explained in the light of Bhabha’s (1994) concept 
‘ambivalence’. According to him, the coloniser has never ceased to be anxious 
about its capacity to maintain the colonial authority. In the case of East Asia, the 
term ‘yellow peril’, coined in the late 19th century, is one of the oldest and most 
persuasive phrases in the western tradition. As Marchetti (1994) defines, it 
“combines racist terror of alien cultures, sexual anxieties and the belief that the 
West will be overpowered and enveloped by the irresistible, dark, occult forces of 
the East” (p. 2). Tchen and Yeats (2014) emphasise that, rather than 
“misinformation” of and a “figment of an overactive imagination”, it is, 
 
“…a structured tradition of concepts and practices hard-wired into the political 
culture of Western enlightenment modernity itself. Globalised especially by 
British and Anglo American expansionism, its patterning is a relational and 
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recurrent process of identity formation and disidentitfication.” (p. 357) 
 
A good example reflecting the British fear of China was the creation and 
popularisation of a fictional character ‘Dr. Fu Manchu’ for a period of over 70 years 
from the 1910s. He was featured as an evil criminal genius and his criminal 
activities included drug trading and white slavery (Frayling, 2014). Facing the 
emerging ‘Asian Century’, the ‘Fu Manchu’ syndrome seems to have continued to 
date. For example, as Peerenboom (2008) points out, China is sometimes assumed 
to be “a brutal, anachronistic and authoritarian regime, a threat to geo-stability and to 
the economies of the industrial world” (p. 2). In the recent trend of ‘East-to-West’ 
EPB, the ‘Orientalised East’ described by Said as ‘childish, feminine, undeveloped 
and inferior’ has no long prevailed in the West. Instead, as Rizvi (2014, October 28) 
argues, some aspects of the old Asian culture, such as hard working, discipline, 
collectivism and strategic intelligence, have deemed to be attributable to its 
achievements in education and competitiveness in economy, which worries the 
‘West’. 
Perhaps, for those aforementioned western countries, the acknowledgement 
that East Asia has ‘beaten’ them has not just hastened the worries of being left 
behind, but also eroded their sense of-superiority. This appears to be similar to what 
Rappleye (2007) observes: in the 1970s and 1980s, Japan, as an IEA star and 
economic juggernaut, was viewed by the US as a model worthy of emulating and a 
challenge that needed to be confronted. In facing a loss of supremacy, Germany has 
held its strong beliefs in the excellent European representative – Finland 
(Takayama et al., 2013). Anglo-Saxon countries have expressed their 
disappointment and shock about their poor performance compared to the ‘East’, 
because, as the title of Friedman and Mandelbaum’s (2011) books suggests45, That 
Used to be Us. Further, the sense of superiority vis-à-vis the ‘East’ that is embodied 
in the culture identity of the West seems to have been used to manipulate the 
public’s emotions in debates about education performance and reform. 
 
                                                             
45 This book asserts that unless the US recognises the challenges and opportunities of globalisation, it will fall 
behind in the competition with East Asia. 
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Imagining the ‘other’: the production of knowledge about East Asian 
education 
 
Said (2003) argues that “the Orientalist, poet or scholar… makes the Orient 
speak, describes the Orient, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West” (pp. 
20-21) and through which the ‘West’ restructures and maintains its political, 
intellectual, cultural and moral power over the ‘East’. As discussed in the literature 
review, instead of individuals, the knowledge of ‘what works’ in ‘world-class’ 
education systems generally and East Asian education systems specifically has been 
increasingly provided by the global policy network.  
In an analogy to “missionaries of our time”, Barnett and Finnemore (1999) 
argue that various international organisations are not impersonal systems or 
structures, but rather as “purposive actors” (Grek, 2009, p. 24), “armed with a 
notion of progress, an idea of how to create a better life, and some understanding of 
the conversion process” (p. 712). Some of them play a role as the ‘lender’ of 
education policies, programmes and institutions, both conceptually and financially, 
through their loan conditions and policies (Steiner-Khamsi, 2002). Among them, 
the OECD has become one of the most powerful and influential ‘missionaries’ and 
‘lenders’ in England and many other countries. It has increasingly impacted on 
national education governance through a series of league tables; through its 
indicator projects collaborated with World Bank and UNESCO; and through its 
national and thematic policy reviews (Lingard & Grek 2007; McGann, 2008; Grek, 
2009). 
Dating back to the 1960s, 18 European countries plus the USA and Canada 
found the OECD in order to provide a platform for seeking answers to common 
economic problems and coordinate transnationally. The post-war period witnessed 
an expansion of the membership to include Eastern Europe; and co-operation with 
non-member economies and civil society organisations. As Sellar and Lingard 
(2013b) argue, this process can also be seen as a promotion of “the emergent 
hegemony of neoliberalism and a global capitalist economy” (p. 715). Currently, 
the OECD has 34 member economies that commit to liberal democracy, human 
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rights and market economies; most of them are high-incoming western economies 
with high levels on human development index and a Christian religious background. 
Carroll and Kellow (2011) argue that the OECD is characterised by an 
intergovernmental structure, which enables it to exert soft power through 
developing an ‘epistemic community’ of politicians, bureaucrats and policy experts 
in member economies. 
Among all the policy-oriented works of the OECD, PISA has been accepted as 
the major tool providing reliable and robust statistical data and analysis of 
education and economic performance in national settings (Grek, 2008). As 
announced on the OECD website, there will be more than 70 participants in PISA 
2015. The design, implementation and data analysis of PISA are delegated to an 
international consortium of research and educational institutions led by the 
Australian Council for Educational Research. Alongside the release of PISA results, 
the OECD also publishes a series of context questionnaires and reports in which 
features of ‘world-class’ education systems, including East Asia, are identified and 
elaborated. These outcomes aim to help the OECD economies better locate their 
education development, support or criticise existing education policies, improve 
their education systems and, consequently, succeed in global socio-economic 
competition – ‘beating’ East Asia. In essence, East Asian education systems are 
instrumentally reduced to a set of core features which can help the ‘West’ regain its 
authority/superiority and ‘surpass’ the ‘East’. 
However, as argued in this study, the extent to which these features reflect the 
‘reality’ of East Asia education system can be highly questioned. The 
western-centred policy network has defined the criteria and measurement of 
‘world-class’, ranked education systems, and explained the factors attributable to 
high performance. Through working closely with national policy-makers, this set of 
‘world-class’ knowledge has gained superiority to other narratives. Even in the 
academia, Takayama (2011) criticises that academic knowledge production has 
been predominated by “near one-directional flow of intellectual influence from the 
western metropoles to ‘other’ peripheries, or the ‘world system’ of academic 
knowledge” (p. 450). The power/knowledge relationship underlying and 
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maintaining Said’s ‘Orientalism’ seems to have continued to characterise 
‘East-to-West’ EPB. The ‘reality’ of East Asia largely depends on how it is 
social-imaginarily represented, especially by the powerful West. In this sense, 
‘East-to-West’ EPB is discursive and imagined. 
Notwithstanding, as Buruma and Margalit (2004) argue, the stereotyped 
‘dehumanising’ images of the ‘West’, conceptualised as ‘Occidentalism’, have also 
long been painted by Asians and other non-westerners. The rhetoric of ‘global 
competition’ and an associated anxiety about ‘lagging behind’, intensified by the 
memory of colonisation and imperial wars, has dominated the discourse of national 
development in East Asian societies as well. Key policy documents in Hong Kong 
(e.g. Learning to Learn, 2000), Singapore (e.g. Teach Less Learn More, 2004) and 
China (e.g. the 2010-2020 National Outline, 2010) have highlighted that the main 
task of their education systems is cultivating more and better talents to enable them 
to succeed in global markets and outperform their competitors. In particular, 
China’s national achievements in the competition with advanced western countries 
in various fields have been politically interpreted as the defeat of the West, which 
wipes out of the hundred years of humiliation imposed by the western imperialists 
and demonstrates the power of China and its people. 
 
Overall, the ‘East’ is ‘Orientalised’ as the ‘other’ opposed to the ‘West’. 
Unlike its old face as described by Said, in some western countries, East Asia has 
been portrayed as possessing the world’s best education systems. Recognised as a 
competitor and threat, high-performing East Asia appears to have generated 
challenge and anxiety/fear. In the globalisation context, a western-centred network 
dominates which represents East Asia to other nations; in this sense, there seems no 
genuine ‘East-to-West’ EPB. Nevertheless, English policy-makers still attempt to 
gain legitimacy for their policy agendas through mythologising that, by emulating 
this represented model, the unsatisfactory English education system can compete 
successfully against East Asia in the global market. 
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8.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated and explained the gap between the English 
representation of school autonomy in East Asian education systems and the ‘reality’ 
perceived domestically. Overall, the level of school autonomy in England is much 
higher than that in Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai; and in these four societies, 
school autonomy granted to different groups of schools serves different functions. It 
has also compared the models of school autonomy in the three East Asian societies, 
and demonstrated that there are significant variations within this imagined 
homogeneous ‘reference society’. So far, all the research questions have been 
addressed. 
On this basis, this study has argued that the degree and nature of school 
autonomy and the rationale, scope, form and nature of reforms of school autonomy 
are essentially varied and determined by the prevailing socio-political priorities in 
each context. More specifically, in Hong Kong, school autonomy has been used to 
strengthen the role of elite/fee-paying schools; in Singapore, it was used to 
reinforce meritocracy by providing greater autonomy to those schools catering for 
the academically most able pupils; and, in Shanghai, the priority was to devolve 
fiscal responsibility from the central to the local. In marked contrast: autonomy in 
England was driven by a Libertarian desire to reduce the role of the state and to 
encourage diversity and competition amongst and between all schools. As Gibb 
(2014) explained, the reforms designed to increase autonomy “reaffirmed” his 
belief that “good government does not improve public services. It enables public 
services to improve themselves”. 
Rather than engaging in policy borrowing, the UK Government has selectively 
referenced policies in East Asia in an attempt to legitimate its long preferred policy 
agendas. In this case, global education convergence, or ‘international standards’ and 
‘world-class’ models, merely exists at the rhetorical level. Put different, the four 
societies studied have gone down divergent routes to a generic theme which has 
been reconceptualised to respectively fit their own ‘socio-logic’. ‘Looking-East’ for 
‘international standards’ and ‘world-class’ models, which has appeared as a reverse 
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form of EPB, does not necessarily lead to a better western understanding of the 
‘East’. In fact, the knowledge of East Asian education systems has been 
manipulated by a western-centred global policy network, which does not result in 
education policy following the flow of ‘East-to-West’. In short, ‘East-to-West’ EPB 
is discursive and imagined. The representation, as a social-imaginary, seems to 
overwhelm the ‘reality’ and is politically used to gain the public’s support for 
preferred education reforms. 
One continuing concern in comparative education is ‘whether a country can 
learn from other countries’ experience’. Perhaps answering this significant question 
should be on the premise of clarifying ‘does a country really want to learn from 
elsewhere’.
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Appendix 1. Conceptual framework for school autonomy - grading benchmarks  
 
Organisation and governance 
 
Area of 
school 
management 
Degree of school autonomy 
No autonomy 
(0) 
Operation –  
strong control (1) 
Operation –  
weak control (2) 
Policy and operation – 
strong control (3) 
Policy and operation – 
weak control (4) 
Full autonomy 
(5) 
Organisation 
structure and 
functions 
Determine by a 
high authority; 
schools cannot 
make any changes 
Structure is 
determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools may 
prescribe 
functions of 
departments, 
approved by a 
higher authority 
Structure is 
determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools may 
prescribe 
functions of 
departments in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued 
by a higher 
authority  
Determined by 
schools, but need to be 
approved by a higher 
authority 
Determined by 
schools in compliance 
with guidelines issued 
by a higher authority 
Freely 
determined by 
schools 
Governance 
mechanism  
Governed by a 
higher authority 
Governance 
framework is 
determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools are 
responsible for 
daily operation, 
Governance 
framework is 
determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools are 
responsible for 
daily operation in 
School 
self-governance, but 
key decisions need to 
be approved by a 
higher authority 
School 
self-governance in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by a 
higher authority 
Freely school 
self-governance  
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approved by a 
higher authority 
compliance with 
guidelines issued 
by a higher 
authority 
Types of 
schools  
Determined by a 
higher authority 
 
Determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools can 
convert, approved 
by a higher  
Determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools can 
convert in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued 
by a higher 
authority 
Determined by 
schools, but need to be 
approved by a higher 
authority 
Determined by 
schools, in compliance 
with guidelines issued 
by a higher authority 
Freely 
determined by 
schools  
 
Finance 
 
Area Degrees of autonomy 
No autonomy  
(0) 
Operation –  
strong control (1) 
Operation –  
weak control (2) 
Policy and operation – 
strong control (3) 
Policy and operation – 
weak control (4) 
Full autonomy 
(5) 
Source(s) of 
funding 
Only funded 
by the 
government 
Funded by the 
government; 
schools can 
receive other 
funding, approved 
by a higher 
authority 
Funded by the 
government; schools 
can receive other 
funding in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Determined by 
schools, but need to 
be approved by a 
higher authority 
Determined by 
schools in compliance 
with guidelines issued 
by a higher authority 
Freely 
determined by 
schools  
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Expenditure Determined 
and managed 
by a higher 
authority 
Determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools are 
responsible for 
daily expenditure, 
approved by a 
higher authority 
Determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools are 
responsible for daily 
expenditure in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Determined and 
managed by schools, 
but need to be 
approved by a higher 
authority 
Determined and 
managed by schools 
in compliance with 
guidelines issued by a 
higher authority 
Freely 
determined and 
managed by 
schools  
Land, 
buildings and 
facilities 
Provided and 
maintained by 
a higher 
authority 
Provided by a 
higher authority; 
daily maintained 
by schools 
 
A higher authority 
provides land and 
standard buildings 
and facilities, but 
schools can purchase 
above-standard 
buildings and 
facilities with their 
own budgets; 
maintained by 
schools   
Purchased and 
maintained by 
schools, but need to 
be approved 
Purchased and 
maintained by schools 
in compliance with 
guidelines 
Freely 
purchased and 
maintained by 
schools  
Financial 
report and its 
availability 
Written by a 
higher 
authority; 
(Not) released 
by a higher 
authority 
The report is 
written by schools 
according to 
prescriptive 
format and 
audited by a 
The report is written 
by schools and 
audited by a higher 
authority; the 
availability of the 
report is suggested 
The report is written 
by schools and 
submitted to a higher 
authority 
The report is written 
by schools in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by a 
higher authority 
Freely (not) 
written/released 
by schools 
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higher authority; 
the availability of 
the report is 
determined by a 
higher authority 
by a higher authority 
 
Curriculum, teaching and examinations 
 
Area Degree of autonomy 
No autonomy  
(0) 
Operational –  
strong control (1) 
Operational –  
weak control (2) 
Policy and operational 
– strong control (3) 
Policy and operational 
– weak control (4) 
Full autonomy 
(5) 
Textbooks Determined by 
a higher 
authority 
Textbooks are 
determined by a 
higher authority; 
deviation needs to 
be approved 
A list of approved 
textbooks from 
which schools may 
choose 
Textbooks are 
determined by schools, 
but need to be approved 
by a higher authority 
Textbooks are 
determined by 
schools, in compliance 
with guidelines issued 
by a higher authority 
Freely 
determined by 
schools 
Subjects Determined by 
a higher 
authority 
Subjects are 
determined by a 
higher authority; 
deviation needs to 
be approved 
A list of permitted 
subjects from which 
schools may choose 
Subjects are determined 
by schools, but need to 
be approved by a higher 
authority 
Subjects are 
determined by 
schools, in compliance 
with guidelines issued 
by a higher authority 
Freely 
determined by 
schools freely 
Content of 
subjects and 
curriculum 
delivery 
The content of 
subjects and 
how to deliver 
them are 
The content of 
subjects is 
prescribed by a 
higher authority; 
The content of 
subjects is 
prescribed by a 
higher authority; 
The content of subjects 
and how to deliver them 
are determined by 
schools, but need to be 
The content of 
subjects and how to 
deliver them are 
determined by schools 
The content of 
subjects and 
how to deliver 
them are 
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prescribed by a 
higher 
authority 
schools may 
determine how to 
deliver them, 
approved by a 
higher authority  
schools may 
determine how to 
deliver them in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
approved by a higher 
authority 
in compliance with 
guidelines issued by a 
higher authority 
determined by 
schools freely 
School-based 
curriculum 
development 
No 
school-based 
curriculum 
development 
Identical to the 
national/ 
mainstream 
curriculum 
Complementary to 
the national/ 
mainstream 
curriculum 
Schools create new 
curricula, but need to be 
approved issued by a 
higher authority 
Schools create new 
curricula in 
compliance with 
guidelines 
Schools create 
new curricula 
freely 
Curriculum 
time 
allocation 
Prescribed for 
schools by a 
higher 
authority 
The number of 
periods for each 
subject is 
stipulated; 
curriculum 
calendar
46
 is 
made by schools, 
approved by a 
higher authority 
The number of 
periods for each 
subject is stipulated; 
curriculum calendar 
is made by schools 
in compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
The number of periods 
for each subject is 
determined by schools, 
but need to be approved 
by a higher authority 
The number of periods 
for each subject is 
determined by 
schools, in compliance 
with guidelines issued 
by a higher authority 
Freely 
determined by 
schools 
School 
calendar 
(terms and 
Determined by 
a higher 
authority 
School terms and 
days are 
stipulated by a 
School terms and 
days are stipulated 
by a higher 
Both school terms and 
days are determined by 
schools, but need to be 
Both school terms and 
days are determined 
by schools, in 
Determined by 
schools freely  
                                                             
46 Curriculum calendar means the arrangement of periods for subjects. 
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days) higher authority; 
school calendar
47
 
is made by 
schools, approved 
by a higher 
authority 
authority; school 
calendar is made by 
schools in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
approved by a higher 
authority 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by a 
higher authority 
Entrance 
exams 
Centrally 
designed and 
organised by a 
higher 
authority 
Exams are 
centrally designed 
by a higher 
authority but 
organised by 
schools, 
monitored by a 
higher authority  
Exams are centrally 
designed by a higher 
authority but 
organised by schools 
in compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Exams are designed and 
organised by schools, 
monitored by a higher 
authority 
Exams are designed 
and organised by 
schools, in compliance 
with guidelines issued 
by a higher authority 
Freely 
designed and 
organised by 
schools 
 
Teachers 
 
Area Degree of autonomy 
No autonomy  
(0) 
Operation –  
strong control (1) 
Operation –  
weak control (2) 
Policy and operation 
– strong control (3) 
Policy and operation 
– weak control (4) 
Full autonomy 
(5) 
Qualification 
and training 
A teaching 
certificate and 
teacher training 
are compulsory; 
A teaching 
certificate and 
teacher training are 
compulsory; teacher 
A teaching 
certificate is 
compulsory, but can 
be issued without 
Qualification 
requirements are 
determined by 
schools, but need to 
Qualification 
requirements are 
determined by 
schools, in 
Qualification 
requirements 
are determined 
by schools 
                                                             
47 School calendar means the weekly and annual arrangement of lessons and activities. 
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teacher training 
is centrally 
provided 
 
training is not 
centrally provided 
training 
 
be approved a higher 
authority 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
freely 
Appointment 
and dismissal  
Selected, 
appointed and 
dismissed by a 
higher authority 
Contract is signed 
with and terminated 
by a higher 
authority; schools 
may selected 
qualified candidates, 
approved by a higher 
authority 
Contract is signed 
with and terminated 
by a higher 
authority; schools 
may selected 
qualified candidates, 
in compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Selected, appointed 
and dismissed by 
schools, but need to 
be approved by a 
higher authority 
 
Selected, appointed 
and dismissed by 
schools, in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Selected, 
appointed and 
dismissed by 
schools freely  
Continuing 
professional 
development  
Continuing 
professional 
development is 
compulsory;  
training courses 
are provided by 
a higher 
authority 
Continuing 
professional 
development is 
compulsory; a list of 
recognised training 
courses are provided 
from which teachers 
and schools may 
choose 
Continuing 
professional 
development is 
compulsory; teachers 
and schools may 
choose training 
courses in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
The requirements for 
continuing 
professional 
development and 
training courses are 
determined by 
schools, but need to 
be approved by a 
higher authority 
The requirements for 
continuing 
professional 
development and 
training courses are 
determined by 
schools, in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
The 
requirements 
for continuing 
professional 
development 
and training 
courses are 
determined by 
schools freely 
Appraisal  Designed and 
conducted by a 
Appraisal is 
designed by a higher 
Appraisal is 
designed by a higher 
Appraisal is 
designed and 
Appraisal is 
designed and 
Freely 
designed and 
277 
higher authority authority, 
school-based 
evaluation is 
validated by a higher 
authority  
authority, 
school-based 
evaluation is 
conducted in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
conducted by 
schools, but need to 
be validated by a 
higher authority 
conducted by 
schools, in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
conducted by 
schools  
Promotion Determined by a 
higher authority 
Criteria for 
promotion is 
determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools may propose 
the promotion list, 
but need to be 
approved by a higher 
authority 
Criteria for 
promotion is 
determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools may propose 
the promotion list in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Promotion is 
determined by 
schools, but need to 
be validated by a 
higher authority 
Promotion is 
determined by 
schools, in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Freely 
determined by 
schools 
Pay (salary 
and bonuses) 
Determined by a 
higher authority 
 
Salary scale is 
determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools may 
determine bonuses, 
approved by a higher 
authority 
Salary scale is 
determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools may 
determine bonuses, 
in compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Determined by 
schools, but need to 
be approved by a 
higher authority 
Determined by 
schools, in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Freely 
determined by 
schools  
Legal status Teachers are Teachers are not Teachers are not Terms and Terms and Teachers are 
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civil servants civil servants, but 
they are subject to 
civil servants’ terms 
and conditions 
civil servants, but 
they are subject to 
civil servants’ 
conditions (or terms) 
conditions for 
teachers are 
determined by 
schools, but need to 
be approved by a 
higher authority 
conditions for 
teachers are 
determined by 
schools, in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
private 
employees, 
schools are free 
to determine 
terms and 
conditions 
 
Accountability 
 
Area Degree of autonomy 
No autonomy  
(0) 
Operation –  
strong control (1) 
Operation –  
weak control (2) 
Policy and operation 
– strong control (3) 
Policy and operation 
– weak control (4) 
Full autonomy 
(5) 
Goals and 
standards 
Determined by a 
higher authority  
Overall goals and 
standards prescribed 
by a higher 
authority; schools set 
their own goals and 
standards, approved 
by a higher authority 
Overall goals and 
standards prescribed 
by a higher 
authority; schools set 
their own goals and 
standards in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority  
Determined by 
schools, but need to 
be approved by a 
higher authority 
Determined by 
schools, in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Freely 
determined by 
schools  
Evaluation 
and 
inspection 
Evaluated and 
inspected by a 
higher authority 
The system is 
designed by a higher 
authority; schools 
The system is 
designed by a higher 
authority; schools 
Evaluated by 
schools, but need to 
be validated by a 
Evaluated by schools, 
in compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
Freely 
evaluated by 
schools  
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conduct 
self-evaluation 
which is validated by 
a higher authority 
conduct 
self-evaluation in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
higher authority a higher authority 
Annual 
report 
Written by a 
higher authority 
The format is 
stipulated by a 
higher authority; the 
report is written by 
schools and 
scrutinised by a 
higher authority 
The format is 
stipulated by a 
higher authority; the 
report is written by 
schools 
Schools determine 
the format and write 
the report, but need 
to be scrutinised by 
a higher authority 
Schools determine 
the format and write 
the report, in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Schools freely 
determine the 
format  
Availability 
of 
information 
(Not) released 
by a higher 
authority 
What to be made 
available to whom 
are determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools can 
determine how and 
where to release that 
information, 
approved by a higher 
authority 
What to be made 
available to whom 
are determined by a 
higher authority; 
schools can 
determine how and 
where to release that 
information, in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Determined by 
schools, but need to 
be approved by 
schools 
Determined by 
schools in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
(Not) released 
by a higher 
authority 
Pupil admission and external relations 
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Area Degree of autonomy 
No autonomy  
(0) 
Operation –  
strong control (1) 
Operation –  
weak control (2) 
Policy and operation 
– strong control (3) 
Policy and operation 
– weak control (4) 
Full autonomy 
(5) 
Pupil 
admission 
Pupils are 
centrally 
allocated by a 
higher authority  
A central allocation 
system is determined 
by a higher 
authority; within this 
system, schools are 
allowed to admit a 
small proportion of 
pupils based on their 
own discretion, but 
need to be approved 
by a higher authority 
A central allocation 
system is determined 
by a higher 
authority; within this 
system, schools are 
allowed to admit a 
small proportion of 
pupils based on their 
own discretion in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Schools determine 
student admission, 
but needs to be 
approved by a 
higher authority 
Schools determine 
student admission, in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Schools freely 
admit pupils  
Relationships 
with other 
schools and 
businesses 
Determined by a 
higher authority 
A series of 
programmes 
provided by a higher 
authority through 
which schools may 
set up relationships 
with other schools 
and business 
A list of schools and 
businesses provided 
by a higher authority 
from which schools 
may choose 
Determined by 
schools, but need to 
be approved by a 
higher authority 
Determined by 
schools, in 
compliance with 
guidelines issued by 
a higher authority 
Freely 
determined by 
schools 
Level of 
parents’ 
No involvement Low involvement, 
schools can only 
Schools can invite 
parents’ to 
Schools can involve 
parents in school 
Schools can be run 
by parents 
Schools can be 
set up by 
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involvement  inform parents of 
pupils’ performance 
participate in school 
activities and events 
management parents 
Relationship 
with mass 
media (or 
interview 
requests in 
general) 
Not allowed Who teachers and 
principals can talk to 
and what topic they 
can talk about are 
stipulated, approved 
and supervised by a 
higher authority 
Who teachers and 
principals can talk to 
and what topic they 
can talk about are 
stipulated by a 
higher authority 
Determined by 
schools, but the 
policies need to be 
approved 
Determined by 
schools in 
compliance with 
regulations 
Freely 
determined by 
schools  
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Appendix 2. List of key interview questions 
 
School task area Interview question(s) 
Textbooks Who decide which textbooks are used in your school? 
Subjects Can school make the decision about which subjects should be 
taught? How about the allocation of curriculum time for each 
subject? 
Timetable Who make the timetable about the beginning and ending of 
school terms and days and the timing for school events and 
examinations? 
Content How do teachers in your school plan and deliver their lessons? Is 
there any guide that they should follow or reference to?  
School-based 
curriculum 
Does your school have school-based curriculum? Who design it? 
How is school-based curriculum delivered and evaluated? How 
much time is allocated to school-based curriculum? 
Exams What are the exams that your pupils sit for? Who design and 
organise those exams? 
Qualification of 
staff 
What are the requirements of becoming a teacher? (Is teaching 
certificate compulsory for entering teaching profession?) Who 
determine these requirements? 
In-service 
training 
Is in-service training compulsory for teachers? Who decide the 
time, form and content of training? Who provide training 
courses? 
Appointment and 
dismissal 
Who select teachers for your school? Who sign contact with 
teachers? If a teacher is not suitable for his/her position, can 
school terminate the contact? 
Appraisal Who appraise teachers? What are the criteria and who design the 
criteria? Can school promote/reward high-performing teachers? 
Structure of 
school 
What is the organisational structure in your school? Who make 
the decision over that? 
Differentiation 
(streaming and 
setting) 
What is the type of your school? Can school convert to another 
type of school? 
Decision-making 
structure 
Who make the decision over school management? Who is in 
charge of school daily operation? 
Source of 
finances 
What are the sources of funding? 
Management of 
finances 
How does your school manage the funding? 
Responsibility for 
buildings and 
facilities 
Who provide land, buildings and facilities? Who is responsible 
for daily maintenance? 
Information 
system 
What and where the information about school is released to the 
public? Who decide that?  
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Salary of staff Who decide teachers’ salary? 
Legal status of 
staff 
Whether teachers are civil servants? 
Recruitment of 
pupils 
How does your school recruit pupils? 
Competition 
between schools 
How do you describe the competition between your school and 
other schools? 
Relationship with 
other schools and 
business 
Can you establish partnership with other schools and business? 
Do you need to ask for permission from higher authorities? 
Parental 
involvement 
Can parents involve in school management and activities? 
Goals and 
standards 
What are the mission, ethos and goals of your school? Who 
decide them? 
Evaluation How is your school evaluated? What are the domains and criteria 
evaluated? Who is responsible for determining the criteria 
Availability of 
evaluation results 
What the information from evaluations is made available to the 
public by whom (schools or inspection authorities)? 
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Appendix 3. List of interviewees 
 
Name Society Description 
C Hong 
Kong 
Principal of an aided school managed by a large sponsoring 
body. 
P Hong 
Kong 
Principal of an ordinary DSS school managed by a large 
sponsoring body. Before that, he was a principal of an aided 
school for several years. 
F Hong 
Kong 
Scholar from a Hong Kong university, who is specialist in 
school management, leadership and accountability. 
R Hong 
Kong 
Scholar from a Hong Kong university, who is specialist in 
education policy, school management and parental 
involvement in school education. 
H Hong 
Kong 
Recently retired principal of an aided school, currently 
teaching school leadership in a Hong Kong university. 
K Hong 
Kong 
Experienced education journalist, who has been living and 
working in Hong Kong for more than 20 years. 
Q Hong 
Kong 
Principal of an aided school managed by a small sponsoring 
body. 
A Hong 
Kong 
Scholar from a Hong Kong university, who is specialist in 
curriculum studies and comparative education 
Z Hong 
Kong 
Principal of a recently-converted DSS school managed by a 
large sponsoring body; the school used to be an aided 
school 
B Hong 
Kong 
Recently retired principal of an aided school, currently 
teaching school leadership and management in a Hong 
Kong university. 
X Hong 
Kong 
Scholar from a Hong Kong university, who is specialist in 
school management, leadership and team work 
W Singapore Policy-maker 
L Singapore Vice principal of a government school 
J Singapore Scholar from a Singapore university, who is specialist in 
school management, leadership and policy studies 
G Singapore Scholar from a Singapore university, who is specialist in 
school management and accountability 
M Singapore Scholar used to work in a Singapore university and recently 
re-located, who is specialist in teacher education and school 
leadership 
S Singapore Scholar from a Singapore university, who is specialist in 
education and development, teacher education and policy 
studies 
Y Shanghai Scholar from a Chinese university, who is specialist in 
education policy and change and curriculum studies 
O Shanghai Principal of a prestigious government school  
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E Shanghai Head of department of a bureau-sponsored people-run 
school 
U Shanghai Principal of a government school with specialist 
N Shanghai Principal of a government school with specialist 
I Shanghai Principal of a low-performing government school 
V Shanghai Scholar from a Chinese university, who is specialist in 
school management, leadership and accountability 
D Shanghai Vice-principal of a prestigious government school 
T Shanghai Recently retired vice-principal of a prestigious government 
school with specialist 
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Appendix 4. Information sheet 
       INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Study Title: Imagining school autonomy in high-performing educational systems: East 
Asia as a source of policy referencing in England 
Researcher: Yun You  
       
Please read this information carefully before deciding to take part in this research. If 
you are happy to participate you will be asked to sign a consent form. 
 
Who is the researcher? 
My name is Yun You. I am doing my PhD research at the Institute of Education, 
University of London. This information sheet tells you about my research. If you have 
any questions about the research before, during or after taking part please contact me 
on: yyou@ioe.ac.uk 
 
What is the research about? 
This research focuses on educational policy borrowing from East Asia to England. 
During recent decades, education systems in East Asian societies, such as Hong Kong, 
Singapore, China and South Korea, have been described as the best education systems 
in the world and cited as the ‘inspiration’ for education reforms in England, due to 
their students’ high performance in a series of international examinations such as PISA 
and TIMSS. Based on the key features of East Asian education systems identified by 
the UK government, the reforms of school governance were proposed in the 2010 UK 
White Paper. The main concern of my research is to determine whether the key 
features of East Asian education systems identified by the UK government accord with 
those identified within East Asia. Therefore, I would like to seek your 
understanding/perception of the school governance in East Asia based on your 
background.  
 
Who will be in the research? 
I would like to interview junior secondary school principals from Hong Kong, 
Shanghai and Singapore, and scholars who are familiar with the education systems in 
East Asia. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you would like to take part in the research you will attend one interview by yourself 
which will last about one hour. This will take part in the school or any place you prefer. 
In the interview I will ask you questions on topics such as curriculum, teaching, 
teacher qualification and examination. The interviewer will be myself and it will be 
voice recorded.  
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Will my participation be confidential? 
The only people who will have direct access to your name and your information will 
be myself. In line with the Institute of Education, University of London ethics policy, 
all the information you give me and your name will remain confidential to all other 
people. The information will be stored on password protected computers and in any 
written or verbal presentation of the research your name and school/group name will 
remain anonymous.   
 
What happens if I change my mind? 
If you change your mind about participating in the research you have the right to stop 
and withdraw from the research at any point.  
 
Could there be problems for you if you take part? 
I do not expect you to have any problems if you take part. There may be some topics 
you do not want to discuss and that is fine. If you have any problems with my research, 
please call me or email me immediately. 
 
What will happen after the interview? 
If you are interested, I would like to send you the interview record and final findings 
when I finish my thesis. 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. 
 
Yun You 
Email: yyou@ioe.ac.uk 
Address: 20 Bedford Way, London, UK, WC1H 0AL 
Mobile: xxxxx 
Department of Lifelong and Comparative Education 
Faculty of Policy and Society 
Institute of Education, University of London 
This research is supervised by Professor Paul Morris 
Email: P.Morris@ioe.ac.uk 
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Appendix 5. Consent form 
 
CONSENT FORM  
 
 
 
Study title: Imagining school autonomy in 
high-performing educational systems: East Asia as a source of policy 
referencing in England  
Researcher name: Yun You  
Department of Lifelong and Comparative Education 
Faculty of Policy and Society 
Email: yyou@ioe.ac.uk 
Mobile: (44)7412353280/(86)13810493012 
 
Please initial the box(es) if you agree with the statement(s):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Protection 
I understand that information collected about me during my participation in this 
study will be stored on a password protected computer and that this information 
will only be used for the purpose of this study. All files containing any personal 
data will be made anonymous. 
 
Name of participant (print name)………… (Signature)…………………  
 
Date………………… 
 
Name of researcher (print name)………… (Signature)……………….. 
 
Date……………………  
I have read and understood the information sheet and have had 
the opportunity to ask questions about the study. 
I agree to be interviewed and agree for the data to be used for the 
purpose of this study 
I understand that my participation in this research is voluntary and 
that I could withdraw from the research at any time without my 
legal rights being affected.  
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